PREFACE

In 1873 George Rawlinson published his Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy. Since that time no other extensive study devoted to Parthia has been written, although Rawlinson's admirable work did not include all of the classical references and obviously does not include the new source material which has since appeared. Because of these facts it was felt advisable to insert in this volume extensive references, both old and new, to the source material for the political history. The large amount of evidence for the cultural history of Parthia from Dura-Europus and Seleucia on the Tigris now in press and in preparation makes discussion of the cultural aspects inadvisable at present. This must be reserved for some future work on Parthia where the necessity of less documentation will allow of fuller interpretation of the political side of Parthia and the presentation of the new cultural material.

The present study was begun in 1927 as a dissertation at the University of Illinois under the direction of Professor A. T. Olmstead, now Oriental Institute Professor of Oriental History in the University of Chicago. It has been rewritten more than once since the writer came to the University of Chicago in 1929—a task which has been interrupted at intervals by
four seasons of excavating in the Near East. The work owes much more than appears in the footnotes to the advice and support of Professor Olmstead, who has furnished encouragement, friendly criticism, and references on many obscure points.

Dr. Robert H. McDowell of the University of Michigan by voluminous letters written in the press of field work and by frequent conversations has been of great assistance. The manuscript was read at Seleucia by Professor Clark Hopkins of the same institution, and many of his suggestions are embodied in the text. Professor Arthur E. R. Boak, also of Michigan, read through the galleys and gave freely of his time during the preparation of the manuscript.

For aid in specialized fields Dr. G. G. Cameron, Dr. Raymond A. Bowman, and Dr. Waldo H. Dubberstein, all of the Oriental Institute, were of great assistance; and many other members of the staff have at one time or another rendered aid.

The painstaking work of Dr. T. G. Allen, one of the editors of the Institute's publications, has eliminated many inconsistencies and infelicities of English. In the final preparation of the manuscript Miss Elizabeth Stefanski has been of great assistance. Members of the Chinese section of the Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures have kindly helped in standardizing the spelling of Chinese names. Both my wife and the editorial staff of the Oriental Institute have spent many hours in working on the manu-

script and in proofreading and indexing. The librarians of the University of Illinois and of the Oriental Institute and the Classics Library at the University of Chicago have been very helpful.

Finally, the whole project was made possible by the late Professor James Henry Breasted, first director of the Oriental Institute, who was never too busy to hear and encourage a young scholar, and by his successor, Professor John A. Wilson, who together have made it possible to devote the time necessary to the preparation of this study.

The portrait of King Mithradates II used as a frontispiece is reproduced about three times original size from a silver drachm in my own collection.

Neilson C. Debevoise

July 29, 1937
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ner, Wroth, and more recently McDowell has been very successful.

If the proveniences of the coins were known, assignment to the various rulers would be greatly facilitated. Unfortunately few of the coins come from excavations, and collections seldom possess records of provenience. The studies of McDowell on coins from the Iranian plateau (still to be published) and on the large amount of numismatic material from Seleucia on the Tigris will help to alleviate this difficulty.

While the writer must deal with the Chinese sources in translation only, the major problem connected with them appears clear. Though much has been done with the identification of personal and place names, many still remain uncertain quantities. Further studies in early Chinese onomatology will increase the certainty and number of identifications. On the Indian frontier numismatics again plays an important part, but here unfortunately there is less historical information to assist in the task of assigning the coins. Furthermore, the inscriptions, though dated, create as many problems as they solve, since in some cases the beginnings of the eras by which they are dated cannot be fixed. Excavations, especially that of Marshall at Taxila, promise to provide the solution to many difficulties on the eastern frontier.

INTRODUCTION

UPON the ashes of Persepolis arose a new Orient, a world in which Greek and oriental elements were strangely intermingled. The task of holding together as a political entity this vast area extending from the Mediterranean to the Indus proved too great for the successors of Alexander; their strength was eventually spent in fratricidal wars, and the East once more lapsed into the control of petty kinglets. The time was ripe for the formation of a new empire. Rising out of the obscure mists to the east of the Caspian Sea, Parthian horsemen rode victoriously over all Iran. Governed by strong, able, and resolute kings, they subdued nation after nation until from the slopes of the Zagros Mountains they could look out over the colorless alluvium of Mesopotamia. In 141 B.C. their squadrons clattered down the passes and conquered these fertile lands. Under Parthian administration commerce greatly increased, and cities long abandoned and then nothing more than mounds of dun-colored earth rose again to life. New canals were dug and old ones cleaned of the silt accumulations of centuries.

Unlike other invaders from the northeast, the Parthians did not kill and destroy for the sake of booty, but often took over new territory without creating
more than a ripple in the life of the common man. The greatest changes which they brought about probably took place within the administrative machinery, but unfortunately little firsthand information is available on the internal structure of the Parthian empire, because we possess very few official documents. Most of our knowledge comes from excavations at sites such as Susa and Dura-Europus or by inference from casual statements made by classical authors. Our best information, then, comes from areas on the periphery of the empire, and general conclusions drawn from it can be accepted only with great caution.¹

In effect the Parthian empire became a vast feudal power, a pyramid the apex of which was the King of Kings, beneath whom came the satraps, the nobles, the Greek merchants, and finally the native tillers of the soil, the ultimate basis upon which any such system must rest. The nobles who controlled the land probably lived in the larger cities, where they and the wealthy Greek merchants who depended upon them for protection would naturally form alliances. The parallel with the Middle Ages in Europe is striking, and the decay of the two systems came about in much the same manner. During much of the period before the Christian era the royal power was supreme; but after that time the nobles, then firmly rooted and grown wealthy from lands and war, began to usurp more and more authority. Their defiance of the king brought about frequent periods of disruption and eventually the downfall of the empire. Very probably the decline of the royal power and the rise of the nobles were closely connected with the religious revival of the latter half of the first century after Christ. Parallels for the struggle between the nobles and Magi on one hand and the king on the other can easily be found in Achaemenian and Sasanian history.

Some years before the death of Mithradates II in 87 B.C. he had carved on the rock at Behistun a relief in which he and his principal officials appear. The chief of these is called satrap of satraps, the other three simply satraps. Probably these men belonged to the great families of Iran such as the Surens and Karesns. Their positions with attendant rights and duties gradually became hereditary. A Suren always placed the crown upon the head of a new king, and, as at Carrhae, a Suren frequently led the Parthian armies in battle.

Evidently the form of government of Parthian dependencies varied widely and changed from time to time. Mithradates apparently appointed a governor to rule over newly conquered Media; Himerus served in the same capacity in Babylonia; and at a later date Mesopotamia was governed by this method. In other

¹ On the organization of the Parthian empire see the publications of the excavations at Dura-Europus, Seleucia on the Tigris, and Susa and the excellent statement by Rostovtzeff in CAH, XI, 113–20.
cases, however, either the local dynasty was retained or some other ruler acceptable to the Parthians was installed. Armenia was ruled by a member of the Arsacid family, as was Media Atropatene at times. Vassal kings remained in Adiabene, Characene, Elymais, and Persis and in some of the city-kingsdoms such as Hatra and Osroene. Of all these only Characene, Elymais, and Persis were permitted to strike money while under Parthian control. Of the important cities, Seleucia alone seems to have been accorded the right to issue civic coinage; and its small bronze issues, contrary to generally accepted numismatic principles, traveled fairly long distances, for example as far as Susa. However, numismatics must be applied with caution to questions of territorial control. Dura-Europus in the Parthian period used money from Syrian Antioch. Southeastern Iran, though at times directly under Parthian control, does not seem to have used the royal coinage. Partian coins traveled eastward along the great silk route into Turkestan; but none has been reported in China, and they are rarely, if at all, found in India proper.

That the royal power extended even to matters of local government is proved by a letter of Artabanus III to the city of Susa validating a contested election. Incidentally it is interesting to note that the letter


was in Greek, though documents sent to the eastern part of the empire would probably be in the official Pahlavi. That an election case was of such vital importance as to force the king to intervene over the heads of the properly constituted authorities seems doubtful; hence we must conclude that certain places were more or less under royal jurisdiction.

Careful distinction is made by some contemporary writers between Greek and Parthian cities within the Parthian empire. This may well imply a difference in administration as well as population, for documents from Dura and Susa show that the governments of these places preserved the pattern of the Hellenistic city-state. Such places rarely held Parthian garrisons. Ctesiphon, for example, is said to have been built to house Parthian troops, which evidently could not be installed in Seleucia across the river.

The Parthians secured their revenues as did the Achaemenidae by means of tribute and customs duties, and they were anxious to further peace and the free interchange of commerce to increase the royal income. Although the Parthian revolt was originally a reaction against Iranian Hellenism, its character as a steppe culture modified by Iranian and Bactrian contacts underwent considerable alteration in the presence of the more ancient cultures of Mesopotamia and the strong Hellenistic influence there. For a hundred or more years after the Parthians entered the Land of the Two Rivers, Greek elements formed an
important part of their culture, until at last they were overshadowed by another oriental reaction.

When the Parthian feudal system was at its height, its military power was immense. In addition to mere numbers, the Parthians possessed the compound bow and complete scale armor for man and horse, arms of offense and defense against which the Roman legions had never before been matched. In 53 B.C. the consul Crassus and thirty thousand of his men fell under a hail of Parthian arrows, and the succeeding years saw raids into the rich territory about the pleasure center of Antioch. The armies which humbled the "invincible" legions were almost entirely composed of cavalry, both light- and heavy-armed. Because of the expense of maintaining horses and armor the heavy-armed was recruited from the nobility, who were also expected to supply and equip some light cavalry, not armored, but furnished with the bow as a weapon of offense.

As a result of their exploitation of the land, the success of their commercial alliances, and the profits of the booty from raids into Roman territory, the nobility gained tremendously in power and importance. On the other hand the royal family, the Arsacidæ, in whom the succession to the throne remained, was torn asunder and weakened by intrigue, murder, and quarrels between members of the dynasty. The result was inevitable, just as in Europe. The feudal lords no longer responded to the call to arms, no longer paid their annual tribute, but engaged in plots against the king and were ready to defy him by force of arms should he interfere with their rights. Disorganization within the empire, not force of arms, opened the way for the Roman legions into Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, the plundering of great commercial centers and royal treasures, as well as losses in man power and territory occasioned by the wars with Rome, greatly contributed to the decline of Parthia.

In the last years of the empire the name "Arsaces" became but a shuttlecock, bandied back and forth by claimants who possessed little if any real power. Under such conditions a strong leader backed by a powerful army had little difficulty in overcoming the disunited efforts of the nobles, many of whom must have longed for another strong central authority which should restore peace and prosperity. The Parthians had originally been alien to both Iran and Mesopotamia; their conquerors the Sasanidae came from Persis, where the ruined cities and the tombs of the great Achaemenid monarchs were a constant reminder of former Iranian glories. Ardashir, first of the new dynasty, found it no difficult task to overthrow the tottering and decrepit Arsacid line and thus to write the last chapter in the political history of Parthia.
CHAPTER I
THE GROWTH OF PARTHIA

THE racial origin of the earliest Parthians is largely a matter of conjecture, since our few authorities differ widely from one another as to who they were and whence they came, and archaeological and anthropological evidence is not yet forthcoming. Skeletal remains from Mesopotamia cannot be expected to yield much information, for we know in advance that they contain a large percentage of native population, a sprinkling of Macedonian or Greek stock, and possibly Negro, Chinese, Indian, and Mongoloid individuals.¹ Because of the heavy beards and the lack of detail, little if any anthropological information can be secured from the portraits on Parthian coins.² Language provides no clue to the origin of the Parthians, for their speech as we know it was adopted

¹ Marcel A. Dieulafoy, L’Acropole de Suse (Paris, 1893), pp. 109–13, has analyzed three skulls from the Parthian strata at Susa, but there is no reason to suppose they are Parthian. The graves and grave objects from Seleucia on the Tigris, not including the skeletal remains, will be treated by Samuel Yeivin in a volume of the “University of Michigan Studies, Humanistic Series,” the manuscript for which is now in preparation.

² Dr. Henry Field, curator of physical anthropology, Field Museum of Natural History, Chicago, was kind enough to examine Wroth’s publication of British Museum coins (see n. 7 below); cf. Charles E. de Ujfalvy, “Iconographie et anthropologie irano-indiennes,” L’Anthropologie, XI (1900), 199–203.
after they entered the Iranian plateau. Their customs give us more extensive and more certain information, but nothing beyond what we already know from classical writers. Love of the hunt and of hard drinking, extensive use of the bow, especially as a weapon on horseback, are all suggestive of the nomadic or seminomadic life of the steppe country.

Early historians paid little attention to the Parthians; when the western world came into contact with them their story had been much obscured by time. They were reported to have been a division of the Parni, who in turn were one of a group of tribes known to the Greeks as the Dahae.1 We first meet them on the banks of the Ochus (Tejend) River, although this was probably not their original homeland.2 These people would not be known as Parthians until they moved southward into the Persian province of Parthava, an event which took place sometime before 250 B.C. Achaemenian and early Greek references to the “Parthians” refer, therefore, to earlier inhabitants of Parthava, not to the Parthians with whom we are dealing.3

That as early as the seventh century B.C. the As-


3 Strabo xi. 9, 2; Apollodoros Parthisa in Strabo xi. 7, 3; Justin xli. 1; Arrian Parthisa fr. 1 in Photius 58.

4 Strabo xi. 9, 2; Apollodoros Parthisa in Strabo xi. 7, 3; Justin xli. 1; Arrian Parthisa fr. 1 in Photius 58.


7 Cf. A. T. Olmstead, History of Assyria (New York, 1923), pp. 45-47; CAG, III, map facing p. 1. The following maps also may be of use: W. W. Tarn in CAG, IX, facing p. 612; British Museum, Catalogue of the Coins of Parthia, by Warwick Wrotch (London, 1903), facing p. 1; British War Office, General Staff, Geographical Section, No. 2149, Persia and Afghanistan, 1 inch = 64 miles, a copy of which may be found in Sykes, Hist. of Persia, Vol. II; Heinrich Kiepert, Atlas antiquus; “Murray’s Handy Classical Maps”; The Eastern Empires and Asia Minor.

8 Cesias in Diod. Sic. ii. 2 and 34. Cesias is not trustworthy; see Cameron, History of Early Iran, p. 176, n. 15. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Cameron for suggestions embodied in this chapter.

9 An inference from Herod. i. 155, who says that Cyrus conquered the Bactrians and the Sacae; cf. Cesias De rebus Persicis fr. 29. 3 f. (pub. with Herodotus, ed. Müller [1844]; Gilmore ed. not available), who places this event before the Lydian war (impossible), and Herod. i. 177, where the account of the conquest of Upper Asia immediately follows that of Lydia. The inclusion of Parthava in the Behistun inscription is almost certain evidence that it was conquered by Cyrus, since Cambyses after his accession went immediately to Egypt.
POLITICAL HISTORY OF PARTHIA

Cyra on the Jaxartes River, and three other cities on or near the Tanais (Oxus) River. The conquest of Parthava probably took place during this campaign. The country was placed under the control of Hystaspes, patron of Zoroaster and father of Darius. Cyrus lost his life fighting against the Daeae in an attempt to expand his empire to the northeast. At that time the satrapcy of Parthava included Hrycania, which lay between the Elburz Mountains and the Caspian Sea. The satrapy revolted about 521 B.C. against Hystaspes and upheld the cause of the Median pretender Fravartish. The first battle was fought at Vishpauzatish on the twenty-second day of VIyakhana. Aid arrived from the army at Rhages (Ravy), and another battle was waged at Patigrabana on the first day of Garmanapa, when 6,520 of the rebels were reported killed and 4,192 wounded. About this time Margiana revolted, and the satrap of Bactria was sent to put down the uprising. Parthava probably remained united with Hrycania at the death of Darius.


Naqshi-Rustem inscription, § 3, in Weissbach, op. cit., pp. 87–89, and the Xerxes inscription found by the Oriental Institute, for which see Roland G. Kent, "The Present Status of Old Persian Studies," JAOS, LVI (1936), 212 f., and "The Daiva-Inscription of Xerxes," Language, XII (1937), 294, lines 19 f. In the Behistun and the Persepolis E inscriptions Parthava is the thirteenth satrapy listed; in the new Xerxes inscription it is sixth; in the Tell el-Maskhoutah inscription from Egypt it is fifth (W. Goldschmidt, "Stèle de Darius aux environs de Tell el-Maskhoutah," Recueil de travaux, XIII (1903), 102–6); and in the Naqshi-Rustem and Susa inscriptions it is third (on the Susa inscription see V. Schell, "Conquêtes et politique de Darius," Mémoire de l'Institut de Perse, XXIV (1933), 119). The name of the satrapy is written in Akkadian as Parta; in Elamite, Partuma; in Egyptian, Pryuwt.
tion seems clear indication that it was acquired by Cyrus; the fact that it appears in the Naqsh-i-Rustem inscription shows that it was still a portion of the kingdom at the death of Darius. The army list preserved in Herodotus vii. 60–81 can be dated as previous to 479 B.C., and therefore reveals the condition of the satrapies shortly after the death of Darius. Hrycenaia had been separated from Parthava and made a province by itself, while the former satrapy of Chorasmia was then joined with Parthava. Other indications suggest possible losses on this eastern frontier. In the army of Xerxes there was a contingent of Parthians under the command of Artabazus the son of Pharnaces. Since Herodotus tells us elsewhere that the satraps led their contingents to battle, Artabazus was probably satrap of Parthia. Aeschylus reports that among those killed in the fighting in Greece was a cavalry leader called Arsaces, a name which later became the throne name of the Parthian kings.

The official tribute list quoted by Herodotus (iii. 89–95) is clearly from his own time, that of Artaxerxes I, not, as he states, from that of Darius. Here again the tendency toward union of the provinces makes us

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40 Cf. PW, art. "Artaxerxes.
41 Hecataeus fr. 292 f. (I, p. 38) notes the proximity of the Parthians and Chorasmians.
42 Persae 995; the names in Aeschylus are generally proper to the country but not historical.
43 This discussion of the satrapies is based on an unpublished study by Olmstead, "The Persian Satrapies and Their History."

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suspect further shrinkage of the frontiers. Parthia was now joined with Chorasmia, Sogdiana, and Aria to form one province, and Hrycenaia was united with Media.

When Alexander invaded Asia, the Parthians fought on the Persian side at Arbela. Parthia fell to Alexander at the death of Darius III, and its satrap Phrataphernes surrendered himself in Hrycenaia. Amminias, a Parthian who had been in Egypt, was made satrap; and Tlepolemus, one of the Companions, was selected to represent Alexander's military interests. Under Alexander, Parthia was reunited with Hrycenaia, but the other districts mentioned by Herodotus as joined with it were then definitely separate satrapies. Bessus in his attempt to seize the power after the death of Darius III also appointed a Parthian satrap, Barzanes by name, who probably never enjoyed opportunity for action.

By the Treaty of Triparadisus in 321 B.C. a certain Philippus was transferred from Bactria to Parthia.
In 318 B.C., Pithon, satrap of Media, seized the province of Parthia, did away with Philippus, and installed his brother Eudamus. The other satraps became alarmed and joined together under the strongest, Peucestas of Persis. The combined armies of Iran drove Pithon out of Parthia, and he retreated to his own province of Media. After 316 B.C. the province apparently was joined to Bactria under the command of Stasander. By the middle of the third century the Seleucid empire was in difficulty. Antiochus II continued the war which his father had begun in Egypt about 276 B.C. When peace was made Antiochus put away his wife Laodice, who retired to Ephesus, and married Berenice, daughter of Ptolemy II (253 B.C.). Although Antiochus had thus secured peace, his relations with Ptolemy were none too secure. About the time of the marriage Diodotus, satrap of Bactria, revolted and assumed the title of king.

33 Diod. Sic. xix. 14; Justin xiii. 4. 23. Cf. Bevan, 
House of Sel., I, 42, 267 n. 6, and 294, and in CAH VI, 477 and 477; Alfred von Gut- 
schmid, Geschichle Irans (Tübingen, 1888), pp. 20 ff.

34 Justin xli. 4. 1, as Bevan, 
House of Sel., I, 267 f. and notes, interprets him.

35 Trog. Pomp. xli. cf. Justin xli. 4. 5. Trogus is proved correct by the 
coins; see Cambridge History of India, I, ed. E. J. Rapson, Ps. II 13 
and III 9, which apparently O. Seel, editor of the Teubner text of Justin, 
did not know. My account of events in the Seleucid empire is drawn 
largely from Tarn in CAH VII, chap. xxii, which agrees substantially 
with the earlier works of Bevan and Bouche-Leclercq.

36 Justin xli. 4. 5.

THE GROWTH OF PARTHIA

Encouraged by the Bactrian success, the Parthians also rose against Seleucid control. This took place shortly before 247 B.C. the beginning of the Parthian era, when two brothers, Arsaces and Tiridates, led a revolt against Andragoras, satrap of Antiochus II Theos (261-247 B.C.). Even the Greeks
themselves were quite uncertain as to the historicity of their accounts of this early period. There is a story that the first Parthian leader, Arsaces, was a Bactrian who became discontented with the rule of the satrap Dioodotus of Bactria, invaded Parthia, and successfully fomented a revolt.\(^{38}\) Still a third and more detailed version is to be found in Arrian,\(^{39}\) according to which either Arsaces or Tiridates was insulted by the Seleucid satrap. The brothers thereupon took five men into their confidence, killed the offender, and persuaded the people to revolt. Without additional evidence it is impossible to determine the correct account.

The two brothers who led the revolt were reputed to be descendants of Arsaces\(^{40}\) the son of Phiarites.\(^{41}\) Later the Parthian kings claimed descent from Artaxerxes II, possibly to support the belief that they were continuing the glories of Achaemenian Iran.\(^{42}\) Andragoras, satrap of Antiochus, apparently perished in the struggle. Arsaces may have been crowned in Aṣa-

\(^{38}\) Strabo xi. 9. 3.

\(^{39}\) *Parthica* fr. 1, quoted in Photius 58.

\(^{40}\) To the discomfort of historians both ancient and modern, all Parthian kings used this name as a title. See Justin xii. 5, 6–6; Strabo xv. 1, 36

\(^{41}\) and xvi. 1. 28; Moses Chor. ii. 1; Amm. Marcell. xxii. 6. 5. So regularly the Babylonian documents.

\(^{42}\) Arrian *Parthica* fr. 1, quoted in Photius 58.

\(^{43}\) Arrian *Parthica* fr. 1, quoted in Syncehds, p. 539. Cf. Tarn, "Queen Ptolemais and Apama," *Classical Quarterly*, XXIII (1929), 138–40, who feels the claim was made to substantiate the Arsacid control of the territory of the Seleucidae, who were also connected with the Persian line.

ak (near Kuchan in the upper Atrek River valley) in Astanaene.\(^{43}\) For the first years of the new kingdom, if such it might be called, the rulers were busy with warfare,\(^{44}\) in the course of which Arsaces must have lost his life.\(^{45}\) Not long after the succession of Tiridates to the throne he invaded and conquered Hyrkania.\(^{46}\)

The death of Dioodotus calmed any fears which Tiridates may have had, and an alliance with the Bactrian's son, also called Dioodotus, gave the Parthian ruler additional strength.\(^{47}\) Through fear of the elder Dioodotus and of Seleucus II Callinicus (247–226 B.C.), Tiridates had built a formidable military force, the value of which he was to appreciate later.\(^{48}\) The situation had become extremely serious for Seleucus. Laodice his mother and her friends had

\(^{43}\) Isid. Char. *Mans. Parth. (Parthian Stations, by Isidore of Charax, ed. Wilfred H. Schoff [Philadelphia, 1914])* 11; Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 575; cf. PW, art. "Asak." If Isidore refers to the first Arsaces it is significant that the sacred flame was kept burning in this city, for the Parthians of that period were probably Zoroastrians.

\(^{44}\) Strabo xi. 9. 21; Justin xlii. 4. 7 f.

\(^{45}\) Arrian *Parthica* fr. 1, quoted in Syncehds, p. 539.

\(^{46}\) Justin xlii. 4. 8. Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 576, following PW, art. "Hyrkania," col. 501, says the conquest must have been made after 217 B.C. because Antiochus III in his campaign of 219–217 in Cœle Syria had Caucidian and Daeanian contingents in his army (Polyb. v. 79. 3 and 7) and hence the Seleucid power must have extended to the Caspian Sea. But mercenaries were common in armies of this period and earlier, even to Greeks among the forces of Nebuchadnezzar, and I do not see how such conclusions can be based on these facts.

\(^{47}\) Justin xlii. 4. 9.

\(^{48}\) Ibid. 4. 8.
done away with Berenice and her son, thus incurring the enmity of Ptolemy III, Berenice's brother. The Egyptian monarch invaded Seleucid territory and marched victoriously at least as far as Syria and perhaps to the Tigris, though later writers extended his conquests to Bactria and even as far eastward as India. But a revolt in the Delta forced Ptolemy to return home before he could consolidate his position.

Sometime in the course of the struggle between Ptolemy and Seleucus, the latter was forced to conclude a peace with his brother which left Antiochus Hierax an autonomous sovereign in Asia Minor. The war with Egypt once ended, Seleucus soon attempted to recover the lost territory; but after some preliminary successes he was completely defeated at Ancyra (Ankara) about 240 B.C. by Antiochus and his Galatian allies. For a time it was supposed that Seleucus himself had perished in the fighting, but he escaped in disguise to Antioch.

About 228 B.C. Seleucus gathered an army at Babylon and marched eastward. Tiridates retreated

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before him and eventually sought refuge with the Apasiaceae, the Apa-Saka or Water Saka, who lived on the steppes of the Caspian region. In the meantime, about 227 B.C. Stratonice incited a rebellion in Antioch, and in concert with her Antiochus invaded Mesopotamia. These domestic troubles caused Seleucus to return to Syria and left the Parthians in a position to claim the ultimate victory.

Seleucus III Soter, the elder son of Seleucus II Callinicus, after a brief reign of three years was murdered in Phrygia as the result of a court intrigue, and Antiochus III, the younger son of Seleucus II, succeeded to the throne (223 B.C.). Two of his generals, the brothers Molon and Alexander, were intrusted with the satrapies of Media and Persis. Not long thereafter Molon, possibly inspired by the Bactrian and Parthian successes, revolted and declared himself king. Liver omens copied in Uruk April 30,

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60 Justin xli. 5. 1.

61 On the basis of Posidonius _Hist._ xvi. fr. 12 (J, II A, p. 228) in _Athen. Deip._ iv. 153 and of the coinage, Gardner (Parthian Coinage, p. 4) argues that Seleucus was once a captive of the Parthians, either after Ancyra or during the campaign under discussion. It must be granted that the beard which appears on his coin portraits is paralleled on the coins of only those rulers who were captives in the east. Cf. Rawlinson, _Sixth Mon._, p. 49, n. 1. Josephus _Contra Apionem_ i. 206 mentions the campaign.

62 Appian _Syr._ 66.

63 Tarn in _CAH_, VII, 724.
221 B.C., picture the thoughts passing through the mind of a priest. Who was to be the victor in the coming struggle for power? Would the city be destroyed? The omen of "Who was king, who was not king?" once applied to the period of disintegration at the close of the Agade dynasty, was now fully appropriate. Babylon was secured; but Antiochus himself took the field and defeated Molon, who committed suicide (220 B.C.). Seleucia, the royal city, was recaptured, and Diogenes of Susa, who had held out against Molon, was rewarded with Media. Antiochus crossed the Zagros and invaded the kingdom of Atropatene, southwest of the Caspian, then under the control of Artabazanes, who was forced to admit vassalage. Additional omen tablets from Uruk, dated February 7, 213 B.C., make more certain the identification of the Parthians with that ancient enemy from the northeast, the Gutti. Could the expedition of Antiochus have been a feint in the direction of a Parthia which had already begun to expand? Did Parthia lend support to Molon? These are questions which as yet we cannot answer.

Meanwhile Tiridates had employed himself in consolidating his position. He increased the army, built forts, strengthened existing cities, and built a new one, Dara, on Mount Apaortenon, an almost impregnable position, which he perhaps intended to make the capital of his kingdom. Tiridates or one of his immediate successors refounded Rhages-Europus under the name Arsacia, a designation which it did not long retain. In later times the royal residence of central Parthia was certainly Hecatompylos. Tiridates

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9 Polyb. v. 40–54.

60 Thureau-Dangin, *Tablettes d’Uruk*, No. 3 rev., lines 28 and 43.

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Justin xli. 5. 1–4; incorrect variant, Zapaortenon.


died in peace about 211 B.C. after a reign of thirty-seven years. He left the throne to his son, whose name was apparently Artabanus (I). In the death of the powerful Tirdates, Antiochus III may have seen an opportunity to regain his eastern possessions; in any case in that same year he turned eastward and advanced to Ecbatana (Hamadan), where loot from the temple of Anahita served to replenish his treasury. In 209 B.C. Antiochus continued his eastward march along the great road with


65 *Arian Parthica* fr. 1, quoted in Syneculus, p. 539.


67 Polyb. ix, 43 shows Antiochus at the Euphrates in the fall of 211 B.C.; he invaded rebel Media and Parthia according to Appian *Syr.*, 1, 1.

68 Polyb. x, 27.

THE GROWTH OF PARTHIA

a large army. While no excuse for this attack on Parthia is known, none was necessary beyond the fact that the territory had once been Seleucid domain. On the edge of the vast salt plains to the east the only available water supply was and still is carried through underground canals to prevent evaporation. Artabanus followed the obviously wise policy of retreating and destroying the wells and canals before him. Cavalry was sent forward which established contact with the Parthian horsemen engaged in this work and drove them away, and the Seleucid forces reached Hecatompylos practically unopposed. Antiochus determined to advance into Hyrcania and moved forward to Tagae (Tag?) near Damghan. His ascent to the summit of Mount Labus (Lamavu) was hotly contested by Parthian troops or their allies posted on the heights above, but he reorganized his system of advance and forced the passage. At the pass itself a pitched battle was fought and the Parthians defeated. Antiochus managed to restrain his troops from headlong pursuit and advanced in good order down into Hyrcania, where he occupied the walled town of Tambrax (Sari?). The important

69 Justin xii, 5, 7 grossly exaggerates the figures, giving 100,000 foot and 20,000 cavalry!

70 PW, art. "Tagae."

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center of Syrinx was taken after a siege of some duration, and all the Greek inhabitants were put to death by the Parthians just before the town was carried by assault. What happened thereafter is uncertain, but Antiochus found it prudent to make peace and a treaty of alliance with Artabanus. Twenty-one years later Antiochus met his death in a vain attempt to recoup his fortune by the sack of a temple of Bel in Elymais. We know nothing more of Artabanus I except that his reign is conventionally represented as ending in 191 B.C.

Priapatius, the succeeding monarch, ruled for fifteen years, but beyond this fact our sources are silent. He left two sons, Mithradates and Phraates. As the latter was the elder, he inherited the throne at his father's death, as was the Parthian custom.

Phraates soon turned his arms against the peoples who dwelt in the Elburz range, south of the Caspian Sea. The Mardians in particular he deported and settled in Charax near the Caspian Gates. Not long after this victory Phraates died and left the throne to his brother Mithradates, for whom he cherished a special affection, although he had several sons presumably of age. If we follow the traditional date, Mithradates came to the throne about 171 B.C., with his accession we enter one of the greatest periods of Parthian history.

About 175 B.C. the usurper Eucratides wrested control of Bactria from Demetrius, who was more interested in his conquests in the Punjab. Taking advantage of Bactrian weakness which had doubtless resulted from continued warfare, Mithradates may have invaded Tapuria and Traxiana at this time.

On these peoples see Arrian Anabasis iii. 24; Strabo xi. 8, 1 and xi. 13. 6.

Isid. Char. Mants. Parth. 7. Charax is the Greek translation of the native word for "stockade."

Justin xii. 5. 9-10.

Wroth, Parthia, p. xx.


Cf. Apollodorus Parthica (?) in Strabo xv. 1. 3; see also xi. 9. 2.

There is no evidence to date this campaign. On these districts cf. Strabo xi. 11. 2, whose Aspius and Turiva are so identified by Tarn, "Sel.-Parth. Studies," Proc. Brit. Acad., XVI (1930), 122-26. Tarn believes the campaign took place after 163, but his argument in CAH, IX, 578 and n. 1, that Parthia was a bar to the transmission of even coinage designs, does not seem strong. Cf. Rostovtzeff in CAH, VII, 174.
The belief that Mithradates extended his power as far south and east as Seistan, part of Aria, and Gedrosia rests solely on the identification of the Hydaspes of Orosius with the modern Porali. On this matter see pp. 36 f. There are other possibilities than the Porali. The southern and eastern conquests are undoubtedly accepted by Tarn in CAH, IX, 579. The elephant on the coins of Mithradates is not evidence for Indian conquests; cf. the coins of Phraates II, Artabanus "II" (my III), and Mithradates III in Wroth, Parthia, p. 262, also G. H. Abbott, The Elephant on Coins (Sydney, 1919), p. 6. The Parthians apparently made little use of this animal; Tac. Ann. xv. 15 and Dio Cass. xlii. 21. 4 are the only literary mentions. This is peculiar, since both the Seleucidæ and the Sasanidæ made much of their elephants.


Appian Syr. 45 and 66; Diod. Sic. xxxi. 176 (ed. Dindorf, 1868).

The hasty departure of Antiochus IV Epiphanes from Palestine for the far eastern portion of the empire suggests an advance by the Parthians. True, Palestine was unsettled—not an unusual condition for that region—but such an event as the invasion of the eastern lands by Mithradates at this time would have loomed as far more important in the eyes of the Seleucid ruler. In 165 B.C. Antiochus crossed the Euphrates and marched into Armenia, where the king, Artaxias, was captured and forced to acknowledge the supremacy of the Seleucid ruler. Thence Antiochus apparently returned to the great road.

II Maccabees 9: 1–2.


Polyb. xxxi. 9.


Justin xlii. 6. 6.

Justin xlii. 6. 7. This was contrary to the usual Parthian custom of feudatory kingdoms.
A badly broken cuneiform tablet, which must be freely interpreted, gives us a contemporary account of the advance of Mithradates. When news of his approach reached the Seleucid ruler, Demetrius Nicator, then in Babylonia and very possibly at Seleucia on the Tigris, the latter quickly gathered together what men he could secure\(^9\) and marched into Media to meet the enemy.\(^9\) Apparently the Parthian managed to outmaneuver him and continued his advance. In the meantime Demetrius had left orders to


\(^9\) That the person referred to is Demetrius, not Mithradates, is shown by the fact that he gathered "men of all sorts." The Parthian ruler would have had with him the army with which he had just invaded the country.

\(^9\) This account of the campaign is drawn from British Museum tablet SH 108, described by F. X. Kugler, *Sternkunde und Sterndienst in Babel* (Münster in Westfalen, 1902-35), II, 442, and partially published in his *Von Moses bis Paulus* (Münster in Westfalen, 1922), pp. 338 ff. Olmstead restores lines 2-9 as follows:

"... Men of all sorts [Demetrius collected]; to the cities of Media [he marched] ... In the beginning of that month, on the 24th day *su-bu* (?), ... the *rab ugu* (general) entered the land of Akkad. [Against him] Arshaka the king to Seleucia [went. The city of ...], of the land of Ashur, which before the face of Arshaka the king [had bowed down], ... [Into Seleucia, the royal city, he entered; that month, on the 28th day, he sat on the throne."

"Year 171, Arshaka the king, on the 30th of the month Du'uzu ..."

This passage was followed by astronomical data. While not certain, the restorations are much more probable than would appear uninitiated, for they are the common formulas of contemporary documents. Kugler's widely different interpretation of the text is followed by Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 576 f. See now Olmstead, "Cuneiform Texts and Hellenistic Chronology," *Class. Philol.*, XXXII (1937), 12 f.

THE GROWTH OF PARTHIA

gather additional troops, and one of his generals entered Mesopotamia, coming probably from Syria, with reinforcements. Mithradates turned southward to Seleucia and defeated him. At Seleucia the Parthian monarch received a deputation which brought word of friendship from some city in the land of Ashur,\(^10\) for that territory must have been fully aware of the turn affairs had taken after the defeat of the general of Demetrius. Mithradates entered the royal city of Seleucia late in June or early in July; he was recognized as king on or before July 8, 141 B.C. Before October 14 of that year Mithradates' sovereignty was acknowledged as far south as Uruk.\(^11\) Naturally the inhabitants of Susa and the surrounding region felt uneasy, as is shown by a dedicatory inscription of 171 S.E. (141 B.C.) for the safety of a king and queen whose names are cautiously omitted.\(^12\) Susa was the next logical point in the advance of the Great King.

Sometime between October and December, 141

\(^10\) Moses Chor. i. 7 and ii. 4. i makes Assyria subject to Mithradates.

\(^11\) The double-dated tablet in Otto Schroeder, *Kontrakte der Seleukidenzeit aus Warka* ("Vorderasiatische Schriftdenkmäler," XV [Leipzig, 1916], No. 37, proves no more than that Uruk then acknowledged Mithradates as king. Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 576 and 579 f., operating with the *reš šarrûti*, "accession year," places the capture of Babylon before 1 Nisan, 141 B.C.; but "accession years" were never employed by the Seleucidae, and therefore documents would have been double-dated as soon as the sovereignty of Mithradates was acknowledged.

\(^12\) F. Cumont, "Nouvelles inscriptions grecques de Susa," *CR*, 1932, pp. 278 f.
Mithradates was on his way to Hyrcania. The cause of his departure from Mesopotamia at this critical juncture in his campaign was probably a raid by the Sacae, who shortly before 165 B.C. had been forced from their homeland in Turkestan by the Yüeh-chi and by this time were certainly close to the eastern borders of Parthia. The forces in Mesopotamia were turned over to a Parthian commander, and Mithradates never returned to that region, for the remainder of his reign was occupied with campaigns in southern and central Parthia. His departure from the Land

Justin xii. 6. 6-9, after the Median campaign, omits the capture of Babylonia and then speaks of Mithradates’ setting out for Hyrcania. Orosius v. 4. 16 preserves the tradition of activity in the east between the first and second campaigns of Demetrius; cf. p. 25. See also discussions of British Museum tablet Sp. I 176 by Kugler, Von Mose bis Pau- lus, pp. 342 f., and T. G. Pinches, The Old Testament in the Light of Historical Records and Legends of Assyria and Babylonia (2d ed.; London, 1903), p. 484 and p. 553, n. Kugler dates the tablet astronomically to Kislimu, 171 B.C., i.e., December, 141 B.C. The passage concerned here says, as translated by Strassmaier for Kugler: “In the same month I heard that Arshaka the king and his troops in (Pinches, ‘to’) the city of Arrania, the king (Pinches omits) . . . . On the 6th the Elamites with their soldiers marched against the city of Apamea on the river Silu . . . .” Elsewhere in the tablet Seleucia is mentioned.

I Maccabees 14: 1-3 states positively that Demetrius was captured (see p. 25) by a Parthian general. Other sources on the campaign do not mention Mithradates. Note that Justin xxxvi. 1. 5 f. says that Demetrius, captured not long after Mithradates left Mesopotamia, was sent to Hyrcania; the logical inference is that he was sent to the Parthian monarch. Cf. British Museum tablet SH 108 (see p. 22, n. 99), line 20, Omstead’s restoration:

“That month (Ululu or later), on the 3d day, Nicaior the king was made prisoner.”

Further on the text mentions “Arshaka the king” and “Seleucia.”

of the Two Rivers for Hyrcania enabled the Elamites to raid the city of Apamea on the Silu River.

Mithradates had no sooner gone than Demetrius returned to the attack. Doubtless he was justifiably encouraged by appeals for help from recently conquered peoples, particularly from the Greek elements. As Demetrius advanced, large numbers flocked to his standards; we hear of contingents from Bactria, Elymais, and Persis. He won several victories, but eventually, by either strategy or force, was taken by the Parthians and as a pointed example paraded through the streets of those cities which had aided him. Demetrius was then sent to Hyrcania to Mithradates. There he was treated as became his rank and was given Rhodogune, daughter of Mithradates, in marriage.

His enemy safely disposed of, Mithradates turned to punish those who had furnished aid to the Seleucid ruler. Not only had the Elymaeans thus provoked an attack, but the wealth of their temples would replenish a treasury depleted by warfare. The loot from


Justin xxxvi. 1. 2-4.

Justin xxxvi. 1. 4. This is the second campaign of Plut. Reg. imp. apophthegm. 184, 1 (Loeb, III, p. 86) and Orosius v. 4. 17. Cf. Kolbe, Beiträge, pp. 38-40.

I Maccabees 14: 1-3; Justin xxxvi. 1. 5-6 and xxxviii. 9. 2-3.

Appian Syr. 67.
the temples of "Athena" and Artemis alone is reported as ten thousand talents,\footnote{Strabo xvi. 1. 18. Note that Justin xii. 6. 7–8 mentions the campaign in Elymais after that in Hyrcania. There was a temple of Artemis on the Eulaeus River below Susa; see Pliny Hist. nat. vi. 135 and PW, art. "Eulæus." The Eulæus is the modern Karun.} and no doubt there were others. The city of Seleucia (Mange?), formerly Solace, on the Hedypophon (Jarāḥi) River was captured.\footnote{Strabo xvi. 1. 18. For the identifications see PW, 2d ser., IV, col. 2361, "Σελεύκεια," No. 13.} Since the Parthians were established in Susa shortly after the death of Mithradates,\footnote{F. Cumont, "Nouvelles inscriptions grecques de Susa," CR, 1932, p. 281, dated to 130 B.C. J. M. Unvala, "Inventaire des monnaies recueillies dans les fouilles," Mem. Miss. archéol. de Perse, XXV (1934), 115, No. 129, published without illustration a coin of Mithradates I from Susa, "161 Sél. = 152/153 ap. J.-C.," actually 151/50 B.C.} that territory was probably added to the empire by the Great King himself. Mithradates died peaceably in 138/37 B.C., the first Parthian date fixed accurately by numismatic and cuneiform evidence.\footnote{Wroth, Parthia, p. 15. Dates on Parthian coinage throughout this volume are computed on the basis of the Babylonian calendar, with New Year on 1 Nisan (April), and of the Seleucid era, which began in Babylon in 311 B.C. For numismatic proof of the use of the Babylonian calendar see Robert H. McDowell, Coins from Seleucia on the Tigris ("University of Michigan Studies, Humanistic Series," XXXVII [Ann Arbor, 1935]), pp. 147–53, and review by E. T. Newell in AJA, XLI (1937), 515–17. A tablet from Unik dated "day 8, year 109 Arisak, equals year 173(i)," i.e., 139/38 B.C., is published by A. T. Clay, Babylonian Records in the Library of J. Pierpont Morgan. II. Legal Documents from Erech Dated in the Seleucid Era (New York, 1913), No. 52. His No. 53, without year but written by the same scribe, is dated in the reign of Arsak'u and Ri-in(?)-nu his mother, who was regent. This king must be the successor of Mithradates. Cf. also Justin xii. 6. 9.}

\footnote{It is often assumed that the lands listed in the Vendidad, fargad i, belonged to Mithradates I; cf. E. Benveniste, "L’Éran-véã et l’origine légendaire des Iraniens," Bull. School of Or. Studies, VII (1933–35), 272. This cannot be, since it is very doubtful, for example, whether Mithradates I ever held Mesene. Even if he did, its conquest must be placed after the occupation of Sogdiana by the Yiej-chi.}

The empire of Mithradates at his death included Parthia proper, Hyrcania, Media, Babylonia, Assyria, Elymais, Persis(?), and the districts of Tapuria and Traxiana.\footnote{Besides the points noted above, the Mithra yasht was evidently written in a period of expansion. The western boundary had reached the Tigris but not the Euphrates; see ibid. xxvii. 104. Cf. also Olmstead, "Intertestamental Studies," JAST, LV (1936), 253, n. 40, and Debevoise, "Parthian Problems," AJSL, XLVII (1930/31), 81.} Mithradates was the first Parthian ruler whose name did honor to the god Mithra; and the worship of this god, hitherto largely officially ignored, must have received official sanction. The Mithra yasht of the Vendidad must have been composed in the last years of the reign of Mithradates.\footnote{Strabo xvi. 1. 18. For the identifications see PW, 2d ser., IV, col. 2361, "Σελεύκεια," No. 13.}

The language of official communication of the Parthian government was probably Pahlavi, that is, Persian written in Aramaic characters. Whole Aramaic words are rather frequently written, for which the reader substitutes their Persian equivalents. Persian in Aramaic characters appears on the tomb of Darius I. The writing on the early coins of Persis, which date roughly about 250–150 B.C., could be either Aramaic or Pahlavi. The introduction of Pahlavi into the government offices may well have been coincident with Parthian expansion over Iran; cer-
tainly it could not have been later than the conquest of Mesopotamia.

After the Parthians occupied the ancient and fertile Land of the Two Rivers, conflict with western powers became inevitable. Expansion to the east also brought with it further responsibilities. The story of these contacts on the frontiers of the empire will be dealt with in the following chapters.

CHAPTER II

EARLY FOREIGN RELATIONS

MITHRADATES THE FIRST established Parthia as a world power; whether or not his successors could maintain that position against the Seleucidae remained to be seen. Phraates II came to the throne about 138/37 B.C. on the death of his father Mithradates.¹ He must have been very young, for his mother, whose name was Ri-šú ṣu(?)-nu, acted as regent.²

Babylonia remained for the next seven years in the hands of the Parthians, as cuneiform documents from there show;³ but the coinage of Phraates suggests

¹ Justin xlii. 1. 1.
³ A copy of an old astronomical work, dated 27 Aiaru, III A.E., 174 S.E. (to be corrected to 175 S.E.; cf. same date correctly written in Reiner, Hymnen, No. 5, referred to below), i.e., 137 B.C., Epping and Strassmaier in ZA, VI (1891), 228 and 244; a copy of another ancient hymn, dated same year, George A. Reiner, Sumerisch-babylonische Hymnen nach Tontafeln griechischer Zeit (Berlin, 1896), No. 5; a copy of another, dated 114 A.E., i.e., 134 B.C., ibid., No. 35, Pl. 153; a tablet dated in year 6 of “Arsišuqqa, king” (i.e., about 132/31 B.C. on the probable assumption that this is Phraates II), Clay, Babylonian Records, II, No. 41. Ephemerales from slightly later years calculate a number of dates during this period and always give them to Arsaces; the last is 180 S.E., i.e.,
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that he spent little time there, occupied as he was with nomadic invaders in the east. Proof for Parthian control over Susa appears for the first time in a double-dated inscription of the early part of 130 B.C.; but, as has been pointed out, the conquest was probably made by Mithradates.

Phraates like his father treated the captive Demetrius in a kindly manner, for he too may have entertained some notion of a Syrian expedition. The Parthian might hope indirectly to control Syria if Demetrius, backed by Parthian arms and money, made a successful attack on the seat of the Seleucid power. Demetrius could not be won over so easily; with the aid of a friend he attempted to escape. Because of their swift horsemen and better knowledge of the terrain, the Parthians were able to recapture the fugitives and bring them before Phraates. The friend was pardoned and recompensed for his fidelity, but Demetrius was severely censured and returned to Hyrcania and his wife. Sometime afterward, when he had become the father of several children, guard was relaxed. Parental cares failed to restrain Demetrius.

132 B.C., Kugler, *Sternkunde*, II, 445. The next document is dated by Antiochus, after his invasion of Mesopotamia; see pp. 31 f.

4 Wrotth, *Parthia*, pp. 16–19; note the preponderance of drachms, a denomination struck almost exclusively in the east. No coins of Phraates II were found at Seleucia; see McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 182 f.


who fled again with the same friend but was caught almost within the boundaries of his own kingdom. He was led again to Phraates, who refused to see him but returned him to his wife and children. To keep Demetrius amused and make him ashamed, the Parthian king presented him with a pair of golden dice.

In the meantime Antiochus VII Sidetes (139/38–129 B.C.), having disposed of Tryphon, his rival to the Syrian throne, and defeated the Jews, prepared to secure his brother Demetrius and so remove him as a potential menace to his throne. He set out in 130 B.C. with a large force, the size of which made a great impression upon later historians. The Parthian army, whose strength was likewise greatly exagger-
ated, was to have been supplemented by Saca mercenaries who had been hired but who failed to arrive until after the termination of hostilities. The troops of Antiochus, magnificently appointed and supported by a contingent of Jews under John Hyrcanus, were also joined by several monarchs who had formerly been Parthian tributaries. Antiochus was the victor in three battles. In one, on the river Lycus (Greater Zab), he defeated the Parthian general Idates and raised a trophy in honor of his victory. Another of the Parthian leaders, Enius, met his death at the hands of the people of Seleucia. Because of these successes Antiochus laid claim to the title of "Great." Other Parthian dependencies, when they saw him master of Babylonia (130 B.C.), believed the newly established empire tottering and joined the Seleucid monarch.

When winter closed in, Antiochus went into quarters in Media instead of retiring to Syria as Phraates had hoped. Because of the numbers of his troops he found it advisable to billet them in several cities, where they formed a burden to the populace, only a part of which was friendly. Since Phraates had been thrice vanquished by force, he turned to methods of greater finesse when the coming of spring brought about the renewal of the campaign. Messengers were sent to ask terms of peace from Antiochus, who named three conditions: Demetrius should be set free, all territory outside Parthia proper should be surrendered, and the Parthian king should pay tribute. Phraates peremptorily refused, as indeed he must except in the last extremity. At this critical juncture Phraates played his trump card by sending Demetrius back to Syria at the head of a Parthian squadron in the hope that he might thus force Antiochus to return home. But relief came from the people of the invaded territory themselves, for, exasperated by months of violence from the rough Seleucid mercenaries and by demands for provisions, these garrison cities became pro-Parthian. The Seleucid soldiers were undoubtedly weakened by prolonged inactivity, and, scattered as they were, they lost their numerical advantage over the Parthians. Incited by agents of Phraates, the inhabitants of the various cities rose simultaneously and attacked most of the troops quartered in their districts. Antiochus, who may have

10 Porphyry in Euseb. Chron. fr. 32. 19 (J, II B, p. 1217); Moses Chor. ii. 2. 4.
11 Justin xliii. 1. 1–2.
13 Justin xxxviii. 10. 5.
16 Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 19.
17 Justin xxxviii. 10. 6.
18 A cuneiform copy of an old hymn is dated under Antiochus, 22 Aiarsu, 182 B.C., i.e., June 2, 130 B.C.; see Reisner, Hymnian, text No. 25. On his p. xiv the date is given as "129 B.C. (1130?)."
19 Justin xxxviii. 10. 7 ff.
20 Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 15.
passed the winter at Ecbatana (Hamadan), hastened to aid the nearest contingent, only to discover that Phraates had anticipated that movement. He was urged by his staff not to engage the superior enemy forces, who had but to fly to the neighboring hills to escape pursuit by the Seleucid cavalry. Spring was at hand and travel difficult, but a successor of Alexander the Great could not give ground before a foe whom he had defeated three times, and the Parthian attack was received on the spot. The Seleucid troops, in poor condition, were easily put to flight by the Parthians, and Antiochus died, abandoned by all his men; perhaps he was killed in the fighting, or he may have committed suicide. So complete was the Parthian victory that Antiochus' young son Seleucus and his nephew, a daughter of Demetrius, were among those captured. Athenaeus, commander of the Syrian forces, was among the first to flee. The number of the slain was placed at the absurdly large figure of three hundred thousand. The body of Antiochus was treated with all respect due a monarch and was sent

by Phraates to Syria in a silver casket. The daughter of Demetrius proved so charming to the Parthian king that he took her into his harem, and Seleucus was treated in a fashion befitting royalty. Thus the last serious attempt by a Seleucid monarch to regain the lost eastern provinces ended in complete failure. Incompetent kings and internal struggles rendered farther Parthian advance relatively easy.

Now that victory was his, Phraates regretted the release of Demetrius and ordered a body of cavalry to recapture him. Once free, however, Demetrius had sought his own country immediately, and the Parthian troops returned empty-handed.

Encouraged by his success against Antiochus, Phraates determined to invade Syria and entered Babylonia; but he was forced to abandon the whole plan by a Saca invasion in the east. Before leaving Mesopotamia to repel the invaders, he appointed his favorite, Himerus, a Hyrcanian, as governor.

The Saca mercenaries hired for the war against Antiochus were probably an advance group of this eastern horde whom Phraates attempted to quiet for a time by a subsidy. If the failure of the sources to mention the presence of Parthians in Babylonia to meet the attack of Antiochus in person is an indication that he was engaged elsewhere we may have additional

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21 Suggested by Bevan, *House of Seleucids*, II, 244.
24 Appian *Syr.* 68; Aelian *De natura animalium* 34.
28 Strabo *xiv*. 5. 2. 29 Justin *xxviii*. 10. 11 and *xxxix*. 1. 1.
evidence that the Saca invasion had begun by 130 B.C. The story that the mercenaries arrived after hostilities had ceased, and consequently were refused their pay, must not be taken too literally. They are said to have demanded either reimbursement for their trouble or employment against some other enemy. When this was refused, they began to ravage the Parthian territory as far west as Mesopotamia. Whether any considerable number of them ever reached the Land of the Two Rivers is doubtful.

The question of whence these invaders came and what caused their movement is part of the story of the Indian frontier and will be discussed in the succeeding chapter. Those who entered Parthia were probably a portion of the Sacaraucae (Saca Rawaca) together with a still larger body of the Massagetae and other groups attracted by the opportunity for new territory and plunder. The invasion naturally followed the two main branches of the great road (cf. pp. 205 f.), one leading to Mesopotamia through Merv, Hecatompylos, and Ecbatana, and the other, utilized when resistance to the westward advance turned the hordes southward, leading to India through Merv, Herat, and Seistan.

31 As Tarn points out in CAH, IX, 581 f.
32 Joan. Antioch. fr. 66. 2 (FHG, IV, 561).

In the army which Phraates led eastward against the Sacae were Greek troops, made prisoners during the war with Antiochus. The Parthian is said to have treated these Greeks with great cruelty. Phraates perhaps counted on the fact that they were facing unknown foes far from their homeland and would therefore be fighting for their lives; but when in the battle which eventually resulted between the Parthians and the Sacae the Greeks saw their captors hard pressed, they at once deserted to the enemy. The tide was turned against the Parthians, and in the massacre which ensued, about 128 B.C., Phraates perished.

Artabanus II, son of Priapatus and uncle of Phraates, inherited the problem of the Sacae, to whom he may have paid tribute. With the invaders in possession of the larger part of his kingdom, Artabanus was soon forced to arms. In an offensive movement somewhere in the region of Bactria against the “Tochari,” perhaps the Yüeh-chi of the Chinese records, he received a wound in the forearm, possibly from a poisoned weapon, which almost im-

31 Justin xlii. 1; McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 183.
32 Justin xlii. 2. 1. 33 Joan. Antioch. fr. 66 (FHG, IV, 561).
34 Tarn, “Sel.-Parth. Studies,” pp. 106-11 and 115-16, believes the Yüeh-chi are historically improbable in this particular case and suggests the Pasiani, whose name might have been miscopied as Asiani, for which the name Tochari would then have been substituted, in the text of Justin xlii. 2. 2. H. W. Bailey, “Taugara,” Bull. School of Or. Studies, VIII (1935-37), 912, denies that äršī = Asii.
mediately caused his death. This must have occurred in 124/23. 39

In the meantime Seleucia and the other cities of Mesopotamia had become dissatisfied with the rule of Himerus, the viceregent appointed by Phraates II in the year 129 B.C. Among other crimes he is charged with selling numerous Babylonians into Media as slaves. 40 Besides these internal troubles Himerus was soon face to face with a new power to the south, a new state arising in the territory once occupied by the old Seleucid province of the Erythraean Sea created by Antiochus III before Molon’s revolt. 41 Shortly after 129 B.C. the ancient city of Alexandria-Antioch near the head of the Persian Gulf was re-founded as Charax Spasinu by the Arab Hyspaosines, son of Sagdodonacus. 42 Under the leadership of Hyspaosines the surrounding country was rapidly conquered, and thus was founded the kingdom of Characene. Not long after Himerus was appointed governor of Babylonia he engaged in a war with this king but was defeated. 43 By 127 B.C. Hyspaosines was in possession of Babylon, 44 and probably also of Seleucia. His only dated coins are from 124/23 B.C., and by the next year Himerus again controlled central Babylonia and the mint city of Seleucia. 45 He celebrated his victory by striking coins which bore a Victory and the legend ΒΑΣΙΛΕΟΣ ΜΕΓΑΛΟΥ ΑΡΣΑΚΟΥ ΝΙΚΗΦΟΡΟΥ, 46 and his assumption of the title “king” 47 probably dated from this time. With the Sacae in possession of the larger portion of the eastern empire, Himerus now occupied the most important territory still under Parthian control.

Other interesting details of this period are cited by Pinches from unpublished tablets in the British Museum.

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45 Until recently the attribution of certain coins to Himerus has been considered reasonably definite: Gardner, Parthian Coinage, pp. 7 and 34; Wroth, Parthia, pp. xxi, xxiii, and 23 (somewhat doubtful); E. T. Newell, “A Parthian Hoard,” Num. Chron., 5th ser., IV (1924), 169 ff.; Newell, Mithradates of Parthia and Hyspaosines of Characene (“Numismatic Notes and Monographs,” No. 26 [New York, 1923]), pp. 13 f. Mr. Newell now prefers to assign them to Phraates II (in Survey of Persian Art, ed. Arthur Upham Pope, in press), following Maurice Dayet, “Un tétradrachme arsacide inédit,” Arethusa, II (1925), 63-66. The problem hinges on the only dated coin of Himerus, 189 B.C., i.e., 123/22 B.C., now considered by Mr. Newell to be of questionable status.

46 Wroth, Parthia, p. 23, No. 2; his other coins bear the title ΒΑΣΙΛΕΟΣ ΑΡΣΑΚΟΥ ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΥΣ ΦΙΛΑΕΛΗΝΟΣ. The titles at once suggest Mithradates II; but the portraits will not allow this identification, and, if Himerus is rejected, Phraates remains the only other possibility.

47 Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 21 and the coins cited in the previous note.
Mithradates II, son and successor of Artabanus, ascended the throne about 123 B.C. As in the case of his illustrious predecessor of the same name, his reign was important, and eventually he was called "the Great." His first task was the reduction of Babylonia and the defeat of the Characenean ruler; bronze coins of Hyspaosinœ overstruck with the titles and portrait of Mithradates in 121/20 B.C. furnish proof that this was accomplished.

How much of eastern Parthia remained in the hands of the Sacae we do not know. Perhaps by this date the main force of the westward movement had been spent and the bulk of the invaders had turned southward.

Mithradates undoubtedly did recover much lost ground, for, as we have seen, he regained Babylonia and probably a number of provinces to the east. In far-off Delos at the shrine of Asclepius a dedicatory inscription of about 110 B.C. commemorates a "king of kings," Arsaces the Great, who to judge from the title must be Mithradates. Fragments of other records of about the same period, written in Greek, have been found in Babylonia. Another campaign of Mithradates was against Artabasdes of Armenia, as a result of which Tigranes, the eldest son of the Armenian

of Merv by 115 B.C. and suggests that this reconquest was due to a hypothetical "king of the campaign coins," a joint ruler controlling the eastern provinces. As Wroth, Parthia, pp. xxxi-xxxi, had already pointed out, these coins cannot on numismatic grounds be assigned to Mithradates II but must be later. A study of a large hoard of Mithradates II strongly confirms this view; see Newell, "Coinage of Parthia" (in Survey of Persian Art, in press). McDowell, Coinage from Seleucia, p. 211, suggests that the "campaign coins" might plausibly be assigned to Mithradates' successor, Sinatruces, who struck them to celebrate his early victories as he advanced from exile among the "Scythians"; c.f. p. 53.

Justin xlii. 2. 4-5 states that he added many peoples to the empire. Perhaps the Bactrian conquests, taken from the Sacae according to Strabo x. 9. 2, should be placed in his reign.


king, was a hostage among the Parthians for a number of years. From this time onward Armenia was destined to play a major role in Parthian affairs. Eventually its ruling family became a branch of the royal Arsacid line, and its territory a bone of contention over which Rome and Parthia waged a long and bitter struggle.

The increased political importance of Parthia during the reign of Mithradates II was due in large part to the wealth accruing to her treasuries from the development of overland trade. While this certainly began before the Parthian invasion of Mesopotamia," unification of political control along the whole route from the Roman frontier to the point where the trade was taken over by Chinese merchants proved a tremendous stimulus to business. Our first definite information comes from Chinese sources," which report

51 Strabo xi. 14. 15; Justin xxxviii. 3. 1; cf. Trog. Pomp. xiii, where the war is mentioned.

that about 128 B.C. the famous Chinese traveler Chang K'ien spent a year in that part of Bactria which lay east of the Oxus, territory then in possession of the Sacae. Sometime later the first Chinese embassy journeyed to the Parthian capital. The members of the mission, sent by Wu-ti (141-87 B.C.) of the Han dynasty, were received with great honor, and when they returned they were accompanied by a Parthian delegation which took with it ostrich eggs and conjurers. 58 Trade between Parthia and China probably preceded rather than followed these events, although the movements of the Sacae and the Yüeh-chi obviously made such ventures hazardous from 165 B.C. onward.

Credit for the discovery and use of the monsoon as an aid to navigation in the Indian Ocean is given to a
merchant named Hippalus about the year 100 B.C.\(^{59}\) As might be expected, full utilization of this knowledge was not made until later, roughly the middle of the first century of our era.\(^{60}\)

His widely extended empire undoubtedly forced Mithradates to delegate extraordinary powers to his subordinates and gave greater opportunities than ever for self-aggrandizement. The satrap of satraps, Gotarzes, who appears on a relief cut by Mithradates in the great rock at Behistun, must by that time already have embarked on a career which eventually brought him into open revolt against his sovereign. If we accept the restoration by Herzfeld,\(^{61}\) based on a copy made before the partial destruction of the relief, the inscription\(^{62}\) should read

\[\text{Κοφασατης μισραθης πεττ[ε]στευμενος...}\]

\[\text{Σισισθης των Σισισθων βασιλευς...}\]

\[\text{Μεγας μισραθης...}\]

"Kophasates, Mithrates the overseer(?), . . . . . . .
Gotarzes the satrap of satraps, (and) the Great
King Mithradates."


\(^{60}\) E. H. Warmington, The Commerce between the Roman Empire and India (Cambridge, 1928), pp. 35 ff.

\(^{61}\) Am Tor von Asien (Berlin, 1920), pp. 35 ff.

\(^{62}\) OGIS, I, No. 431.

The figures thus named represented Mithradates, the chief satrap Gotarzes,\(^{63}\) and three others, probably also satraps.

About 94 B.C., probably on the death of his father Artavasdes, the Armenian prince Tigranes,\(^{63}\) for some years past a hostage among the Parthians, was returned to his country and placed on the throne with the aid of Parthian troops. In payment for their services the Parthians received "seventy valleys."\(^{64}\) Tigranes proved an able monarch. Soon after his establishment as king of Armenia he formed an alliance with Mithradates of Pontus, who between 112 and 93 B.C. had built a great and powerful state to the northwest. To further cement the union he married Cleopatra, daughter of his ally. The two kings then proceeded to drive Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia from his throne.

In the meantime Mithradates of Parthia, safe from interference by the growing power of Armenia, pushed rapidly westward. Antiochus X Eusebes Philopator was contending for the doubtful honor of the Seleucid throne with Demetrius III Eucaerus and Ptolemy

\(^{63}\) This might be the Gotarzes of A.D. 38–51 (see pp. 166–74), but there are several arguments against such attribution. Tacitus Ann. xi. 10 gives the name of the ruler contemporary with Gotarzes II as Meherdates, a form definitely later than that of the inscription. The forms of the letters agree with the earlier rather than the later date. Finally, the name Gotarzes ceases to appear in the same year as the commonly accepted date for the death of Mithradates II, 87 B.C. On this point see p. 44 and Herzfeld, Am Tor von Asien, pp. 39 ff.

VIII Lathyros. A certain Laodice, when she was attacked by the Parthians, who had now reached the Euphrates, summoned Antiochus, who fell in the fighting.

Rome deemed it time to interfere in 92 B.C. and commissioned Sulla to replace Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia on his throne. The real but not avowed object was to curb the growing power of Mithradates of Pontus. The rapid advance of Parthia toward the Roman frontier was no doubt a matter of some concern. Orobozus was sent as ambassador of Parthia to meet Sulla on the Euphrates, probably near Melitene. The Parthian asked for the friendship of the Roman people and perhaps also an alliance both offensive and defensive. Schooled in Hellenistic rather than Latin tradition as Orobozus undoubtedly was, he assumed his request would be taken literally, and never dreamed it implied an offer to become tributary. Sulla had little realization of Parthia’s military strength and still less of her future potentialities. In Roman eyes Parthia was overshadowed by the more obvious peril of Armenia and Pontus.

Livy Epit. c refers to the treaty with Lucullus; but Ruf. Fest. 15' Florus i. 46. 4, and Orosius vi. 13. 2, all following Livy, seem to indicate some agreement with Sulla. Cf. Dobiáš, op. cit., pp. 219 f.

Plut. Sulla 5.

Our source, Avroman parchment I, is dated 225 of an unspecified era which, following the arguments of E. H. Minns, “Parchments of the Parthian Period from Avroman in Kurdistan,” JHS, XXXV (1915), 22-65, I take to be the Seleucid, making the date 87 B.C. If it were the Arsacid era, the date would be 23 B.C. The question cannot yet be settled with certainty; but the Avroman parchments show undoubted relationships to contemporary Babylonian business documents, which in every known case where single dating is found employ the Seleucid, not the Arsacid, era. The year 87, not 23, is the time when a Parthian king would boastfully place his Armenian wife between his two sister-wives in his titulary. Tigranes II, who cannot have come to the throne much before 20 B.C., likewise bore, however, according to his coins, the title “great king”; see E. T. Newell, Some Unpublished Coins of Eastern Dynasts (“Numismatic Notes and Monographs,” No. 30 [New York, 1926]), p. 13. On the arguments for the Arsacid era see Rostovtzeff and Welles, “A Parchment Contract Loan,” Yale Classical Studies, II (1931), 41 f. Other articles on the Avroman documents are: Ludwig Mitteis, “Miszellen,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung, XXXVI (1918), 425-29; A. Cowley, “The Pahlavi Document from Avroman,” JRAI, 1919, pp. 147-54; P. M. Meyer, Juristische
Tigranes, and allied himself with Mithradates of Pontus.\textsuperscript{71}

Some business documents dated in the reign of Arsaces, king of kings, with a date corresponding to 93 B.C.,\textsuperscript{72} and astronomical ephemerides dated under Arsaces in years corresponding to 92/91 B.C.\textsuperscript{73} suggest that Mithradates was then in control of Babylonia. But early in 91 B.C.\textsuperscript{74} a Gotarzes (I), king, with his queens Ashi\textsuperscript{a}batum and another whose name we cannot read,\textsuperscript{75} appears on tablets from Babylon. Gotarzes, the former satrap of satraps, had now set


\textsuperscript{71} Appian Mith. 15.

\textsuperscript{72} R. Campbell Thompson, \textit{A Catalogue of the Late Babylonian Tablets in the Bodleian Library, Oxford} (London, 1927), pp. 28 f.; Strassmaier in \textit{ZA}, III (1888), 133 f.


\textsuperscript{74} The date in Reiser, \textit{Hymnen}, No. 51, was miswritten by the ancient scribe as 6 II Addaru, 155 a.e., 231 s.e.; but since 155 a.e. had no second Addaru the Arsacid date must be changed to 157 to correspond to the correct Seleucid one. The Arsaces of this hymn is almost certainly Gotarzes, for in 89 B.C. Queen Ashi\textsuperscript{a}batum appears as his consort; see \textit{ZA}, VI (1891), 232.

\textsuperscript{75} Reiser, \textit{loc. cit.} Minns, “Avroman Parchments,” \textit{JHS}, XXXV (1915), 34 f., texts h-j, transliterates the ga\textsuperscript{a}n sign as \textit{bli}\textit{t}tu (“lady”), whereas \textit{ibid.}, p. 35, n, and p. 36, p, he transliterates exactly the same sign as \textit{sarratu} (“queen”). This is correct, though confusing, for the ga\textsuperscript{a}n sign may be transliterated either way; but Tarn in \textit{CAH}, IX, 587, attempts to deduce historical evidence on the basis of the titles \textit{bli}\textit{tu} and \textit{sarratu}; Strassmaier in \textit{ZA}, VIII (1893), 112, the source for both Minns and Tarn, was aware of the double value: “...\textit{bli}\textit{t}tu (oder: \textit{sarratu}).”

\textsuperscript{76} The sole fact which these tablets provide is that Gotarzes was then recognized as king in Babylon; the inference regarding the extent of his territory remains uncertain.

\textsuperscript{77} Gotarzes and his immediate successor, Orodes, are the only Parthian kings in all the numerous documents of the period mentioned by name rather than by their title Arsaces. The conclusion is obvious: the name was necessary to denote which Arsaces was meant, and we have here evidence of conflict between Mithradates and his former satrap of satraps. On the parallel usage of the coins cf. McDowell, \textit{Coins from Seleucia}, p. 223.

\textsuperscript{78} Mss., Zi\textsuperscript{g}ov.
dates II, by whom he was well treated. This event, which took place in 87 B.C., is the last dated occurrence in the reign of Mithradates II, and we have evidence which suggests that he died soon thereafter. Mithradates had controlled Iran, including Kurdistan, and northern Mesopotamia, while Gotarzes held sway in Babylonia. Upon the death of his great opponent the personal name of Gotarzes was immediately dropped from the tablets, since there was no longer necessity for a distinction between contenders for the title, and he appears simply as Arsaces, king.

Mithradates II had been a friend and ally of Tigranes of Armenia. On his death the latter felt free, not to say urged, to proceed against Gotarzes, who was perhaps not of the Arsacid line. Tigranes took back the seventy valleys; he invaded Gorduene, besides overrunning the region about Nineveh; and Adiabene, with the important center of Arbela, fell into his hands. Thence he advanced into Media, where he burned the royal palace at Adrampa (Artaman) on the great road to the west of Ecbatan. Atropatene became his vassal state. Eventually Tigranes carried his arms victoriously throughout northern Mesopotamia and as far west as Syria and Phoenicia, flaunting in the very faces of the Parthians their customary title, king of kings, never claimed by Gotarzes.

Gotarzes continued to control Babylonia until 81/80 B.C. But in April, 80, there appears on the tablets an Orodus (I), the use of whose personal

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"Josephus Antiq. xiii. 384–86. Justin xlii. 4 is confused between Mithradates II and Mithradates III; Trog. Pomp. xliii was apparently not the source of error, since he places a number of kings between Mithradates and Orodus."


"Note the Iranian characteristics of his drachms, Wroth, Parthia, Pl. VIII, on which Mithradates appears as an old man. Ms. Avroman I, dated 87 B.C., was found in Kurdistan. On Mesopotamia see p. 48."

"Tablets dated in the reign of "Arsaces who is called Gotarzes" continue until 87 B.C.; see Epping and Strassmaier in ZA, VI (1891), 222 and 226."

"Reisner, Hymnen, Nos. 27, 49, and 55; Epping and Strassmaier in ZA, V (1890), 355."

"This is implied in his subsequent offer (Memnon [FHG, III, 556 f., fr. 58. 1]) to return them."

"Strabo xi. 14. 15; Plut. Lucullus 21 and 26."

"Ibid. Char. Mani, Parth, 61, cf. Orosius vi. 4. 9. Plut. Lucullus 14 says that Tigranes cut the Parthians off from Asia."

"Appian Syr. 48; Plut. Lucullus 14; Josephus Ant. xii. 419-21; Justin xi. 1; Eutrop. Brev. vi. 8."

"[167] A.e., 1221. E.c., 81/80 B.C., Reisner, Hymnen, No. 49. The insertion in the Parthian line of an "Artabanus II" to rule from 88 to 77 B.C. has been suggested by Gutschmid, Geschichte Iran, p. 81 and n. 1, followed by Wroth, Parthia, p. xxx, but this is now generally rejected; see p. 16, n. 66. The coins formerly assigned to him must follow those of Mithradates II, and they should be given to Gotarzes, Orodus, or Sinatruces."

"Strassmaier in ZA, III (1888), 135, and VIII (1892), 112; Epping in ZA, IV (1889), 78. E. Schrader in SAW, 1890, p. 1327, n. 1, on the basis of a re-examination by Bezold of the tablet published in ZA, VIII, 0.
name again suggests conflict with the reigning Arsaces, presumably Gotarzes, who is henceforth no longer known to us. Orodes ruled but a brief span, for in 76/75 B.C., an Arshakan, king, and his sisterwife, Isbubarza, queen, appear on the tablets. This must be Sinatruces, who was undoubtedly on the throne by that date. Sinatruces was an old man of eighty when recalled from among the Sacaraucae to rule over Parthia. Although assisted by these nomads, he presumably was related to the Arsacidae, and this would explain why he was summoned to end a period of dissension. In the winter of 72/71 B.C., Mithradates of Pontus requested assistance against the Romans, but the aged Sinatruces was in no position to antagonize such powerful opponents and re-

112, rejects šar šarrāni, but he restores it in his transliteration. Strassmaier’s cuneiform copy should certainly be read šar šarrāni. See also Kugler (Sternkunde, II, 447, No. 26), who follows Strassmaier.

90 Strassmaier in ZA, VIII (1893), 112; Kugler, Sternkunde, II, 447 f.

91 Sinatruces died in 70 or 69 B.C.; see Phleger fr. 12.6 (J, II B, p. 1164). He ruled seven years according to Lucian Long. 15.

92 Spellings are: Sintricus, Appian Mith. 104; Sinatrocles or Sinatruces, Lucian Long. 15; Sinatruces, Phleger fr. 12.7 (J, II B, p. 1164).

93 Lucian Long. 15; cf. his appearance on the coins, Wroth, Parthia, pp. 42 f. and Pl. X.

94 Rawlinson, Sixth Mon., p. 139 and n. 4, suggests that he was a son of Mithradates I and a brother of Phraates II. Had he been a candidate from among the Sacaraucae, they would surely have selected a younger man.

fused. The old king died in 70 or 69 B.C. and was succeeded by his son Phraates III.

With the reigns of Sinatruces and his successors we reach a period for which our sources are both more extensive and easier of interpretation. Let us turn therefore from the western part of the empire to the eastern frontier and examine the events of the past hundred years, events which molded and shaped new boundaries and new customs and which had a powerful effect on the politics of the empire as a whole.

95 Memnon (FHG, III, 549, fr. 43.2).
CHAPTER III
THE INDO-IRANIAN FRONTIER

Evidence for the story of the eastern frontier of Parthia is scanty, for events there were too remote to interest western historians and archaeological work in eastern Iran has hardly begun. Indian history, which might supplement our inadequate information from the west, helps but little, since, in spite of considerable evidence both literary and archaeological in character and years of study by excellent scholars, the chronology of the period remains still uncertain. Fortunately the accounts of Chinese travelers and historians are fairly complete and accurate, and they possess the additional advantage that events mentioned can be accurately dated. From them, more than from any other source, we can obtain a few clues to the still uncertain question of the Indo-Scythian kingdoms.¹

In the period between 174 and 165 B.C.² a tribe known to the Chinese as the Yüeh-chi, who dwelt in the province of Kansu, were attacked by their neighbors, the Hsiung-nu or Huns. As a blow delivered on the last of a series of balls is transmitted to others in contact with it, so this movement of the Huns was reflected far and wide among the tribes to the west. The Greek name for the Yüeh-chi is somewhat uncertain; they were a composite group of which the Tochari formed the bulk and the Arsi the ruling or most important element.³ When the Yüeh-chi were driven from their homeland, they came into conflict with a tribe known as the Sak (modern Sai or Sê), who lived in the region of the Jaxartes River. These were the Sacae or Scyths of the Greek and Roman writers, and in this case probably the Sacaraucæ, one of the two principal divisions of the Sacae.⁴ The

¹ Little new evidence has been uncovered in the past twenty years, and most of the articles go back to common sources. The bibliography in this chapter is not complete; additional titles will be found in the works cited and in the Annual Bibliography of Indian Archaeology (Leyden, 1928—).


Yüeh-chi occupied the lands of the Sak and forced the Sak to move westward before them into Bactria. The Sacae, by this time a large horde consisting partly of Sacaraucae and Massagetae and partly of other smaller groups gathered en route, were thus forced into Ta-hsia (Bactria).

Determination of the time when this migration came into conflict with the Parthians depends upon the uncertain date of the Parthian expansion to the east. While the Parthian invasion of India under Mithradates I (171–138 B.C.) can hardly be styled a ‘legend,’” there is no good evidence as yet for such conquests beyond the statement of Orosius, a late writer of uncertain accuracy. If by Hydaspes he


For the Chinese sources see pp. 42 f., n. 57. The late Dr. Laufer of Field Museum, Chicago, was kind enough to offer suggestions as to the relative merits of the translations.

Hersfeld, “Sakastan,” AMI, IV (1932), 21–25, believes that Ferghana was the point from which the Sacae began their wanderings. His identification of Wu-sun as Ferghana is against the almost universal opinion of Sinologists, who believe Ferghana to be Ta-yüan.

As does Tarn in CAH, IX, 579.

Orosius v. 4. 16. Note that the drachms collected by G. P. Tate in Seistan (Rapson, “Note on Ancient Coins,” JfRAS, 1904, p. 677) begin with Mithradates II. The small number of coins, however, largely negates the value of the evidence. For a chronological table based on an acceptance of Orosius see V. A. Smith, “The Indo-Parthian Dynasties,” ZDMG, LX (1926), 72 f.

meant not the Indian Jhelum but some other stream, the Porali, or possibly even the Median Hydaspas of Vergil, then Parthian conquests in India must remain in doubt. Orosius was influenced by the post-Augustan literary tradition, in which the gem-bearing Hydaspas figured prominently.

If the identification of Turiva with Traxiana in the upper Ochus River valley be accepted, then the reign of Mithradates I brought the Parthians into a position where contact with the advancing Sacae was inevitable. In 130 B.C. Phraates II engaged the services of a body of Saca mercenaries (see pp. 35 f.), and shortly thereafter the flood of invaders must have reached the eastern provinces. The remnants of the Bactrian kingdom were swept away by these hordes.


10 Horace Od. i. 22. 8; Seneca Medea 723 ff. and Herc. Oet. 628; Lucan De bell. civ. iii. 236 and viii. 227; Pliny Hist. nat. vii. 71; Statius Thebais viii. 237; Dionysius Periegetes 1138 f.; Claudian Paneg. dictus Prohino et Olybrio 70–80, In Rufinum ii. 243, Paneg. terrio cons. Hon. 4, Paneg. quarto cons. Hon. 601, Paneg. dictus Manlio Theodoro 29, and De raptu Proserpinar. 82 and iii. 325. Note the frequency of the references in Claudian, who immediately preceded Orosius.

11 Strabo xi. 11. 2.


against whom the Parthians threw the full weight of their military forces. The severity of this struggle is shown by the fact that two Parthian kings, Phraates II (138/37–ca. 128 B.C.) and his successor Artabanus II (ca. 128–124/23 B.C.), lost their lives in battle against the Sacae.

Individual groups may have penetrated into the heart of the Parthian empire, perhaps even as far as Mesopotamia; but the majority of the Sacae were turned back by the exertions of the Parthians, and thus the Roman orient was spared their ravages. The explanation for the close interrelation in later times between the Sacae and the Parthians lies in the contacts which occurred as the hordes moved slowly southward toward India, contacts which must also explain the Parthian cultural influences at Taxila in India. While a portion of the Sacae evidently turned southward from the great road and entered India through Ki-pin,14 others must have passed through eastern Parthia and entered India perhaps through the Bolan Pass in the Brauh Mountains.15

Even the energetic Mithradates II was apparently unable to regain complete control of the eastern provinces, though the Sacae may have acknowledged some form of vassalage. After his death one of his successors sometime between 87 and 75 B.C. made a series of campaigns in the east and struck coins to commemorate the recovery of Margiana, Traxiana, and Aria.16

When the Sacae entered India remains uncertain, and new evidence must be forthcoming to settle the question. The date of the first Indo-Scythian king,

14 Ki-pin, which shifted its position at various periods, has not been identified with certainty. Christian Lassen, Indische Alterthumskunde (2d ed.; Leipzig, 1867 and 1874), II, 269 and n. 5, and Herzfeld, “Sakaistan,” AMI, IV (1932), 31–35, on historical grounds believe it part of Arachosia. Lévi and Chavannes, “L’Itinéraire d’Ou K’ong,” JA, 9. sér., VI (1895), 371–84; France, Beiträge (APAW, 1904, No. 1), pp. 55 f., and Hirth, “Story of Chang K’ien,” JAOS, XXXVII (1917), 133, suggest Kashmir, an identification to which the late Dr. Lauffer agreed. Klapperth, Tableaux hist. p. 133, and Wiegier, Textes historiques, I, 716, identify Ki-pin with Kabul; but, as Rapson in CHI, I, 563, pointed out, the Kabul valley was still in the possession of the Tavana princes and no numismatic evidence of the early Sacae kings has been found there. See also H. W. Jacobson, An Early History of Sogdiana (unpublished dissertation, University of Chicago, 1933), pp. 14 f. Both Rapson, loc. cit., and F. W. Thomas,

15 The Date of Kaniska,” JRAS, 1913, pp. 624 f., feel that the physical difficulties of the Kashmir route preclude a large tribal migration. Obviously all the Sacae could not have entered India by this route, or so large a Parthian element would not be present in their culture.

16 Rapson in CHI, I, 564. The writer does not agree with the view of F. W. Thomas, “Sakaistan,” JRAS, 1906, pp. 181–216, that the Sacae had long been in eastern Iran.

17 Wroth, Parthia, p. 40 and n. 1. On the assignment of these coins see pp. 40 f., n. 51. Isid. Char. Man. Parth. 18 f. offers only a post quem date of about 1 B.C. on the acquisition of Seistan and Arachosia. Tarn in CAH, IX, 587, cites the Chinese sources as recording an independent kingdom, “Woo-yi-shan-li,” which occupied the same territory as these provinces about 75 B.C. A similar statement was earlier made by Gutschmidt, Geschichte Zentralasien, pp. 79 f., also without reference. Neither V. A. Smith, “The Indo-Parthian Dynasties,” ZDMG, LX (1906), 55, nor the writer has been able to locate the source for this statement; cf. de Groot, Chinesische Urkunden. II. Die westliche China, pp. 91–93. Note that the Chinese sources almost invariably use such names as Parthia, Chaldae, Bactria, and Arachosia in a provincial sense rather than in a more all-embracing meaning.
Maues, offers no solution, since it hinges on the doubtful interpretation of a much discussed word in the Taxila copper-plate inscription of the satrap Patika and on the uncertain dating of an era. Probably Maues should be identified with the Great King Moga of the inscription, which is dated in the year 78 of some unspecified era. The month name is Parthinian. Since 169 B.C. is out of the question, this cannot be the Arsacid era, which began in 247 B.C.; even if the 78 stands for 178, the date would be 69 B.C. Rapson suggested that the era may possibly mark the capture of Seistan by Mithridates I, but a date as late as 9–6 B.C. for the inscription is favored by some on the theory that the era began after the death of Mithridates II in 88/87 B.C.

Herefore Parthia has been considered almost solely from the Graeco-Roman viewpoint. Parthian influence in India must be regarded as an Indo-Iranian culture in which other elements such as the Hellenistic are present. In a similar manner many phases of the Parthian occupation of Dura-Europus and Seleucia on the Tigris which hitherto have found no counterpart in western Hellenism may be explained as local Graeco-Iranian. That in the Parthian period both India and Mesopotamia faced more toward Iran than toward Hellenized Syria has only recently been recognized. Proof for this lies in material excavated at Taxila, Seleucia, and Dura-Europus, some of which has already appeared in print, though much is still in press or remains unpublished in museums.

From the time of the Indian invasion by the Sacae, the latter are so closely connected both politically and culturally with the Parthians that they cannot be distinguished one from the other. The fact that "very few true Parthian coins are found in India" furnishes additional evidence for the belief that the

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18 G. Bühler, "Taxila Plate of Patika," in Epigraphia Indica, IV (1896/77), No. 5, pp. 54–57; Rapson in CHI, I, 570. For a good general discussion see L. de la Vallée-Poussin, op. cit., pp. 272 f.


20 Rapson in CHI, I, 570; cf. pp. 19 f.

21 See the articles by Konow cited on p. 64, n. 30, and McGovern, Early Empires (in press).


Saceae and the Pahlavas were independent of the Parthian empire, though they had been vassals of that power. In spite of the warlike reputation which the Parthians attained in the west by virtue of their successes against the Romans, they were a people quick to realize and profit by the advantages of peace. Wanton destruction was not one of their characteristics; they had rather a canny instinct for a pact advantageous to both parties. The ability of Mithradates, combined with his victories on the battlefield, would result in agreements for mutual benefit. Treaties would be drawn up which according to the usual Parthian custom bound the signatories within their loose feudal system and guaranteed commercial rights. Indian officialdom probably contained both Parthians and Saceae, but little evidence can be obtained from their names, for one of the first acts of a newly elevated officer would be the adoption of a garb and name suitable to his new station.

For the organization of the Indo-Scythian kingdoms and their relations with the feudatories of southeastern Iran we must depend almost entirely upon numismatic evidence of unknown provenience. Though Rapson’s arrangement may fit all the facts

Note that the Seleucids and the Sasanids both utilized elephants when their possessions extended far enough east to enable them to secure the beasts. There is no record of the Parthians using them in war.

CHI, I, chap. xxiii. For a different interpretation see Herzfeld, “Sakastan,” AMJ, IV (1932), 91–98, and a briefer account in the Cambridge Shorter History of India (ed. H. H. Dodwell; Cambridge, 1934),

now available, new evidence may bring radical changes at any time.

Normally there were three contemporary rulers of royal rank in eastern Iran and northwestern India: a “king of kings” in Iran, some junior member of his family associated with him, and another “king of kings” in India. The junior member in Iran usually became in due course the supreme ruler in India. The belief that the title “king of kings” was not used in Parthia from 88 to 57 B.C. led logically to the correct conclusion that the rulers of Iran and India were independent of Parthia; but at least one case of its use in Parthia in 64 B.C. is known.

In eastern Iran the ruler issued coins together with that member of the family associated with him in the government. The legend of the king is in Greek, and that of the prince, or the reverse, in Kharosthi; since the use of Kharosthi in this period is known from Arachosia only, we may infer that the prince governed that territory.

The evidence of the coins and the Taxila plate

Notes:
1 An interesting, though earlier, parallel to this custom is found in Elam; see Cameron, Hist. of Early Iran, pp. 20 and 71 f.
2 Rapson in CHI, I, 569.
3 Kugler, Sternkunde, II, 447, No. 31.
4 For coins of the Indo-Scythian period see Percy Gardner, The Coins of the Greek and Scythian Kings of Bactria and India in the British Museum (London, 1886); E. Drouin, “Chronologie et numismatique des rois indo-
inscription suggests that Maues conquered Gandhara, including Pushkalavati to the west and Taxila to the east of the Indus River. But in the eastern Punjab the conquests of Maues remained to be completed by two of his successors, the first of whom was Azes I. This king associated with himself one Azilises, who eventually succeeded him. The arrange-


31 Konow, “The So-called Takht-i-Bahi Inscription,” pp. 273 f., suggested that Azes and Azilises were the same person; but he now rejects this idea in his “Notes on Indo-Scythian Chronology,” p. 24. Cf. for evi-

ment of these and the following rulers is based solely on the coinage; in the present case Azes, as the elder, appears on the obverse with a Greek inscription, and Azilises, on the reverse, with one in Kharosthi.32

Shortly after the first Saka king commenced his rule in India, a monarch with the Parthian name of Vonones established himself in eastern Iran and took the imperial title. His reign cannot be dated, and it seems impossible to identify him with Vonones I of Parthia (A.D. 8–11).33 The dynasty established by Vonones is often called “Pahlava” to distinguish it from the contemporary ruling family of Parthia. Azilises as king of kings in India made further conquests in the Punjab; but either voluntarily or perforce he relinquished Arachosia, which came under the control of Vonones. It was ruled by Vonones’ brother Spalairos, who held the territory conjointly with his son Spalagadames.34 One of the Indian princes, Azes II, became associated with Azilises in the Indian kingship and eventually succeeded to the supreme power.


34 This is based on the assumption that Spalairos is the equivalent of the Greek Sparys; see Whitehead, Cat. of Coins in the Pan. Mus., 1, 143, followed by Rapson in CHI, I, 574.
Vonones was succeeded by Spalirises, who has been identified as a brother of Vonones solely because the coins of Spalirises bear the legend “the king’s brother” and Vonones is generally believed to be the king in question. Spalirises’ son Azes became ruler in Arachosia; and, as we have seen, he was later king of kings in India as Azes II. The next successor whom we know in the Iranian line was a certain Orthagnes. His Iranian name means “victorious,” and his coins bear a winged Victory similar to those on the coinage of Vonones I of Parthia, though whether the symbol refers to some conquest or merely to the king’s name we cannot tell.

In Arachosia two men were associated at this time in joint rule, Gondopharnes and Guda (or Gudana), possibly a brother of the king of kings Orthagnes. Gondopharnes left Arachosia in A.D. 19 to assume supreme command in India, where he became the most famous of the Pahlava kings. His name also is Iranian, “winner of glory.” The coins lead us to suspect that he included within his realm the Pahlava and Saca territory in southeastern Iran and northwestern India as well as the Kabul valley, where large numbers of his coins were found. Abdagases, a nephew (?) of Gondopharnes, acted as viceroy in the new Iranian provinces. Gondopharnes was still in power in A.D. 43, but we do not know the date of his death. On the basis of numismatic evidence Rapson has suggested that Gondopharnes may have captured some territory from the Parthians. His coins, whether struck alone or with his nephew or his commanders in chief, usually bear the symbol $\mathfrak{A}$; this mark is found counterstruck on coins of Orodos II (57–37/36 B.C.) and Artabanus III (A.D. 12–38).

Gondopharnes was succeeded by Pacores, who bears a good Parthian name. Numismatic evidence suggests that he was suzerain in southeastern Iran and that he controlled at least a part of India. His coins, bearing a figure of Victory similar to those of Orthagnes, have been discovered at Taxila; they have also the Gondopharnes symbol and the legend of a well known commander in chief. One more ruler of Seistan is known, Sanabares, conjecturally assigned to that territory because of the Greek legends on his coins.

The Saca power in India began to dwindle away rapidly under the successors of Gondopharnes. Here the Chinese sources again bring some light. A hundred years or more after the settlement of the Yūēh-

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chi in Bactria and the departure of the Sacae for India a chief of the Kushans, one of the tribes of the Yüeh-chieh, gained supremacy over the entire group (about A.D. 25–81?) and established a kingdom which became known by the name of his tribe. This king, Kujula Kadphises, rapidly expanded his power over Gandhara, Arachosia, and Kabul at the expense of either Gondophares or Pacores. Perhaps the Parthian conquests to which the Chinese sources refer are those of the Kushans in the Indo-Scythian kingdoms; possibly they may indicate attacks on Parthia proper. The second of the Kushan rulers, Vima Kadphises, ended his reign not long before the accession of Kanishka, whose date has been so long a subject of discussion (A.D. 125?).

39 Chavannes, "Les pays d'Occident d'après le Hou Han chou," T'oung Pao, 2. sér., VIII (1907), 190–92; Wiegert, Textes historiques, I, 716 ff.

A remnant of the old Saka power existed in the Indus delta for some time. The author of the Periplus speaks of the "Parthians" as still in control there and describes the struggles of the various petty chiefs for supremacy.**

CHAPTER IV
DRUMS OF CARRHAE

PHRAATES III THEOS succeeded his father Sinatruces on the Parthian throne at a time when the fortunes of Mithradates of Pontus were at a low ebb. Tigranes of Armenia, the Pontian ally, though stripped of much of his territory, remained one of the great figures in the Orient. That the Parthian king should be drawn into the maelstrom of international politics was inevitable.

Shortly before the Battle of Tigranocerta in 69 b.C., Mithradates and Tigranes sent pleas for aid against Rome to Phraates, offering the "seventy valleys," Adiabene, and northern Mesopotamia as an inducement. Mithradates proposed that the Parthian should attack Mesopotamia while he and his ally advanced on Armenia, thus cutting Lucullus off from supplies. After his victory Lucullus, learning of these negotiations, sent some of his allies to threaten the Parthian king, should he join forces with Mithradates and Tigranes, and to promise rewards for his friendship. Phraates replied in a conciliatory manner to the overtures of both parties, and both felt that he had promised them support. The Parthian response reached Lucullus in Gorduene, and the legate Sextilius was sent to continue negotiations. Phraates suspected, perhaps rightly, that the officer was sent to report Parthian movements; the net result was that he did not give aid to either side, but attempted the dangerous procedure of straddling the diplomatic fence. Lucullus, who felt that Mithradates and Tigranes were both so exhausted from the prolonged struggle that they were not dangerous, determined to attack Parthia. Sornatus was ordered to bring the army from Pontus to Gorduene, but the troops refused to move and even threatened to leave Pontus undefended. When this news reached the legions with Lucullus they also mutinied, and the Parthian

\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{1} Phlegon fr. 12. 7 (J, II B, p. 1164); Appian Mith. 104; Dio Cass. xxxvi. 45; cf. the coins assigned Phraates by Wreth, Parthia, pp. 45-55.}
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\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{2} Memnon fr. lvii. 2 (PHG, III, 556 f.), "Phradates"; Dio Cass. xxxvi. 1; Appian Mith. 87; Plut. Lucullus 30.}
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\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{3} Sallust Histr. iv. fr. 69. In the letter of Mithradates as reported by Sallust the last historical reference (line 15) concerns the defeat of a large Pontian force in a defile. This is obviously the defeat described in Plut. Lucullus 25, which occurred before the Battle of Tigranocerta. Mauren-}
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\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{4} PW, art. "Sextilius," No. 2.}
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\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{5} Plut. Lucullus 30; Appian Mith. 87; Dio Cass. xxxvi. 3.}
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\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{6} PW, art. "Sornatus."}
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expedition had to be abandoned for one against Tigranes.7

In 66 B.C., under the Lex Manilia, Pompey was appointed to replace Lucullus and at once secured an agreement with Phraates to insure Parthian neutrality in the same manner as under the previous treaty. But Tigranes the Younger, after an unsuccessful revolt against his father, sought refuge with Phraates and urged him to invade that part of Armenia held by the elder Tigranes.8 Phraates acquiesced, though with some hesitation because of his agreement with Pompey. News of the Parthian treaty with the Romans alarmed Mithradates, and he began to negotiate for a truce.

The Parthian forces advanced to Artaxata (Arta- shat). When the siege promised to be of considerable duration, Phraates left a detachment of his troops with the younger Tigranes and returned to his own country. Tigranes the Elder then took the field and

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7 Cicero Manil. 23–24; Plut. Lucullus 30; Sallust Hist. iv. fr. 72. See also PW, arts. “Licinius (Lucullus),” No. 102, and “Mithradates,” No. 12. From about this time comes a tablet of the year 68 B.C. mentioning an Arshakan, king, and Pi-(?)-us(or -ri)-ta-na-a, his wife, queen. The king must be Phraates III; cf. Strassmaier in Zf, VIII (1893), 112; Kugler, Sternkunde, II, 447 and n. 3; Minns, “Avroman Parchments,” JHS XXXV (1915), 36.

8 Cf. Dio Cass. xxxvi. 45, where the invasion of Armenia seems to have been required by the treaty with Pompey, and ibid. 51, where it is the result of the efforts of Tigranes the Younger. But since the treaty was the same as that made by Lucullus, and Phraates had misgivings about violating his agreement with Pompey, the version of xxxvi. 51 is correct. See also Appian, Mith. 104. On the younger Tigranes see PW, art. “Tigranes,” No. 2.

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defeated his son. The young man thought of seeking refuge with Mithradates of Pontus, but felt that Mithradates was now little stronger than he; so, perhaps at the suggestion of Phraates, he threw himself on the mercy of Pompey. The Roman commander was already marching on Artaxata, and Tigranes acted as guide. Tigranes the Elder despaired of further resistance and submitted to Pompey. In the partition which followed, Sophene and Gorduene were to be given to Tigranes the Younger.9 His father retained Armenia proper, but was forced to relinquish his conquests in Syria. Almost immediately after this decision there were fresh disputes, and Pompey seized the younger Tigranes. Cappadocia was then restored to its king Ariobarzanes I, and along with it went the districts of Sophene and Gorduene;10 but the latter at least was never effectively occupied.11

In 65 B.C. Pompey made an extended campaign against the Iberians and Albanians, leaving L. Afranius to maintain control of Armenia. Pompey was within three days’ march of the Caspian Sea and was even inquiring the distance to India when he was forced to abandon his advance.12 In the meantime A. Gabinius, then a legate under Pompey, made a

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9 Appian, Mith. 105.
10 Appian Mith. 105.
11 See p. 74.
12 Plut. Pompey 36; Pliny Hist. nat. vi. 52.
raid across the Euphrates as far as the Tigris, and Phraates, who had learned of the seizure of Tigranes the Younger, again invaded Gorduene, which he rapidly won from Tigranes the Elder. While Pompey was returning through Lesser Armenia he received ambassadors of the Medes and the Elymaeans, who came perhaps because of the Roman attack on Darius of Media Atropatene, who had befriended Antiochus I of Commagene or Tigranes. Phraates too sent an embassy, perhaps inspired by Gabinius’ raid, requesting that Tigranes the Younger, his son-in-law, be delivered over to him, and at the same time demanding formal recognition of the Euphrates as the boundary between Rome and Parthia.

Pompey asked the return of the newly captured district of Gorduene and refused to surrender Tigranes. As for the boundary the only satisfaction Phraates could obtain was the lofty sentiment that the Romans set justice as their boundary toward the Parthians. Since the ambassadors were not instructed with regard to Gorduene, Pompey wrote briefly to Phraates, addressing him merely as “king,” not “king of kings,” a title which he wished to reserve for Tigranes, and without waiting for a reply sent Afranius to occupy the disputed territory. Whether this was accomplished without fighting we cannot be sure; but Gorduene was given again to Tigranes of Armenia. Contrary to a treaty with the Parthians, Afranius returned through Mesopotamia to Syria, encountering many hardships and nearly losing his army.

The quarrel between Tigranes and Phraates was not yet ended. In 64 B.C., while Pompey was in Syria, ambassadors from both parties arrived to consult him. As an excuse for not supporting his Armenian appointee, Pompey replied that he could take no action without orders from the Senate; but he did send three commissioners to settle the boundary dispute. Apparently Phraates retained Adiabene, and Tigranes Gorduene and Nisibis. No doubt the ambassadors found the matter somewhat simplified by the fact that both kings now realized they must conserve their strength for attacks on their common enemy, Rome, rather than waste it in petty quarrels. About 58/57 B.C. Phraates III was murdered by his sons.

13 Dio Cass. xxxvii. 5. 2.
14 Dio Cass. xxxvii. 5. 3; Appian Mith. 106; Plut. Pompey 36.
15 Plut. Pompey 36. 16 Appian Mith. 106 and 117; Diod. Sic. xi. 4.
18 Dio Cass. xxxvii. 5 says the district was taken without a battle, whereas Plut. Pompey 36 states that Afranius drove Phraates from the district and pursued him as far as Arbela. Strabo xvi. 1. 24 mentions Pompey’s giving of Gorduene to Tigranes.
19 Appian Mith. 106; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 5; Plut. Pompey 39.
20 Plut. Pompey 39; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 7.
Bambyce (Membidj), and enrolled a few additional soldiers. About the same time, or perhaps in the spring, Orodes sent ambassadors to Crassus to demand the reason for this unprovoked invasion. If the war was being waged without the consent of the Roman people, as the Parthians had been informed, then they would show mercy and take pity on the old age of Crassus; but if the attack were official, then it was to be a war without truce or treaty. If the message is correctly reported, this is one of the numerous examples proving the superiority of the Parthian intelligence service over the Roman, which seems to have been notoriously bad in the East. Such a reply was not calculated to pacify the Roman; on the contrary it provoked him to fury, as perhaps Orodes intended. Crassus replied that he would answer their demands in Seleucia. The eldest of the Parthians then stretched out the palm of his hand and responded: “Hair will grow here before you see Seleucia.” The gesture and retort are still in use among present-day Arabs.

Because he had garrisoned the captured towns Crassus had no choice but to follow the same road on his next campaign, for, as he said, he had left many good men there. This decision cost him the support of a large body of foot and horse tendered by Artavasdes the Armenian, who advised Crassus to advance by way of Armenia and thus keep in the hills, where the Parthian cavalry would be least useful. His advice and support were refused, and he rode away.

Crassus crossed the Euphrates at Zeugma with a force which numbered about forty-two thousand, including four thousand cavalry and a like number of light-armed men. Opposed to these troops were ten thousand cavalrymen (ten dragons), munitioned by a thousand camels which carried additional supplies of arrows. These forces were in command of Suren, the Parthian commander in chief, assisted by the satrap Silaces; for Orodes, taking with him the bulk of the infantry, had gone to Armenia to hold in check Artavasdes the king and to await the Roman attack, which he had every reason to expect would fall in that direction. But even Orodes was unable to

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46 Said by Plut. Crassus 19 to have numbered thirty thousand foot and sixteen thousand mailed horse.

47 On the location of this Zeugma and the earlier one to the north see F. Cumont, Études syriennes (Paris, 1917), pp. 119-42; J. Dobiás, “Seleucia sur l’Euphrate,” Syria, VI (1925), 253-68.

48 Plut. Crassus 20 gives the force at seven legions with four thousand horse and as many light-armed men. Florus i. 46. 2 speaks of eleven legions; Appian Bell. civ. ii. 18 makes the total force a hundred thousand! The legions are estimated at thirty-five thousand by Rawlinson, Sixth Mon., pp. 155 f.; thirty-four thousand by Sykes, Hist. of Persia, I, 347 f.; and twenty-eight thousand by Tarn in CAH, IX, 608.

49 The Parthian military unit was a “dragon,” consisting of one thousand men, according to Lucian Quomodo hist. 29.

50 This is a family name; see Herzfeld, “Sakastan,” AMI, IV (1932), 70 ff.
foresee the foolhardiness of Crassus; hence the brunt of the campaign was borne by the cavalry left to defend Mesopotamia, where they were eminently suited to the level country.

Cassius, the quaestor, suggested a halt to rest the men in one of the garrisoned villages and the dispatch of scouts to gather information on the enemy forces. He argued that, if the advance had to be made at once, the best route lay along the Euphrates to Seleucia, which was the objective. But when Abgarus of Osroene rode into camp with news that the Parthians were retreating and taking their goods with them, and that they had left only two subordinates to cover their flight, Crassus permitted his enthusiasm to win the upper hand, and immediate advance across Mesopotamia was decided upon. Abgarus was later accused of acting as agent of the Parthians, but it is difficult to substantiate the charge. 60

Suren was undoubtedly a man of great ability and courage, although not yet thirty years of age. He traveled with a large number of personal attendants, a bodyguard of a thousand mail-clad horsemen, and a sufficient number of concubines to require two hundred wagons. Apparently his force was composed entirely of cavalry, 61 the logical arm for the open country and for the distances to be traversed.

60 Dio Cass. xl. 20. Rawlinson, Sixth Mon., pp. 162 ff., expressed doubts as to the accuracy of the original source; Tarn in CAH, IX, 608, believes Abgarus innocent.


Crassus hastened across Mesopotamia through territory which the Roman authorities who seek an excuse for the subsequent defeat claim was trackless desert waste. Actually the country was rolling, and there were some villages and water holes throughout the region. Since the legions, among the most rapid marchers in the world, set out in the spring, they probably arrived before the lush grass of the last rains had burned away. On May 6 the troops reached the river Balicha (Balīkh) at a point below the city of Carrhae (Harran).

At Carrhae the Roman commander was informed by his scouts that Suren was near by. The officers urged a rest and a reconnoitering expedition; but Crassus, carried away by the ardor of his son, advanced almost immediately, allowing his men barely sufficient time to eat and drink while standing in ranks. As Cassius had advised, Crassus moved forward with a wide front and little depth to his line, the wings supported by cavalry. To his son Publius he gave the command of one wing, to Cassius that of the other, while he himself took the center. The hurried advance tired still more the already weary Romans. On the approach of the Parthians, the bulk of the troops were formed into a square. The strength of the enemy remained an unknown quantity, for their numbers were masked by an advance guard and the heavy armor of the cataphracts was concealed under skins. At a given signal the Parthians
discarded the coverings and with the roar of a multitude of kettledrums charged the Roman line. This move resulted in a general withdrawal of the scouts and light-armed to positions within the square; and before the astonished Crassus was aware of the maneuver, he was surrounded.

To understand the disaster which followed, some discussion of the character of the forces involved is demanded. The chief strength of the Parthian army was in its cavalry, which was divided into two branches, the light- and the heavy-armed. The light-armed wore no armor at all, though each man probably bore a small oval shield and carried a powerful bow and a quiver of arrows. This compound bow outranged the Roman weapons and had sufficient force to penetrate the armor of the legionaries. Camels stationed behind the fighting lines carried an extra supply of arrows from which the light-armed replenished their quivers.

The heavy cavalry, the cataphracts, wore scale armor which covered horse and rider to head to foot. Their weapon was a long, heavy lance, with which they charged the enemy, relying on weight to carry them through the opposing forces. Scale armor was first developed in Iran and spread rapidly eastward into China and more slowly westward through Parthia to the later Roman army. In direct contrast to the Parthians were the Romans, armored foot soldiers, equipped for close fighting, each man protected by a shield and by a javelin (pilum) which he hurled before closing in with his short sword. In cavalry the army was weak, for the Romans as yet depended on their allies to supply this branch of the service; the lesson taught at Carrhae eventually caused the expansion of the Roman mounted forces.

The Roman infantry were surrounded by the Parthian bowmen, who poured into them a deadly hail of arrows from every side. A charge by the Roman light-armed proved ineffectual. When the legions attempted the hand-to-hand fighting by which they hitherto had always conquered, the Parthians retired before them and continued to wield their bows with telling effect until they drove the legionaries back to the main body. Crassus realized the necessity of decisive action at once; the order was given for his son to charge the Parthians. With thirteen hundred horsemen, five hundred archers, and eight cohorts (about four thousand men), the young Publius drove the enemy before him with ease until, caught far from all support, the Parthians turned upon him. Many of

Examples were found at Dura-Europos, *Illustr. London News*, September 2, 1933, p. 362. The horses apparently were not as heavy as Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 601, has supposed, since the Dura armor fitted light Arab horses. However, the Dura armor is later in date than the time of Crassus. See also the figures clad in scale armor on Trajan's column (p. 217).

those engaged in the attack on Crassus left and joined the assault on Publius. The bowmen rode Indian fashion around the bewildered Romans, shooting as they passed. Only the light-armed Gauls were effective against the Parthians, for they slipped from their mounts and stabbed the unprotected bellies of the Parthian horses or seized the lances and dragged the heavily armored riders to earth. But they were too few. Publius was wounded and attempted to fall back on the legions. His soldiers retired to a little hill, perhaps a tell, locked their shields, and fought on until they were killed or forced to surrender; not more than five hundred were taken alive. Publius and the majority of his officers ordered their shield-bearers to kill them or committed suicide. The Parthians cut off the head of Publius, fixed it on a lance, and returned to the main attack.

In the meantime Crassus, relieved somewhat by the departure of those who had joined the assault on Publius, took courage and drew up his troops on sloping ground. Warned by a messenger of the danger to which his son was exposed, Crassus prepared to move to his aid; but scarcely had he set his forces in motion when the returning Parthians appeared with the head of Publius. Attacked by bowmen on the flanks and crowded by the heavy cavalry in front, the situation of the Romans was extremely serious until nightfall, when the Parthians withdrew.

54 Cicero Pro Scauro ii. 1.
who was in their service, in the position of guide to the Roman forces. Crassus set out at night toward the hill town of Sinnaca, but Andromachus wasted time until day broke. For this service he was rewarded with the tyranny of Carrhae, which he held until his cruelty led the citizens to kill him and his family. Octavius, more successful in his choice of guides, reached the hill country safely with about five thousand men. Meanwhile Cassius, disgusted with the meanderings of Andromachus, had returned to Carrhae, whence he fled with five hundred horsemen to Syria. Unnerved by this bitter experience, he ever after kept a man ready to kill him should he so direct.

At dawn Crassus was still a mile and a half from Octavius and the safety of the rough country when the appearance of the Parthians forced him to take refuge on a knoll. Surrounded by an enemy numerically far superior, his situation was extremely dangerous; Octavius perceived his peril and courageously left a safe position on high ground to relieve Crassus.

Suren realized that he must act immediately, for if the Romans reached the near-by hills it would be impossible to use the Parthian cavalry. His next move, though possibly motivated by a desire to secure the person of Crassus, who was believed to be the instigator of the war, may also have been caused by a genuine desire to make peace, perhaps for purposes of self-aggrandizement. He released some Roman prisoners who had been allowed to overhear a conversation in the course of which assurances of kind treatment for Crassus and a desire for peace were expressed. The Parthians were ordered to cease fighting, and Suren with his staff advanced to the base of the rise on which the Romans had made their stand and offered safe passage and a treaty of peace. Crassus, fearing treachery, was disinclined to accept; but his men threatened him, and he was forced to comply. The meeting took place in the open space between the two armies, and each commander was accompanied by an equal number of men, presumably unarmed. The Parthians were on horseback, the Romans on foot. After a short conversation Crassus was offered a horse and the party started in the direction of the Euphrates, the boundary where most of the preceding treaties had been signed. But the Romans, weary with fighting and expecting treachery, perhaps failed to understand the purpose of this act, seeing in it an abduction of their commander. Octavius seized the bridle of Crassus' horse, and a general scuffle ensued, during which Octavius drew a sword and slew one of the Parthian grooms. This precipitated a mêlée in which Crassus, Octavius, and

58 Strabo xvi. 1. 23; Tarn in CAH, IX, 610, n. 1.
60 Nic. Dam. cxiv (J, II A, p. 378, fr. 79); Plut. Crassus 29.
57 Plut. Brutus 43.
58 Plut. Crassus 30; but cf. Dio Cass. xl. 26, who says that Crassus trusted Suren without hesitation.
other Romans were slain. Whether or not the Parthians intended treachery we cannot be sure, but one of the supposedly unarmed Romans struck the first blow, and the whole affair may have been a tragic misunderstanding. Later the headless bodies of the Romans were dragged around the walls of Sinnaca.

The Roman troops either surrendered or scattered during the night, only to be hunted down when daylight broke. Of the forty-two thousand who had set out with Crassus, scarcely one-fourth escaped, for twenty thousand were slain and ten thousand were made prisoners. The captives were settled at Margiana (Merv), where they intermarried with native women. Some were pressed into the Parthian armies and later betrayed their captors. Suren proceeded to Seleucia, where he held a mock triumph to impress the citizens. Not long afterward, realizing the danger from so able a man, Orodos put Suren to death.

While the campaign against Crassus was in progress, Orodos had come to terms with Artavasdes, who was no longer under Roman influence. The Parthian had arranged a marriage between his son Pacorus and the sister of the Armenian monarch. While the festivities were in progress and the entire company was watching a performance of the Bacchae of Euripides, messengers arrived with the head and hand of Crassus, gruesome trophies of Carrhae. In announcing the victory the head was thrown upon the stage, an action scarcely in keeping with Greek tradition, though both of the kings and their attendants were familiar with the Greek language and literature, and Artavasdes had written orations and histories and composed tragedies in that language.

The result of Crassus' fiasco was to place Parthia on an equal if not superior plane with Rome in the minds of men from the Mediterranean to the Indus. The lands east of the Euphrates became definitely Parthian, and the Euphrates remained the boundary between Rome and Parthia until A.D. 63, when the defeat of Paetus took place. The Parthians failed to follow up their victory, although Cassius, now in command of the Roman troops in Syria, was short of men and unlikely to receive reinforcements while civil war was threatening in Rome.

Among the groups most strongly affected by this increase in Parthian prestige were the Jews. For

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59 G. E. J. Guilhem de Sainte-Croix, "Mémoire sur le gouvernement des Parthes," Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres, Mémo. de litt., L (1808), 62, was the first to point out this very possible interpretation of the story.

60 Pliny Hist. nat. vi. 47.

61 Pliny Hist. nat. vi. 47.

62 Horace Od. iii. 5. 5. 63 Vell. Pat. ii. 82; Florus ii. 20. 4.

64 Plut. Crassus 33. Just how much reliance can be placed on this much overworked story is doubtful. In any case, the evidence concerns only the immediate court circle, and the extent to which Hellenism penetrated the life of the common people yet remains to be determined.

65 Strabo xi. 9, 2; Dio Cass. xii. 11; Pliny Hist. nat. v. 88 (25) ; Justin xli. 1. 1; Herodian iv. 10; Plut. Antony 34.
years they had looked to this newly risen power in the East as a possible source of support, and the strong Jewish colonies in Babylonia must have kept their more westerly brethren informed of the Parthian successes. As the Greeks of Mesopotamia directed their appeals for aid to the rulers of Seleucid Syria, so the Palestinian Jews turned their eyes toward Parthia for deliverance from oppression.

Perhaps in the time of Antiochus Sidetes (139/38–129 B.C.) an agreement for co-ordinated action had been reached between the Jews and the Parthians. Certainly either during the ill-fated Parthian expedition or immediately afterward John Hyrcanus had made attacks on Syrian cities. A passage of about that date in the Talmud seems to mention an attack by the Jews on Antioch. In the time of Alexander Jannaeus (103–78 B.C.) a Parthian embassy of good will is mentioned as having been feasted at Jerusalem. During the celebration they inquired for the old man Simeon, then in exile, who had entertained them previously. It is noteworthy that during the reign of Alexander no mention is made of Jewish embassies to Rome such as had commonly been sent by his predecessors. The disaster which the Roman arms had suffered at Carrhae made certain the supremacy, at least for the time being, of pro-Parthian over pro-Roman sentiment among the Jews.

In 52 B.C. raids were made on Syria; but the Parthians were driven out by Cassius, who then hastily marched southward into Judea, where he assaulted and captured the city of Taricheae. Large numbers of Jews who had revolted, perhaps inspired by the Parthian success, were sold into slavery. The Jews discovered in plots against members of the pro-Roman party naturally turned toward Parthia as a certain refuge.

The next, more determined, attempt by Parthia opened the way for expansion to its farthest western limits. This advance forms the subject of the following chapter.

66 A late writer, Josippon, chap. 28, says that John Hyrcanus received an embassy which proposed such an agreement.

67 Josephus Anti. xiii. 254 and Bell. i. 62.

68 Soṭah 33a. “Antioch” is by many emended to “Antiochus”; see J. Klausner, Israelite History [in Hebrew], II (Jerusalem, 1924), 74.

69 Yerushalmi, Berakoth 7. 2 (Krotoschin ed., reproduced by L. Lamm [Berlin, 1920], I, 11b) and Nazir 5. 5 (ibid., II, 54b).
and Hybreas of Mylasa both wished to oppose him, but others, who were without arms and inclined toward peace, yielded. Hybreas especially provoked Labienus, for when the latter struck coins with the legend IMPERATOR PARTHICUS, Hybreas said: "Then I shall call myself 'Carian general.'" When Mylasa was taken the home of Hybreas was especially singled out for plunder, but the orator himself had sought safety in Rhodes. Alabanda also surrendered only after sharp fighting; Stratonicea of Caria, though it was besieged a long time, was never taken. A later rescript of Augustus praised Stratonicea for its resistance to the Parthian attack. L. Munatius Plancus, governor of Asia, fled to the islands for refuge. The forces of Labienus may even have penetrated as far as Lydia and Ionia. Naturally he did not neglect the opportunity thus created to collect funds from the captured territory.

Pacorus, proceeding along the coast, and Barzapharnes, one of his commanders, marching farther inland, met with equal success in the south. All Syria fell before them except Tyre, against which Pacorus was powerless without a fleet. In some places, such as Sidon and Ptolemais (Acre), he was favorably received.

At this time in Judea the political power of the Hasmoneans was gone. Hyrcanus (I), the high priest, was but nominal ruler; and Antigonus, his nephew, had already failed in the attempt to wrest Jewish leadership from his uncle. The real power lay in the hands of Phasael and Herod, sons of Antipater the Idumean. To the advancing Parthians Antigonus offered one thousand talents and five hundred Jewish women, and because he was the head of a pro-Parthian group Pacorus decided to aid him. A special squadron of horsemen under the command of the cupbearer Pacorus, a man who bore the same name as the prince, was detailed to advance into Judea for this purpose. While these troops were raiding Carmel, a large number of Jews volunteered their services to Antigonus. Jews and Parthians together advanced to a grove of oak trees not far away, where they defeated the opposing forces, and then hastened on to Jerusalem.

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65 G. F. Hill, Historical Roman Coins (London, 1909), pp. 128–31 and Pl. XIII 80. These coins bore on the obverse the head of Labienus and on the reverse a saddled and bridled horse. The assumption of such a title should mean a victory over the Parthians, but the Parthians were the allies of Labienus! It was evidently as difficult for contemporaries to understand this action as for us.

67 Dio Cass. xlvi. 26; Josephus Ant. xiv. 330 ff., xx. 245, and Bell. i. 248 ff.


Within the city the writer of Enoch was moved by the coming of the Parthian hosts to express the pious hope that the city of righteousness would be a hindrance to their horses. In possible internal dissensions among the invaders he saw deliverance for the elect—a most reasonable hope in view of the past history of Parthia, but one not fulfilled in this case.

The combined Jewish and Parthian forces managed to enter the palace; but the struggle, eventually little more than an armed contest between two political factions, went on for some time within the walls. Finally the cupbearer Pacorus was admitted to the city with five hundred Parthian horsemen, ostensibly to act as mediator. Hyrcanus and the tetrarch Phasael were persuaded to go as ambassadors to the Parthian commander Barzapharnes. To allay suspicion Pacorus left with Herod two hundred horsemen and ten “Freemen,” and the remainder of the cavalry acted as escort to the embassy. They were well received by Barzapharnes, and it was not until the Parthian commander had departed to rejoin Prince Pacorus and the ambassadors had reached Ecdippa (ez-Zib) on the coast that they learned they were virtual prisoners.

In the meantime Pacorus the cupbearer was attempting to lure Herod outside the walls of Jerusalem in order to seize him. But Herod was suspicious, for he had heard of his brother’s arrest; under cover of darkness he fled with most of his family, pursued by the Parthians. Herod and his supporters managed to hold both the Parthians and the hostile Jewish group at bay and eventually reached the stronghold of Masada (es-Sebbeh) to the west of the Dead Sea. The Parthians pillaged Jerusalem and the surrounding country and laid waste the city of Mareshah or Marissa (Tell Sandahannah). Antigonus himself bit off the ears of Hyrcanus, so that his mutilated condition might prevent his ever again holding office. Phasael killed himself; Antigonus was made king in Jerusalem; and Hyrcanus was carried away to Parthia. By Parthian intervention a Jewish king again sat on the throne in the Holy City; the dream of re-establishing the kingdom had become a reality. The wide extent of Parthian influence, no doubt originally through trade relations and now through military strength, is demonstrated by the rapidity with which Malchus, king of the Nabataean Arabs, obeyed Parthian orders to expel Herod from his territory. This act later cost him a large sum of money.

\[\text{Cf. Lev. 21:16-23.}\]


\[\text{78 Josephus Bell. i. 276.}\]

\[\text{79 Dio Cass. xlvi. 41.}\]
in the hands of Parthia or were seriously threatened by her. Antony, though aware of the situation, took no decisive action during his voyage up the Syrian coast on his way to Greece, for war was on in Italy and his presence there was imperative.

In 39 B.C. Antony was sufficiently in control of the situation at home to begin a new campaign against the Parthians. He had sent Publius Ventidius Bassus in advance into Asia in 40 B.C., and this officer surprised Labienus with only a small body of local troops, for his Parthian allies were not present at that time. Labienus, unable to offer battle, was forced into Syria, where he was evidently cornered. Both the Romans and the troops of Labienus awaited reinforcements; for the former these were heavy-armed men, for the latter the Parthians. Both received the expected aid on the same day, but Ventidius wisely re-

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83 Dio Cass. xlviii. 27; Plut. Antony 30.
84 Appian. Bell. civ. v. 65, 75, 132 f.; Gellius Noct. Att. xv. 4; Victor De viv. iii. 85; Dio Cass. xlviii. 39-41 and xlix. 19-22; Eutrop. Brev. vii. 5; Florus ii. 19 f.; Frontinus Strat. i. 1. 6 and ii. 5. 36 f.; Tac. Germ. 37; Josephus Ant. xiv. 392-94 and 420 and Bell. i. 284-92; Justin xlii. 4. 7-11; Juvenal Sat. vii. 199; Livy Epit. cxxvii; Orosius vi. 18. 23; Pliny Hist. nat. vii. 135 (44); Plut. Antony 33 f.; Ruf. Fest. 18; Strabo xii. 2. 11, xiv. 2. 24, xvi. 2. 8; Val. Max. vi. 9. 9; Vell. Pat. ii. 78; Zonaras x. 18 and 22 f.

85 Dio Cass. xlviii. 26 and 39-40; Strabo xiv. 2. 24. Rhous (Arsus) seems to have begun a new era on its coinage with these victories of Ventidius in 39 B.C.; see George Macdonald, “A New Syrian Era,” Journal international d’archéologie et numismatiques, VI (1903), 47 f.

86 Or Poppeadius; see notes in Boisivain’s ed. of Dio Cass. at xlviii. 41.

87 Dio Cass. xlviii. 41; Eustath. ad loc., n. 1, states that the Cilician Gates are meant. That is obviously an error, since the Cilician Gates are located in the Taurus Mountains, whereas Dio clearly refers to a pass in the Amanus on the border between Cilicia and Syria. Rawlinson, Sixth Mon., p. 190 and n. 2, suggests the Syrian Gates, on the basis of Strabo xvi. 2. 8; the reference in n. 2 is incorrect, for Strabo xv. 2. 8 refers to the Caspian Gates, hundreds of miles to the east. The Amanus Gates, just north of Epiphanea in Cilicia, are the most probable.
fore the close of the siege. Unfortunately Antony was even less successful than his able lieutenant before the walls of Samosata, and he was at last constrained to accept three hundred talents in lieu of the original offer of a thousand.\footnote{Plut. \textit{Antony} 34; Josephus \textit{Ant.} xiv. 439-47 and \textit{Bell.} i. 321 f.; Dio Cass. xlix. 20 f. Can this be the treaty mentioned in Florus ii. 20. 1?}

Ventidius returned to Rome. Gaius Sosius was to take charge of Syria, and Publius Canidius Crassus was expected to subdue Armenia and then proceed northward to the Caucasus. In November, 38 B.C., Ventidius celebrated his triumph in Rome.\footnote{The speech in which he proclaimed his victories was borrowed from C. Sallustius, according to Fronto \textit{Epist.} ii. 1. 5 (Loeb, II, p. 137). On Ventidius see Suetonius in \textit{Gellius Nast. Att.} xv. 4. On the triumph see \textit{Fasti triumphales populi Romani}, ed. E. Paix (Rome, 1920), F. Tr. 715/39; CIL, I 1, p. 461, a.v.e. 716; Vell. Pat. ii. 65.} Antony also was granted one, but did not live to enjoy it. Jerusalem fell in 37 B.C.; Antigonus was put to death, and Herod became king of the Jews.

The loss of his son Pacorus proved a great shock to the aged King Orodes and may have unbalanced his mind to some extent. With thirty sons to choose from, Orodes found it difficult to make up his mind. His selection of Phraates, the eldest of his eligible children,\footnote{Justin xlii. 4. 11-16; Dio Cass. xlix. 23.} was most unfortunate, as the events which followed proved.

PHRAATES IV came into power shortly before 37 B.C.\footnote{No coins are known to have been struck in 38/37 B.C. either by Orodes II or by Phraates IV; see McDowell, \textit{Coins from Seleucia}, p. 184. Phraates' first known issue, A. Ritter von Petrovics, \textit{Arsacidien-Münzen} (Wien, 1904), p. 77, No. 1, is dated June, 37 B.C. Horace \textit{Ep.} 7. 9 should be placed about this time.} Not long thereafter he attempted to hasten the death of his aged father by a dose ofaconite.\footnote{Plut. \textit{Crassus} 33. In dropy the excess blood which the heart cannot handle backs up into the extremities, causing them to swell. When given in small doses, aconite strengthens and steadies the heart action and might thus effect a temporary cure, though larger quantities would be fatal. The drug is made from \textit{monn monskhoid and would be in an impure state as prepared in antiquity—a fact which may account for the cure rather than the death of Crodes. The whole incident may be a later Greek or Roman addition.} When this failed he resorted to the more certain method of strangulation. To make his position more secure, he shortly murdered his brothers and was thus apparently without opposition. But soon he found himself compelled to remove numbers of prominent Parthians, while the remainder fled to refuge among various peoples and in distant cities.} When this failed he resorted to the more certain method of strangulation. To make his position more secure, he shortly murdered his brothers and was thus apparently without opposition. But soon he found himself compelled to remove numbers of prominent Parthians, while the remainder fled to refuge among various peoples and in distant cities.

\footnote{There is almost no agreement of sources with regard to the time of these murders: no clue in Justin xlii. 5. 1; Plut. \textit{Antony} 37, Phraates put Orodes to death; Dio Cass. xlii. 23, Orodes dies of grief and old age before the murder of the sons. Cf. Rawlinson, \textit{Sixth Mem.}, p. 196 and note 1.}
Some even sought the protection of the Romans. Among the latter was a noble, Monaeses, a man of great prominence and wealth who had gained a reputation as a commander during the war just completed. He promised Antony to lead the Roman army and believed that he could easily win over almost all of Parthia. Induced by this favorable presentation of the situation, Antony prepared for war against the Parthians. Late in 37 or early in 36 B.C. Publius Canidius Crassus forced Armenia to become a Roman ally and then turned northward to defeat the Iberians and Albanians, thus removing the threat of an attack from the rear on the proposed expedition.

Hyrkanus, the Jewish high priest carried off to Parthia in 39 B.C., though unable to serve again in his former capacity because of his mutilated condition, wished to return home. Not long after his accession to the throne in 37 B.C. Herod sent an ambassador to request the release of Hyrcanus. Despite the protests of the local Jews, leave to depart was granted by the Parthian king. Financed by his friends, Hyrcanus journeyed to Jerusalem, where he lived in honor until 30 B.C., when he was put to death on the suspicion that he was plotting against Herod. Later Phoreras,

4 Horace Od. iii. 6. 9; Plut. Antony 37. Adolf Günther, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kriege zwischen Römern und Parthern (Berlin, 1922), p. 58, n. 1, suggests that his reputation was won in the attack on Statianus.


6 Josephus Bell. i. 433 and Ant. xv. 11-22 and 164-82.


8 Dio Cass. xlix. 24; Plut. Antony 37.
most powerful. When late in April or early in May Antony advanced to the Euphrates, contrary to expectations he found the whole region carefully guarded; but, since he was following the plan of invasion laid out by Caesar rather than that of Crassus, this made little difference. Since in any case he needed the cavalry to be furnished by his northern allies, he turned up the Euphrates, passed through Zeugma (near modern Birecik, Türkisch Birecik, which is the ancient Apamea; see p. 83, n. 46), and at some point, perhaps Carana (Erzurum), met the auxiliaries and held a review of the troops.

The total forces under Antony's command numbered about a hundred thousand men, divided as follows: sixty thousand legionaries (sixteen legions), ten thousand Iberian and Celtic cavalry, and thirty thousand allies, both horsemen and light-armed, including seven thousand foot and six thousand horse.

11 Dio Cass. xlix. 25; Plut. Antony 37; cf. Strabo xi. 3. 4 and xvi. 1. 28.
13 Suet. Julius 44.
15 These horsemen, fully equipped and armored, the Armenian king was proud to display before Antony. His advice was to attack Media Atropatene, since the ruler of that country, also named Artavasdes, and all of his troops were with the Parthians on the Euphrates. The guide who led the Romans northward from Zeugma to the borders of Atropatene, and later even Artavasdes himself, were accused of being Parthian agents; but the charge may have been based on a desire to shift the blame for the defeat that ensued. In order to speed up his advance Antony left behind his slow-moving baggage, his siege engines (carried in three hundred wagons), and all beasts of burden. About two legions, under Oppius Statianus, were assigned the task of bringing forward this material as rapidly as possible. Because there was no heavy timber in the country to be traversed, siege engines could not be constructed there; if they were to be available, they had to be brought with the army. Antony himself took the cavalry and the pick of the infantry and hurried to the capital of Media Atropatene, Praespa (Takh-i-
16 Plut. Antony 37. Justin xxii. 3. 3 and Florus ii. 20 state that he had with him sixteen legions; Victor De civ. ill. 85. 4 reports the number as fifteen; Livy Epl. lxxx gives 18; and Vell. Pat. ii. 82 says thirteen. Kromayer, op. cit., Hermes, XXXIII (1898), 27, estimates the average strength of these legions at 3750. See also Günther, Beiträge, p. 50 and n. 2; Farn, "Antony's Legions," Classical Quarterly, XXVI (1932), 75–81.
Sulaimān), which he was forced to besiege. Lack of siege equipment was a great handicap, for Antony had to build huge mounds in lieu of the usual towers. Phraates, when he saw that the task of reducing the well garrisoned and strongly defended city was likely to occupy Antony for some time, turned his attention to the baggage train. Statianus, caught off his guard, was surrounded by cavalry, and in the battle which ensued the Roman commander and all his men were lost. The valuable siege engines and the baggage were destroyed by the Parthians. Among the numerous captives taken was Polemon, king of Pontus, who was afterward released for a ransom. Artavasdes the Armenian deserted either just before the battle, which may account for the completeness of the Roman defeat, or shortly afterward when he despaired of the Roman cause. He took with him, besides his own troops, some of the allied forces, a total of sixteen thousand men. Antony, hastening with reinforcements in response to messengers from Statianus, found only corpses.

The Roman commander was now in a peculiarly difficult position. To obtain food he had to send out foraging parties, which, if they were small, were wiped out or, if large enough to defend themselves, so reduced the strength of the besiegers that the people of Praaspā could make successful sorties and destroy the siege works. The legionaries, though protected by slingers, suffered much from the Parthian archers and their run-and-fight cavalry tactics. As Dellius, probably an eyewitness, remarked in his account of a skirmish engaged in by a large foraging party in which the Parthian dead totaled eighty, the Romans thought it a terrible thing that, when they were victorious, they killed so few of the enemy and, when they were vanquished, they were robbed of as many men as they had lost with the baggage wagons. Shortly after this particular party returned, the people of the city made a sally and put to flight the Romans on the mound. To punish the cowardice of these men Antony was reduced to decimation; that is, he put to death every tenth man. To the remainder he gave barley instead of the usual wheat. Since neither side wished to prolong the campaign into the approaching winter, Antony made a last, unsuccessful attempt to

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20 Dio Cass. xlix. 25.
21 Plut. Antony 38 mentions the loss of ten thousand men; Livy Epit. cxxxv and Vell. Pat. ii. 82, two legions.
25 Ibid.; Frontinus Strat. iv. 1. 37. Though Dio Cass. xlix. 27 says that all the army was given barley, the substitution of barley for wheat is ordinarily part of the punishment; cf. Octavian in the Dalmatian War, Suet. Augustas 24; Dio Cass. xlix. 38. 4; H. M. D. Parker, The Roman Legions (Oxford, 1928), pp. 232-34 (a work almost valueless for the eastern campaigns).
secure the lost standards and captives before raising the siege. After all negotiations proved abortive, Antony departed, leaving behind his improvised siege implements.

Phraates expected the Romans to return by the route they had come, but Antony was advised by a friendly Mardian26 to follow the hills and thus avoid the archers to some extent rather than cross the open, treeless plains. The hill route was also said to be shorter, to be better provisioned, and to have the additional advantage of passing through many villages. With the Mardian as guide, Antony took the route suggested, and for two days all went well. On the third, when he had relaxed his guard and was marching in open order, he came to a point where the road was flooded by a recently breached dike. Warned by his guide that this was the work of the Parthians, Antony ordered his men into battle array, a task scarcely accomplished when the Romans were enveloped by enemy cavalry. Charges by light-armed troops simply caused the Parthians to withdraw momentarily, but attacks by the Celtic horsemen were effective.

Antony then adopted a formation consisting of a hollow square the flanks of which were covered by slingers and javelin-throwers, while horsemen broke up the Parthian attacks with charges. Thus the column was able to proceed, though but slowly.27 On the fifth day Flavius Gallus asked for some of the light-armed troops from the rear. When the usual attack came, he pressed forward against the enemy instead of drawing them back toward the legionaries as was the custom. In a few moments he was surrounded and forced to ask for aid, but the small detachments sent were quickly cut to pieces. Disaster appeared imminent until Antony arrived from the van and with him Legion III, which pushed its way through the fugitives and effected a rescue. Some three thousand were killed and five thousand wounded, among them Gallus, who died shortly afterward.28 On the next day the Parthians, said to number about forty thousand, hoped to complete the destruction of the Roman forces, but the legions rallied and met the attack by forming a testudo.29 The Parthians, deceived by the sea of shields, supposed that the Romans were giving up the struggle and so dismounted and charged on foot. When they were within a short distance, the legionaries rose and met them with their short swords, killing those in the front ranks and putting the remainder to flight. The weary retreat then continued.

Famine fought with the Parthians, for the small amount of grain available was difficult to grind after the mills had been abandoned with the transport

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26 Plut. *Antony* 41. The later writers Vell. Pat. ii. 82 and Florus ii. 20. 4 represent him as a survivor of Crassus’ expedition, settled in Mardiana.

27 On the retreat see also Frontinus *Strat.* ii. 13. 7.


29 Plut. *Antony* 45; Dio Cass. xlix. 29 f.; Frontinus *Strat.* ii. 3. 15.
animals. Wild plants which the soldiers ate produced sickness and even death.

When the vigor of the Parthian attacks had declined for a time, Antony considered leaving the hills for level ground, especially as the rough hill country ahead was reported to be waterless. A cousin of the Monaeszes who had been with Antony came to camp and warned him through an interpreter that the same fate which had befallen Crassus awaited him should he ever leave the hills. The Mardian was of the same opinion, and he added that but one day without water awaited them on the safe route. Accordingly they continued on as originally planned. Camp was broken at night, the troops carrying water in such vessels as they had or even in their helmets. But the Parthians, contrary to their usual custom, took up the pursuit even in the darkness and followed close behind the legions. About sunrise they overtook the rear guard, then worn out by a thirty-mile march. The parched soldiers suffered from drinking water laden with salts, for it was impossible to restrain them from anything liquid. Antony began to pitch camp, but abandoned the idea and resumed the march on the advice of a Parthian deserter who assured him that a river of good water was not far off, and that beyond it the Parthians were not likely to pursue them. As a reward for this information, the deserter was given as many gold vessels as he could conceal in his garments. The disorganization of the Roman army was by this time almost complete, for Roman stole from Roman, Antony's own baggage-carriers were attacked, and the commander himself made arrangements for a freedman in his bodyguard to kill him should he so command. To reorganize his troops Antony called a halt, and he had partially brought order out of chaos when the Parthians resumed the attack. A testudo was formed, and the front ranks moved gradually along until they came to the river, across which the wounded were sent first, while the retreat was covered by the cavalry. Beyond this the Parthians did not pursue, even as the deserter had predicted. Six days later the Romans reached the Araxes (Aras) River, the border between Media and Armenia, twenty-seven days after leaving Praespa.\textsuperscript{3\textsuperscript{a}}

The expedition cost the lives of approximately thirty-five thousand men. In eighteen defensive engagements the Romans had managed to preserve their forces from annihilation. A few more such Pyrrhic victories, and no one would have returned to tell the tale.\textsuperscript{3\textsuperscript{b}} Phraates celebrated his victory by re-


\textsuperscript{3\textsuperscript{b}} Plut. \textit{Antony} 50 puts the loss at twenty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, but apparently (see Rawlinson, \textit{Sixth Mon.}, p. 305 and n. 2) does not include the ten thousand men lost under Statius. Vell. Pat. ii. 82 states that losses amounted to not less than one-fourth of all the soldiers, one-third of the camp followers, and all of the baggage. Florus ii. 20. 10 says one-third of the legions remained; cf. Plut. \textit{Demetrius et Antonius} 11.
striking with his own types the tetradrachms of Antony and Cleopatra captured as a part of the spoils.\textsuperscript{32}

Antony, though keenly aware that the desertion of Artavasdes the Armenian had cost him dearly, was forced to treat him with respect and friendliness in order to secure much needed supplies. From Armenia Antony proceeded in haste to a place called Leukê Kômê ("White Village") between Beirut and Sidon on the Syrian coast, though he was constantly hampered by inclement weather in the rainy season and lost eight thousand men on the march. There he stayed until joined by Cleopatra, who brought with her clothing and money for the troops. When these proved insufficient, Antony made up the difference from his own pocket and the pockets of his allies.\textsuperscript{33}

After a short rest together on the Syrian coast, Antony and Cleopatra proceeded to Alexandria, where they spent the winter. In the meantime a quarrel had arisen between Phraates and his Median ally over the booty taken from the Romans. The Median, fearful for the safety of his throne, sent Polemon\textsuperscript{34} to Antony with an offer of alliance. This Antony accepted, and he later gave the kingdom of Lesser Armenia as a reward to the ambassador.

During this winter in Alexandria Sextus Pompeius, perhaps inspired by the successes of the late Labienus, sent messengers to the Parthians to offer them his services. The envoys were captured by Antony's men and sent back to Egypt.\textsuperscript{35}

Meantime Antony planned to advance through Media Atropatene in the spring, join the king at the Araxes River, and invade Parthia. He had actually left Egypt when he learned that his other wife, Octavia, was on the way from Rome; he thereupon returned to Alexandria.\textsuperscript{36} After the failure of an attempt to entice Artavasdes into Egypt, Antony sent Quintus Dellius to seek one of the daughters of the Armenian monarch as a wife for his son by Cleopatra. Evidently this also failed, since in the early spring of 34 B.C. Antony marched northward through Palestine. Herod escorted him for some distance, and Cleopatra accompanied him as far as the Euphrates.\textsuperscript{37} Antony advanced to the borders of Armenia, whence he conducted further negotiations for the marriage alliance. At length, when the king did not appear in person, Antony hastened toward Artaxata, the Armenian capital. Artavasdes was finally induced to enter camp, where he was at once seized and put in

\textsuperscript{32} Allotte de la Fuýe, "Monnaies arsacides surrappées," Rev. num., 1904, pp. 174–87; the example discussed is now in the collection of E. T. Newell, New York City. See also Allotte de la Fuýe in Mém. Miss. archéol. de Perse, XXV (1934), 34.

\textsuperscript{33} Dio Cass. xlix. 31. Cf. Plut. Antony 51, according to whom one account relates that Cleopatra brought only the clothing and Antony furnished the money from his private funds.

\textsuperscript{34} Dio Cass. xlix. 33.

\textsuperscript{35} Appian Bell. civ. v. 133 and 136; Dio Cass. xlix. 18; Livy Epit. cxxxi.

\textsuperscript{36} Plut. Antony 52; Dio Cass. xlix. 33.

\textsuperscript{37} Josephus Ant. xv. 80 and 96 and Bell. i. 362.
chains. The fact that Octavian had attempted to enlist the aid of Artavasdes may have provoked Antony's action. The Armenians, who knew nothing of this intrigue, found in the seizure of their king a permanent grievance against Rome.\textsuperscript{39b}

Antony thereupon subdued the country with comparative ease and drove the king's eldest son, Artaxes, about whom the Armenians had rallied, out of the country to refuge with Phraates. After the region had been garrisoned, Antony went back to Egypt. The Armenian king and his wife and children and much booty were given as presents to Cleopatra. The king eventually graced a triumph and later was put to death.\textsuperscript{38} Antony's son Alexander was made king of Armenia, Media, and Parthia—that is, from the Euphrates to India.\textsuperscript{38a}

In 33 B.C. Antony again penetrated as far as the Araxes River, where he made a treaty with the Median king, an alliance against Octavian and the Parthians. Troops were exchanged, the Median king received a part of Armenia, and Antony secured Iotape, daughter of the ruler, for his son. The standards taken at the defeat of Statianus were also returned.

Not long afterward the Parthians together with

\textsuperscript{38} Dio Cass. xlii. 41. 5; possibly also Vergil \textit{Georg.} iv. 360.

\textsuperscript{39b} Tac. \textit{Ann.} ii. 3.

\textsuperscript{38} Plut. \textit{Antony} 50 and \textit{Demetrius et Antonius} 5; Josephus \textit{Bell.} i. 363 and \textit{Ant.} xv. 104 f.; Strabo xi. 14. 15.

\textsuperscript{38a} Plut. \textit{Antony} 54. 4; Dio Cass. xlii. 41.

Artaxes of Armenia, whom they had aided to recover his kingdom, were defeated by the Median Artavasdes with the help of his Roman allies.\textsuperscript{39} Later, when Antony recalled his troops, Artavasdes was in turn overcome and forced to seek refuge with the Romans. Armenia and Media were thus lost to Rome, the first to Artaxes, the second to Phraates. Such Romans as were left behind were killed.\textsuperscript{40}

As a result of Phraates' victory over Antony, the brewing internal strife in Parthia broke forth, and even before 31 B.C. a certain Tiberius (II) was in open revolt against the king.\textsuperscript{41} Both parties sought aid from Octavian, who was too deeply engaged in his war with Antony to take up the matter. Cleopatra and Antony were defeated in the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C., and both chose to take their own lives rather than appear in the triumph of Octavian. Tiberius was victorious, and the deposed Phraates sought aid from the "Scythians." Among the Greek inscriptions from Susa is a much mutilated metric one which Cumont has dated to Phraates IV.\textsuperscript{42} As he suggests, this rebel Tiberius might be the general men-

\textsuperscript{39} Horace \textit{Od.} iii. 8. 19 suggests internal strife among the Parthians; cf. also Plut. \textit{Antony} 53. 6.

\textsuperscript{40} Dio Cass. li. 16. 2. Note the Zeus Nikephoros types struck by Phraates in 32/31; see McDowell, \textit{Coins from Seleucia}, pp. 184 f.

\textsuperscript{41} Justin xlii. 5. 4; Dio Cass. li. 18; cf. also Horace \textit{Eplt.} i. 12. 27-28 and \textit{Od.} i. 26. 5, and Vergil \textit{Georg.} i. 509. See also PW, art. "Tiberius," No. 4.

tioned in these verses, perhaps a commander who won fame in the victory over Antony.

From Egypt Octavian passed through Syria to the province of Asia, where he spent the winter of 30/29 B.C. About the same time Phraates and his "Scythian" allies drove Tiridates from Parthia, and he fled to Syria, where Octavian permitted him to live in peace. Because of the laxity of the royal guards Tiridates had been able to steal Phraates' young son, whom he took with him to Syria. Phraates, then sole ruler of Parthia, on learning of this, sent envoys to Octavian in Asia Minor requesting the return of his son and the surrender of Tiridates. When Octavian left for Rome the son of the Parthian king and the pretender Tiridates went with him. They were brought before the Senate, which turned the matter over to Octavian for settlement. The son of Phraates was then returned to his father upon the condition

that the standards be restored, but it was a number of years before the Romans actually received them.

Coins of Attambelus II of Characene overstruck by Phraates about this time show that the former had suffered some defeat at the hands of his overlord.

In the spring of 26 B.C. Tiridates evidently advanced down the Euphrates with unexpected speed, for Phraates was forced to kill his harem on a little island a short distance south of Belesi Biblada (Kalat Bulak). Perhaps at this time Tiridates struck the coins with the unique legend ΠΡΩΜΑΙΟ. Tiridates must have reigned but a very short time, for his only

would be barely sufficient for Tiridates alone, to say nothing of the envoys, to reach Spain and return. Since Tiridates' coins stop in March, 25, the interpretation of Dio liii. 33. 1 solves the problem usually created by dating the passage to 23 B.C. All of Justin xiii. 9. 6 may be erroneous, or he may have misplaced the incident of the kidnapping of the son. This type of error is even more common in Justin than one of fact. If the foregoing argument is accepted, we must date the return of Phraates' son between 25 and 26 B.C.


45 The following table, drawn from McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 185, lists the known tetradrachms from Mesopotamia bearing dates from 26-25 B.C. assigned to Phraates IV and Tiridates II:

| Phraates IV | April, 25 B.C. |
| Tiridates II | May, 26 B.C. |
| Phraates IV | Aug., Sept., and Nov., 26 B.C. |
| Tiridates II | March, 25 B.C. |
| Phraates IV | May, 25 B.C. |


47 Wroth, Parthia, p. 135. The reference in Horace Sat. ii. 5. 62 should be dated about this time.
coins of this period are dated in May, 26 B.C. Soon thereafter, if we may accept Justin, he again fled with many of his adherents to Octavian, who was then in Spain. An inscription found in Spolato seems to refer to a son of Tiridates who eventually became a Roman citizen under the name Caius Julius Tiridates and who fell while in command of some Parthian auxiliaries serving in the Roman army.

But Tiridates was not thus easily disposed of; in March, 25 B.C., he was again striking coins in the mint city of Seleucia. By May of the same year, however, Phraates had resumed control sufficiently to coin money at the same place, and Tiridates had vanished from our knowledge, this time permanently.

Meanwhile Roman losses at the hands of the Parthians had not been forgotten. War in the East was

48 Cf. p. 136, n. 44. See the discussion of this period in David Magie, "The Mission of Agrippa to the Orient in 23 B.C.,” Class. Philol., III (1908), 145 f. Troxus sheds no light on the question. Tiridates had a maximum of ten months to make the trip, but perhaps like Herod he did not fear to travel in winter. Tiridates is mentioned by Horace Od. i. 26. 5 and in Mon. Ancyr. vi (32). I cannot agree with the suggestion of Tarn, “Tiridates II and the Young Phraates,” Mélanges Glotz, II, 834, that “Phraates, son of Phraates,” mentioned by Augustus was set up as a joint king by Tiridates in his second attempt on the throne. Tarn feels that Dio Cass. ii. 18. 3 is impossible and Justin xii. 5. 6 untrue, but it seems equally impossible that the Romans ever supported dual candidates for the throne. The junior Phraates in question is perhaps Phraataces, son of Phraates IV.

49 CIL, III, No. 8746; V. E. Gardthausen, "Die Parther in griechisch-römischen Inschriften,” Orientalische Studien Theodor Nöldeke zum siebzügsten Geburtstag gewidmet (Gieszen, 1906), pp. 847 f. 50 Propertius iii. 1. 16; 4. 1-19; 5. 48; 9. 25 and 53 f.; 12. 1-15. The ante quem date for these plans would seem to be the recognition of Octavian as a god, Propertius iii. 4. 1-19, and the post quem date the recovery of the standards in 20 B.C. Since his patron was C. Maecenas, friend and military adviser to Octavian, Propertius would be in a position to secure information. There are indications of such plans as early as 30 B.C. in Tibullus iii. 7 and Horace Od. i. 2. 21 f. and 51 (on the dating of this ode see J. Elmore, “Horace and Octavian [Car. i. 2],” Class. Philol., XXVI [1931], 258-63); 11. 2; 12. 53 ff.; 19. 11 f.; 21. 15. On Icarius’ preparing chains for the Medes see ibid. i. 29. 4 f.; on new levies, i. 35. 30-32. See also ibid. ii. 9. 18 ff.; 13. 17 f.; 16. 5; iii. 2. 31; 34; 5. 4; 29. 27; Vergil Aenid vii. 605 f.

51 Magie, "Mission of Agrippa,” Class. Philol., III (1908), 145 ff., suggests that while Agrippa was at Mytilene in 23 B.C. his officers may have been negotiating for the return of the standards. Horace Od. i. 12. 53, and perhaps also i. 19. 12, should be placed about this time. The date of Od. i. 21. 15 is uncertain; see A. Steinmann, De Parthiis ab Horatio memores (Berlin, 1898), p. 22.
Seleucid era, Phraates had at least four queens: Olennieire, Cleopatra, Baseirta, and Bistheibanaps.53

On May 12,54 20 B.C., when Augustus was in Syria, the prisoners and standards were surrendered to Tiberius, who was commissioned to receive them.55 One can hardly appreciate how large this event loomed in the eyes of contemporaries, even in view of the numerous literary references, until one turns to numismatics. The restoration of the standards was recorded on coins struck in the Asiatic, Spanish, imperial, and senatorial mints.56 Indeed, most of the legends which relate to contemporary events are concerned with Parthian affairs. Augustus thought the return of the standards important enough to boast of it in his record a copy of which is preserved as the Monumentum Ancyranum.57 The event was celebrated in

53 Avroman II; see E. H. Minns, "Parchments of the Parthian period from Avroman in Kurdistan," JHS, XXXV (1915), 22-65. The document bears the date 291, i.e., 21/20 B.C. if the era is Seleucid, A.D. 44/45 if it is Arsacid. For further bibliography on the parchment see p. 47, n. 70; see also p. 179, n. 87.

54 Ovid Fasti v. 545 ff.; CIL I (2d ed.), pp. 229 and 318.

55 Suet. Augustus 21. 3 and Tiberius 9. 1; Justin xlii. 5. 11 f.; Livy Epit. cxxi; Vell. Pat. ii. 91. 1; Florus ii. 34. 63; Eutrop. Brev. vii. 9; Orosius vi. 21. 29; Horace Od. iv. 15. 6–8 and Epist. i. 12. 27 f. and 18. 56 f.; Ovid Tristia ii. 227 f. and Fasti v. 579 f. and vi. 465–68; Strabo vi. 4. 2 and xvi. 1. 28; Vergil Aeneid vii. 605 f.; Propertius iv. 6. 79–82; Oraz. Sibyl. v. 47 ff. See also the later statue of Augustus in CAH, Plates, iv. 148 a and 150.


57 Mon. Ancyrr. v (29).

Rome by the erection of a triumphal arch,58 and the standards were ultimately placed in the temple of Mars Ultor.59

As we have previously seen,60 after Artaxes had cleared Armenia of the Roman garrisons left by Antony, he remained ruler of the country. About 20 B.C. the Armenians became so dissatisfied with him that they requested that Tigranes, brother of Artaxes, be sent to rule over them. Augustus sent not only Tigranes but in addition an army under the command of Tiberius to drive out Artaxes and place Tigranes on the throne. Archelaus of Cappadocia was given Lesser Armenia as well as certain lands in Cilicia. Ariobarzanes, son of the former king of Media Atropatene, was appointed to rule over his father's lands.61 Before Tiberius arrived, Artaxes had been slain by the Armenians; hence there remained little for the Roman forces to do. Tigranes reigned for some years, and at a later date may have fallen under Parthian in-

58 Mattingly and Sydenham, op. cit., I, 46; 61, No. 17; and 63, No. 37; Dio Cass. liv. 8.

59 Mon. Ancyrr. v (29); Dio Cass. liv. 8. This temple in the forum of Augustus was not finished until 2 B.C., and the representations on the coins (for which see Mattingly and Sydenham, op. cit., I, 46; 61, No. 16; 85, Nos. 281 ff.) do not correspond to the known plan of the building. G. F. Hill, Historical Roman Coins (London, 1969), p. 143, and other writers have suggested that the building on the coin is a temporary shrine erected on the Capitol.

60 See p. 135.

61 Strabo xii. 1. 4 and 3. 29; Dio Cass. liv. 9. 2; Suet. Tiberius 9. 1.
fluence, although at the time the general feeling was that Armenia had been restored to the ostensible, if not actual, control of Rome.

The years which followed the Parthian victories in Syria and Armenia and the subsequent disorder within their empire saw the scene of their contest with Rome shifted to the Euphrates, which by the beginning of the Christian era had for nearly a hundred years been the boundary between the two great powers.


63 Mon. Ancyr. v (27); Strabo xvi. 1. 54; Dio Cass. liv. 9; Josephus Ant. xv. 105; Tac. Ann. ii. 3; Vell. Pal. ii. 94. 4 and 122. 1; Suet. Augustus 21. 3 and Tiberius 9. 1. Cf. also Crinagoras in Anthologia Planudea xvi. 61 (Loeb, V). On the coinage see Mattingly and Sydenham, op. cit., i. 47 and 69, Nos. 97 ff., issued in 18 B.C., especially No. 104, which bears the legend CAESAR DIVI F ARME CAPTA and the figure of an Armenian kneeling to the right.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONTEST FOR THE EUFRATES

The standards and captives taken from the armies of Crassus and Antony had been returned to Rome; faced with discord within her own domains, Parthia yielded them without a struggle. Shortly after their surrender in 20 B.C., Augustus sent as a present to Phraates, the Parthian king, an Italian slave girl named Musa. Whether she was placed in a strategic position as a source of information or with the hope that she might influence the king, we have no means of knowing. By Musa Phraates had a son, also named Phraates (V), better known by the diminutive Phraataces. After the birth of this male heir to the throne, the status of Musa was raised from that of concubine to queen.

When about 10 B.C. Phraataces attained sufficient age to become a candidate for the succession to the throne, Musa persuaded her husband to send his older children to Rome and thus to leave the field clear for her own son. Phraates invited M. Titius,

1 The son of Musa was old enough to rule Parthia in 2 B.C.; cf. p. 147.

2 He is probably the Aphrathas the son of Aphrathas who ruled over Seleucia and Ctesiphon of Beth Aramaya according to Mar Mari in Acta martyrum et sanctorum, ed. Paul Bedjan (Paris, 1890-97), I, 68, § 7.

PW, art. "Syria," col. 1629. Titius was governor from 10 to 9 B.C.
then governor of Syria, to a conference and turned over to him his sons: Seraspadanes, Phraates, Rhodaspes, and Vonones, as well as two of their wives and four of their sons. Throughout their residence at Rome these princes were treated with all respect due their rank, and one of them, Phraates, built a temple at Nemi, dedicated perhaps to the goddess Isis.

"Who fears the Parthian... while Augustus lives?" boldly sang Horace about this time, but others of his poems both earlier and later betray a lively interest in the East not unmixed with that emotion. In Parthia itself the surrender of the standards aroused further animosity against Phraates and provided additional fuel for the discontent already present. Josephus mentions a Parthian king named Mithridates who was in power sometime between 12 and 9 B.C. and who must represent some opposition of which all other record is lost.

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4 Mon. Ancyr, vi (72). Seraspadanes and Rhodaspes are mentioned in an inscription found in Rome, CIL, VI, No. 1799 = Dessau 842. See also Strabo vi, 4, 2 and xvi, 1, 28; Tac. Ann. ii. 1. 35; Vell. Pat. ii. 94-4; Justin xlii. 6, 12; Josephus Ant. xviii. 42; Suet. Augustus 21. 2 and 13. 1; Euthrop. Brev. vii. 9; Orosius vi. 21. 29.

5 They are generally spoken of as hostages (see the references in the preceding note); but this word, like "tribute," was regularly abused by ancient writers.

6 CIL, XIV, No. 2216; Garsthausen, "Die Parther," p. 844.

7 Od. iv. 25.

8 Horace Carmen saec. 52 ff.; Epist. ii. 1, 112 and 236; Od. iv. 14, 42 and 15, 23.

9 Josephus Ant. xvi. 253; Wroth, Parthia, p. xxxviii; Gutschmid, Geschichte Tiran, p. 116.

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Strong central government in Parthia was a thing of the past, and for some years to come the empire remained in a state of turmoil. Under such conditions party, racial, and religious strife found ample opportunity to develop. The Parthians had long enjoyed friendly relations with the Jews both within and without their political domain. The return of Hyrcanus from Parthia to Jerusalem in 37 B.C. is but the last demonstration of this "entente cordiale." The breakdown of royal power brought a change in the situation. Sometime not long before 6 B.C. a Babylonian Jew, Zamaris, fled with one hundred of his relatives and five hundred of his armed cavalry to Antioch, where he sought refuge with C. Sentius Saturninus, then governor of Syria. Such a man was no city merchant but a rich and powerful landowner, one of the feudal nobility who lived on vast estates outside of the city areas. Indeed, many other Babylonian Jews, like Zamaris, were agriculturists, not merchants, even as they were in the time when Babylon flourished. Only some desperate situation could force a man who could raise five hundred armed retainers to flee from his homeland; perhaps Zamaris had espoused the cause of the Mithridates mentioned by Josephus. Saturninus gave him land at Ulatha near Daphne; but Herod offered a tract in Batanacea...
with special privileges, including freedom from taxation.

About the end of the century events occurred in Armenia which led again to Roman intervention. As we have seen (p. 141), the expedition led by Tiberius in 20 B.C. arrived too late to be of great service, for the death of Artaxates permitted the installation of his brother Tigranes II without difficulty. When not long before 6 B.C. Tigranes died, the nationalist party placed on the throne Tigranes (III) and Erato, his sister-wife, the children of the dead king. To insure the investiture of a candidate satisfactory to Rome, Tiberius was commissioned to leave for Armenia. But Tiberius lingered at Rhodes. Eventually Augustus ordered that a certain Artavasdes II, perhaps a brother of Tigranes II, be installed as ruler of Armenia. Tigranes and Erato must have been deposed, and Artavasdes reigned a short time.


13 Dio Cass. lv. 9; Zonaras x. 35; Ovid, Consol. ad Liviam 389 ff. may refer to the commission of Tiberius.

14 Cf. Tac. Ann. ii. 3.

15 Artavasdes struck coins with portraits of Augustus and himself; see Percy Gardner, “On an Unpublished Coin of Artavasdes II., King of Armenia,” Num. Chron., N.S., XII (1872), 9–15. Besides the fact that the portrait of Augustus is reasonably youthful, the Artavasdes from Media would probably not have followed such a model.

THE CONTEST FOR THE EUPHRATES

In 2 B.C. Musa took the final step to secure for her son Phraatates the throne of Parthia; Phraates, now an old man, was poisoned. Artavasdes, established by Roman aid on the Armenian throne, was looked upon with disfavor by many of his subjects and certainly by the Parthians. A coalition of these two groups drove him from the throne about 1 B.C., and Tigranes and his sister-wife again secured control. If Rome was to maintain her sphere of influence in Armenia and her prestige in the Near East, immediate action was imperative. At the moment Augustus had few whom he could trust to cope with this new development. His grandson Gaius was put in command of the forces sent to restore Roman authority. Someone, perhaps Isidore of Charax, was commissioned to secure information about the East—a definite indication that the government was awakening to the inadequacy of the Roman military intelligence service.

When the news of the advance of Gaius reached Parthia, Phraatases sent an embassy to Augustus.

The earliest coins of Phraatases are dated early in 310 B.C.; see Wroth, Parthia, pp. 111 and 136.

16 Tac. Ann. ii. 4; Dio Cass. lv. 10. 18; Vell. Pat. ii. 100. 1; cf. Mon. Ancyr. v. (27).

to explain matters and to request the return of his brothers. The Roman reply was addressed baldly to “Phraatoces” and directed that he lay aside the title of king and withdraw from Armenia. 29 The Parthian answered with equal rudeness. Alarm by the turn affairs had taken, Tigranès of Armenia attempted to make peace with Augustus and was sent to Gaius with a promise of favorable action. Not long after this Tigranès died fighting some barbarians, perhaps on the northern frontier, and Erato abdicated.

When Gaius reached the Euphrates, Phraatoces, now thoroughly aroused by active intervention on the part of Rome, held an interview with him on an island, while the armies were drawn up on opposite banks. Later the two dined, first on the Roman side and then on the Parthian, pledging their good faith thus in typical eastern fashion. One of the officers, Velleius Paterculus, a youthful tribune with Gaius, aptly describes Phraatoces as an excellent youth. 20

The terms arranged appear to have favored the Romans, for it was agreed that the Parthians should drop all claim to Armenia and that the four Parthian princes should stay in Rome. 21

In A.D. 2 Phraatoces and Musa his mother were

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married. 22 This act, which horrified the Greeks and Romans, 23 suggests a possible connection with the changes which Zoroastrianism was then undergoing. Customs long confined solely to the Magi were being adopted at this time by the people as a whole; thus burial in rock tombs was abandoned for exposure and the collection of the bones in small rock cuttings. 24 Next-of-kin marriages had been common among the Magi.

After his interview with Phraatoces Gaius advanced northward into Armenia, where he placed Ariobarzanes, son of Artabazus, king of the Medes, on the throne. Revolt against this new Roman appointee was soon in full swing, and Gaius began military operations to suppress it. In due course he attacked the stronghold of Artagira, 25 which was defended by Addon, 26 perhaps the satrap set over the

29 The date is fixed by the appearance of the head of Musa for the first time on the coins along with that of Phraatoces; see Gardner, Parthian Coinage, pp. 45 f. The only other appearance of the heads of king and queen together on the Parthian coinage is in the reign of Gotarzes II; see Wroth, Parthia, p. 172.


21 Justin xlii. 3. 5. Silius Italicus xiii. 473 f. mentions that it was proper to bring dogs to the royal corpses in Hyrcania. Lucian De luctu 21 notes that the Persians bury their dead. See also Herzfeld, Archaeological History of Iran (London, 1935), pp. 38 f.

22 PW i.p., No. 1. The spelling and date are fixed by CIL, IX, No. 5290.

23 PW, art. “Donnes.” The spelling is uncertain; perhaps Dones or Addus is better.


in power after his marriage to his mother, an act which his subjects did not approve. In A.D. 4 he was either killed or driven into Syria, where he died shortly afterward. The nobles called in a prince of the Arsacid family named Orodès (III), whose violent temper and great cruelty made him intolerable. Another insurrection followed, and Orodès was murdered at a festival or while hunting about A.D. 6.

Ambassadors were then dispatched to Rome, whence they were sent to Tiberius, who was probably in Germany. They requested the return of one of the sons of Phraatès IV; and Vonones, the eldest, was sent. The Parthians were not long satisfied, for they were irked by the western manners and friends their new sovereign had acquired at Rome.

31 Josephus Ant. xviii. 42 f.  
32 Gardner, Parthian Coinage, p. 46; the last coins of Musa and Phraatès are dated Hyperberctaeus, 315 s.e.  
34 Josephus Ant. xviii. 44 f.  
35 The only known coin of Orodès, if indeed it is properly assigned, is dated 317 s.e., i.e., A.D. 6/7; see Gardner, Parthian Coinage, p. 46 and Pl. V. 1. No coins were struck in the two years which followed.  
36 Suet. Tiberius 16.  
37 Mon. Ancyr. vi (33); Tac. Ann. ii. 1–2; Josephus Ant. xviii. 46. This is probably Vonones mentioned in a poem quoted by Ausonius Epist. xxiii. 6. The poem, sent him by Pontius Paulinus, was based on Suetonius Lives of the Kings, a work now lost.
His dislike of the hunt and of traditional feasts, his free and open manners, his failure to show interest in horses—all these things caused the nationalists to call in another Arsacid, Artabanus III. He was king of Atropatene, but had connections on one side of his family with the Dahae. On his first attempt to secure the throne, in A.D. 9/10, Artabanus was badly defeated and forced to retreat to the mountain fastnesses of his own kingdom. Vonones hastened to re-strike the old tetradrachms of Musa and Phraataces with a design symbolic of his success, a winged Victory bearing a palm branch, and then to strike drachms in a similar style with the legend ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥϹ ΝΟΝΩΝΗϹ ΝΕΙΚΗϹΑϹ ΑΡΤΑΒΑΝΟΝ.43 But his triumph was short-lived, for Artabanus collected a second army and returned to the attack. This time Vonones was defeated and forced to flee to Seleucia on the Tigris. Artabanus followed, and many of his opponents were slain. The victor entered Ctesiphon and was proclaimed king about A.D. 12.42 Vonones escaped from Seleucia to Armenia, which was then without a king, for Artavasdes III had been murdered and Tigranes (IV), a grandson of King Herod the Great, sent by Augustus to succeed him, had been deposed after a brief reign.43 Vonones secured the Armenian throne, but owing to pressure from the Parthian king Artabanus he was forced to abdicate in A.D. 15 or 16.44 He threw himself on the mercy of the governor of Syria, Creticus Silanus,45 who allowed him to live in Antioch and to retain the pomp and name of king.

Shortly before the abdication of Vonones from the throne of Armenia, in A.D. 14 the aged Augustus died and his adopted son Tiberius succeeded him. When Artabanus of Parthia sent his son Orodus to fill the vacant place, Tiberius felt it incumbent upon himself to take action. In A.D. 18 he sent his adopted son Germanicus with full authority to act as a free agent and with what was felt to be an impressive retinue. Germanicus proceeded to Artaxata, the Armenian capital, where he found that the people were ready to accept Zeno, son of Polemon, king of Pontus, who had grown up among them and adopted their customs and manners. As Zeno was also friendly to the Romans, Germanicus crowned him in the midst of a

43 Mon. Ancyr. v (27); Tac. Ann. ii. 3 f. and vi. 40; Josephus Ant. xviii 140 and Bell. ii. 222. See also PW, art. "Tigranes," No. 5.


46 Tac. Ann. ii. 43.
multitude of people who hailed him as king of Armenia under the name Artaxias.\textsuperscript{47}

Germanicus then returned to Syria, where an embassy from the Parthian king reached him. The proposal was made that the friendly alliance in effect between their predecessors should be renewed, and Artabanus sent word that he would be willing to come as far as the Euphrates, the traditional meeting-place for Roman and Parthian and the boundary between the two great empires. He requested, however, that Vonones be removed from the neighborhood of the frontier, whence he was fomenting discontent among the Parthians. Germanicus replied with politeness but made no mention of the proposed conference, which apparently never took place. He did transfer Vonones to the coastal city of Pompeiopolis (ancient Soli, near modern Mezitli) in Cilicia.\textsuperscript{48} At the same time Germanicus sent Alexander, perhaps a Palmyrene merchant, on a mission to Mesene and to a certain Orabazes. The nature of his message we can only conjecture; but it could hardly involve any direct threat against the Parthians, with relations as amicable as they then were. The embassy suggests

that the Parthian vassal state of Mesene was by this time more or less independent, which is not surprising in view of the weak central government.\textsuperscript{49}

Vonones bribed his guards the next year, A.D. 19, and in the course of a hunt attempted to escape. Halted at the banks of the Pyramus River (Jeihan, Turkish Ceyhan Nehri) by the destruction of a bridge which had been torn up to prevent his escape, he was arrested by Vibius Fronto, prefect of the cavalry. Shortly afterward Vonones was assassinated by Remmius, under whose charge he had been placed in Pompeiopolis. Probably Remmius had been implicated in the escape and feared the revelations which might be made after its failure.\textsuperscript{50}

In the same year that Vonones was murdered, Germanicus died, and for the next decade the East remained at peace. Thus between the years 19 and 32 only one governor was sent out to Syria, and even he probably served but a short term. Tiberius was later reproached for thus inviting trouble on the Armenian frontier by leaving that office vacant.\textsuperscript{51}

Artabanus at once set about consolidating his position. Josephus\textsuperscript{52} tells us at length a story of two Jewish brothers, Aniaeus and Asinaeus, who lived in

\textsuperscript{47} Tac. Ann. ii. 36; cf. also Suet. Gaius 1. 2 and Strabo xii. 3. 29. Coins were struck in Caesarea of Cappadocia with the legend \textit{GERMANICUS ARTAXIAS} and with the coronation scene; see Mattingly and Sydenham, \textit{Rom. Imp. Coin.}, I, 104, No. 8. Mattingly suggests that these were perhaps struck by Caligula.

\textsuperscript{48} Tac. Ann. ii. 58; the contemporary Strabo xvi. 1. 28 confirms the fact that the Euphrates was still the boundary.


\textsuperscript{50} Tac. Ann. ii. 68; Suet. Tiberius 49. 2. On Remmius see PW s.v., No. 3.

\textsuperscript{51} Suet. Tiberius 41.

\textsuperscript{52} Ant. xviii. 310-79.
Neharda. They set up a robber kingdom in northern Babylonia, defeated the Parthian satrap, and thus brought themselves to the attention of the Great King. Artabanus handled the situation in a manner much used by present-day mandararies: he sent for the brothers and placed them in formal control of the region which they had ruled as robber barons. This arrangement served admirably for fifteen years, until the death of the brothers just before the revolt of Seleucia. As a consequence of this military inactivity we have little information for the period; one exception is a letter which Artabanus wrote in December, A.D. 21, to the magistrates and the city of Susa, the only royal document of the Arsacid period which has come down to us. The purport of the letter, which was later engraved on the stone base of a statue, was to validate a contested city election.

83 Arrian Parthica xi, Νάρδα; see also PW, art. "Νάρδα." This city lay on the Euphrates not far from Sippar and near the mouth of the Nahr Malka.

84 This chronology is not exact, but it seems to fit the evidence. If the six-year period mentioned by Josephus Ant. xviii. 373 represents, as it seems to do, the duration of the revolt of Seleucia, which began in A.D. 35 (see p. 164), then subtraction of the fifteen peaceful years (Josephus Ant. xviii. 373) gives A.D. 20 for the beginning of the brothers' activities.

85 Artabanus ceased coining money long before the end of his reign. McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 188, reports his last known coin as dated A.D. 27/28 but adds with a query coins from 29/30 and 30/31.

86 F. Cumont, "Une lettre du roi Artaban III," CR, 1932, pp. 238-60; M. Rostovzeff, "L'Hellénisme en Mésopotamie," Scientia, LIII (1933), 120 f.; C. Bradford Welles, Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period (New Haven, 1934), pp. 299-306. As to Welles, op. cit., p. 302, note that while Dura-Europus would follow the Syrian Seleucid era beginning October, 212 B.C., Susa would use the Babylonian one beginning April, 311 B.C. The Parthian era dates from April, 247 (not 248) B.C.


88 Tac. loc. cit.; Dio Cass. Iviii. 26; Suet. Tiberius 66.

89 E. S. Drower, The Mandaean of Iraq and Iran (Oxford, 1937), pp. 6 ff., suggests that Madai may have been a city in Media, the homeland of Artabanus, or may have been located farther east.
after his arrival in Syria, perhaps from age and the fatigue of travel, or possibly overtaken by the fate which hovers over those who pretend to thrones occupied by such as Artabanus. Artabanus discovered the mission of the two ambassadors to Tiberius, removed Abdus by poison, and kept Sinnaces occupied by various missions and pretenses.

Not discouraged by his first attempt, in 35 Tiberius dispatched another Arsacid prince, this time Tiridates (III), a grandson of Phraates IV, and appointed L. Vitellius as governor of Syria. To make the task of Vitellius easier he planned to set up a rival king in Armenia, and to this end he reconciled Pharasmanes, king of Iberia, and his brother Mithradates. Financial encouragement was offered to Pharasmanes to place his brother on the Armenian throne. Since this was added the incentive of removing so dangerous an opponent at a safe distance, Pharasmanes undertook the task. 60 Arsaces, the son of Artabanus, was murdered by his attendants, who had been bribed, and Pharasmanes took Artaxata without resistance. When this news reached the Parthian court, Artabanus at once sent his son Orodes to recover the lost dependency.

Unfortunately Orodes was unable to secure sufficient mercenary troops, since the passes through which they must come were controlled by the Iberians. The Parthian forces consisted almost wholly of cavalry, while the Iberians had a force of infantry. Orodes was unwilling to risk a battle against superior odds and prudently evaded the issue until forced by his men to give battle. When the Parthian prince was defeated in personal combat by Pharasmanes, the troops of the defeated leader, supposing him to be dead, fled from the field. 61

Artabanus in 36 gathered the remaining forces of his empire and advanced against the Iberians. The Alani, possibly incited by agents of Vitellius, had moved through the passes of the Caucasus and, unopposed by the Iberians, had swarmed into Parthian territory. 62 Before Artabanus could force a decisive engagement, Vitellius took the field at the head of his legions and spread the rumor that he was about to invade Mesopotamia. Because he felt it impossible to maintain the struggle in Armenia and at the same time engage in a war with Rome, Artabanus withdrew from Armenia to defend his homeland. When he had thus attained his objective, Vitellius modified his policy and by means of bribes encouraged disaffection within the Parthian kingdom. He was so successful that Artabanus was compelled to retire to his eastern frontier with only a band of foreign merc.

60 Tac. Ann. vi. 33; Dio Cass. lviii. 26; Josephus Antiq. xviii. 97; Pliny Hist. nat. xv. 83.

61 Tac. Ann. vi. 35; Josephus Antiq. xviii. 97 ff. From Tiberius to Severus Alexander the Orac. Sibyl. xii. 47–288 furnishes a fairly extensive sketch of Roman history.

cenaries. There he hoped to find support among those long-time friends of Parthia, the tribes to the east of the lower Caspian Sea, for he felt sure that the Parthians would soon tire of a ruler set up by Rome.

Meanwhile Vitellius urged Tiridates to seize his kingdom while opportunity offered, and to this end conducted him with legions and allies to the banks of the Euphrates. After sacrifices were made and the omens found favorable, a bridge of boats was thrown across the river and the army passed over it to Parthian territory. There they were met by Ornospades, a Parthian who had served under Tiberius and had thus won Roman citizenship. Shortly afterward Sinnaces arrived with more troops, and Abdagases brought the royal treasure and ornaments.

The Greek cities of Mesopotamia, such as Nicephorium and Anthemusia, and the Parthian cities, such as Halus and Artemita, all welcomed Tiridates, who was apparently acceptable to the Greeks, the nobility, and the pro-Romans. Seleucia received him with acclaim, and his supporters were rewarded with control of the city government, displacing the more aristocratic group which had upheld Artabanus. Coronation ceremonies were delayed pending the arrival of Phraates and Hiero, two powerful nobles. This Phraates was perhaps satrap of Susiana, then an important Parthian province. These two nobles were probably engaged in negotiations with Artabanus, with whom they shortly allied themselves, for they failed to appear at the coronation, and Tiridates was crowned by a member of the Suren family according to the custom. Restained by lack of funds from an attack on Artabanus, now installed in the far eastern part of the empire, Tiridates laid siege to a fort in which the former ruler had left his treasure and his concubines. The possession of the royal harem was vital to recognition by the country at large, and we have seen how Phraates IV slew his women rather than allow them to fall into the possession of the pretender Tiridates.

Parthia was never long sympathetic with kings who held their crowns by virtue of Roman support.

Tac. Ann. vi. 36; Josephus Ant. xvii. 100.

Tac. Ann. vi. 37; cf. Rawlinson, Sixth Mon., p. 234. Ornospades was not yet satrap of Mesopotamia, an honor which he received after he rejoined his king.

This distinction between Greek and Parthian cities is made by a number of ancient authors. Besides cities given above from Tac. Ann. vi. 41, Isid. Char. Mam. Parth. 1-3 mentions Ichnae, Nicephorium, Artemita, and Chala as Greek cities. Note that Artemita is called both Greek and Parthian; on its location see T. Jacobsen in Four Ancient Towns in the Diyala Region, a forthcoming Oriental Institute Publication.

McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 225, suggests that his supporters in Seleucia were the native elements, consistently pro-Roman. This idea cannot be reconciled with information from Tacitus, which clearly indicates that the three groups behind Tiridates were the Greeks, the nobility, and the pro-Romans, unless we assume the last to be the native elements.

and the disaffected party probably had strong support from the two nobles who had failed to attend the coronation. Artabanus was discovered in Hyrcania clothed in dirty rags and living by his bow. Naturally he was suspicious of a trap when first approached, but eventually he became convinced of the reality of Parthian dislike for Tiridates if not of the people’s love for himself. Artabanus hesitated only long enough to gather some Dahae and Saca contingents before he hastened forward, still in his rags, which he continued to wear to arouse sympathy. He was in the vicinity of Seleucia before his opponent made a move. Some of the adherents of Tiridates advised bringing the struggle to an immediate issue before the troops of Artabanus could be reorganized and rested. Another faction, headed by the king’s chief adviser, Abdagases, suggested a retreat across the Tigris into Mesopotamia proper, for this would delay action until the arrival of Roman troops and of Armenian and Elymaean forces. Tiridates, who was not of a warlike disposition, agreed to the withdrawal. The strategic retreat soon took on the aspect of a flight, for his troops deserted rapidly. Among the first to leave were the nomadic tribes; and they were soon followed by others, some of whom went over to Artabanus. Tiridates fled to Syria, where he arrived with scarcely more than a handful of men.

Artabanus evidently had little trouble in reoc-

cupying the country. Tiberius desired to have the struggle formally ended and instructed Vitellius to that effect late in A.D. 36. Artabanus expressed his willingness and met the Roman commander on a bridge of boats across the Euphrates. Each was escorted by a guard. We do not know the terms agreed upon, but not long afterward Artabanus’ son Darius was sent to Rome to live. Negotiations completed, Herod Antipas, the Jewish tetrarch and a Roman ally, invited both leaders to a rich feast in a tent erected on the bridge. Among other objects, Josephus says that the Parthians presented the Romans with a Jewish giant some seven cubits in height! After the banquet Vitellius went to Antioch and Artabanus to “Babylon.”

Struggle after struggle between contenders for the throne for over half a century had reduced Parthia to a state of anarchy, and the good effects of the strong rule of Artabanus had been largely negated by his contest with Tiridates. This situation is clearly reflected in the coinage, for from the beginning of the Christian era until about A.D. 40 there are frequent intervals for which no royal coins are known. The kings were either not in possession of the mint cities

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69 Josephus Ant. xvii. 101–3. Cf. Dio Cass. lix. 17, 5 and 27, 2 f.; Suet. Vitellius 2, 4 and Gaius 19; all of these either place this incident in the reign of Gaius or leave the question unsettled. See Eugen Tübler, Die Parthenachrichten bei Josephus (Berlin, 1904), pp. 33–39.

70 Josephus Ant. xviii. 103 f. This is probably an early case of confusion between Babylon and Seleucia.
or were too poverty-stricken to be able to coin money. If life and commerce continued, it was because of the strength of local authorities or the power and prestige of ancient cities. The story of Anialaeus and Asinaeus (pp. 155 f.) well illustrates the situation in Parthia about this time. Artabanus was forced to recognize the virtual independence of large areas in the north, and Parthian troops and officials were everywhere helpless. Within Seleucia there was continual strife between opposing elements. The native or Babylonian group and the Jews at first combined against the Greeks with success; but the Greeks managed to alienate the natives from their former allies, and together they massacred thousands of Jews.

One specific example is known to us of the way in which the great commercial centers met this breakdown of authority. About two years before the death of Tiberius, which took place in March, A.D. 37, the great mint city of Seleucia, center of the royal power, revolted. For five years no royal coinage had been struck in the city. Then the strong commercial elements, wearied of the bickerings of petty contenders for the throne, declared their independence. Life within and without the city probably continued much as usual, except in time of actual siege. During the

77 Numismatic evidence given in McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, pp. 225 and 188 ff., and Wroth, Parthia, p. xlvi, when combined with Tacitus’ statement (Ann. xi. 9, 6) that the revolt lasted seven years, enables us to date its beginning. On the coins struck by the city during the revolt see McDowell, op. cit., pp. 141 f., No. 141.

seven years of the revolt Seleucia maintained an independent position.

Not long after the meeting between Vitellius and Artabanus discontent was again manifest among the nobles. The situation appeared so hopeless to the king that he thought it prudent to leave the country and place himself under the protection of his neighbor and vassal, Izates II of Adiabene. The story of the Parthian vassal kings of Adiabene is an interesting one. The first king known to us, Izates (I), had two children, Helena and Monobazus (I). Following the custom then prevalent, these two were married. Monobazus succeeded to the throne about A.D. 30. Izates II, their son, was sent to Adinerglus, 77 king of Charax, for safety from the threat of death which hangs over all youthful oriental princes who are surrounded by half-brothers with zealous mothers. While there he was converted to Judaism by a commercial Jew. When Izates was old enough, his father recalled him and gave him land in Gorduene. Through the efforts of another Jew, Helena adopted the new faith. On the death of Monobazus I, about A.D. 36, Izates II came to the throne of Adiabene. 73

Upon the abdication of Artabanus a certain Cinna-

77 Josephus Ant. xx. 22, Abnergerius. The Ad(or b)niggerlus named on coins of A.D. 10 (?) may be identical with the Adinerglus of A.D. 22; see G. F. Hill, Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Arabia, Mesopotamia and Persia (London, 1922), pp. ccxxix–cix.

73 Josephus Ant. xx. 17–37 and 54. “Gorduene” depends on an emendation; the text reads Kappôn, which is impossible (cf. PW s.v.).
mus, who had been brought up by Artabanus, was selected to rule. Artabanus arrived at the court of Izates with a thousand relatives and retainers, and his faithful vassal was easily persuaded to act as mediator. In response to a letter from Izates suggesting that Artabanus resume his throne, the Parthians replied that, since Cinnamus had already been installed, they feared another change would bring civil war. Cinnamus, either because of genuine friendship for Artabanus or because he felt his own position very insecure, offered to abdicate in favor of the former ruler and even placed the crown on the head of the exile himself. Izates was rewarded by the gift of the city of Nisibis and its surrounding lands, which were detached from the Armenian kingdom.  

Artabanus lived but a short time after his restoration, for the evidence suggests that he died about A.D. 38. He was followed by Gotarzes II, who was probably not an Arsacid but may have been of Hyrcanian origin, the son of a man named Gew. Gotarzes had two brothers, Artabanus and Vardanes, whom he evidently feared, for he murdered the first together with his wife and son, and the second fled far away. Gotarzes had been on the throne about a year when in A.D. 39 the nobles called in Vardanes, who is reported by Tacitus to have covered three thousand stadia in two days. Such a feat, if not impossible, is very extraordinary. As a result of this hasty trip Vardanes surprised and put to flight Gotarzes. The deposed ruler escaped to the country of the Dahae, where he occupied himself with plots against his brother.

If the rule of Vardanes was to be firmly established, control of the mint city of Seleucia was essential. He began a siege of the city, which was strongly fortified by walls and by its natural defenses, the river and the canals, and was well provisioned. Perhaps Vardanes made use of Ctesiphon as his base of operations, for at a later date he was believed to have been its founder.

In the meantime Gotarzes had enlisted the aid of the Dahae and the Hyrcanians and soon advanced to recover his kingdom. Vardanes abandoned the siege of Seleucia in 39 and moved his forces to the great Bactrian plain, far to the east; but preparations for the battle were suddenly interrupted when Gotarzes discovered that the nobles were planning to take the throne away from both his brother and himself. Drawn together by this common danger, the brothers agreed that Vardanes was to occupy the throne of Parthia and Gotarzes was to withdraw to Hyrcania. "Victory" coins were struck by the aristocratic party in Seleucia in the years 40/41–43/44 in celebration of their triumph over the popular party and the restoration of Vardanes to the throne.\(^{89}\)

In the spring of 42 the sage Apollonius of Tyana passed through Babylonia on his way to India.\(^{81}\) Vardanes had but two years and two months before recovered his throne;\(^{82}\) Seleucia still apparently remained in revolt,\(^{83}\) and Vardanes was established in Babylon. The account of Philostratus suggests that Vardanes' territory was limited in extent, for Apollonius passed into Parthia after leaving Nineveh, which evidently belonged to Adiabene and hence to the kingdom of Gotarzes. By June, A.D. 42, Vardanes had again advanced to the neighborhood of Seleucia and under guidance of the aristocratic party, then apparently favorable to his candidacy for the throne, the city had voluntarily surrendered.\(^{84}\) The revolt, which had lasted for seven years, was thus ended.

Philostratus reports that the governor of Syria sent an embassy to Vardanes regarding two villages (in Roman territory near a Zeugma) which the Parthians had recently seized. Because of their lack of importance they were apparently surrendered without a struggle. He states further that Megabates, a brother of the king, saw Apollonius in Antioch.\(^ {84 a}\)

The Iberian Mithradates, Roman appointee to the throne of Armenia, having proved unsatisfactory to the patron nation, was brought back, imprisoned, and then banished by Caligula.\(^{85}\) Shortly after the latter's death in 41, his successor Claudius released Mithradates and sent him eastward to regain his kingdom, the throne of which had apparently been vacant for some time and then had been seized by the Parthians. Supported by Roman troops and by Iberians supplied by his brother Pharasmanes, Mithradates defeated the Armenians under Demonax with

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\(^{89}\) McDowell, \textit{Coins from Seleucia}, pp. 225 f.

\(^{81}\) Philostratus \textit{Vita Apoll.} i. 19-40; cf. A. von Gutschmid, \textit{Kleine Schriften}, III (Leipzig, 1892), 58 f.

\(^{82}\) Philostratus \textit{Vita Apoll.} i. 28; cf. also i. 21.

\(^{83}\) \textit{Ibid.} i. 21. Ctesiphon alone is mentioned. The reference to Babylon cannot in this case be assigned to Seleucia, although such details cannot be pressed too far in this source.

\(^{84}\) He at once began the issue of royal coinage; see McDowell, \textit{Coins from Seleucia}, p. 189.

\(^{84 a}\) Philostratus \textit{Vita Apoll.} i 31 and 37.

\(^{85}\) Dio Cass. lx. 8; Seneca \textit{De tranquillitate animi} xi. 12; \textit{Tac. ANN.} xi. 8. 1.
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ease. Lesser Armenia under Cotys continued resistance for some time, but it too was at last subdued. The new king, perhaps because he felt insecure, ruled with great cruelty, which soon caused appeals for aid to the Parthian Vardanes. The Parthian king attempted to secure the help of one of his principal vassals, Izates II of Adiabene, but was unable to convince him that a campaign against Mithradates had much chance of success. The fact that his five sons were in Rome undoubtedly influenced Izates. Angered by the latter's refusal, Vardanes began a campaign against his vassal. Possibly for the purpose of distracting Vardanes, Vibius Marsus, governor of Syria from 42 to 45, made a feint at the Euphrates frontier. 86

The position of Vardanes was perhaps becoming too strong for the nobles; at any rate they encouraged Gotarzes to secure the throne. About 43 Gotarzes collected an army and advanced to the river Erindes (probably the ancient Charindas) 86 in Hyrcania. The passage of this stream was hotly contested, and Vardanes at last managed to prevent his brother from crossing. This victory Vardanes followed up with other successes until he was master of all the territory to the river Sindes, which separated the Dahae from the people of Aria. 89 There the troops refused to advance farther, and a monument was erected.

About the end of 45 the conflict between the brothers broke out again, and from 46/47 to 47/48 they were engaged in a struggle which terminated with the death of Vardanes. He was assassinated by the nobles, probably at the instigation of Gotarzes, while engaged in the national sport of the chase. 90 With the death of Vardanes, a thoroughly native king, the only hope of Gotarzes' opponents lay in appeal to Rome.

From this period onward the dates given in this volume are calculated on the basis of a readjustment in the calendar which took place between the years A.D. 16/17 and 46/47, almost certainly in the latter year. The 19-year cycle of intercalation introduced in 74/7 B.C. had been employed without change since 367 B.C. The calendar year was again brought into conformity with the solar year by the insertion of a full month so that henceforth the Macedonian month Xandicus instead of Artemisius corresponds to the Babylonian Nisan, the beginning of the year. 90a

86 Tac. Ann. xi. 10; Josephus Ant. xx. 72.

87 Gotarzes' first coins, Wroth, Parthia, p. 161, were struck early in 355 B.C., i.e., A.D. 44/45; cf. McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, pp. 226 f. and table, p. 189. If Avromian II (see p. 140, end of n. 53) is dated in the Arsacid era, it should be placed in A.D. 44. It seems better, however, as indicated in chap. ii, to consider that the Seleucid era was used and that the date is 21/20 B.C.; cf. p. 47, n. 70. The occurrence of the name Cleopatra among the queens is a further argument for the earlier dating, for after Actium Cleopatra was not a popular name; see PW, arts. "Cleopatra."


89 Tac. Ann. xi. 10. 3.

90 McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 190. Vardanes' coins stop in the fourth month of 45/46, but this proves only that Vardanes no longer held Seleucia. Furthermore, coins of 46/47 and 47/48 bear the personal name of Gotarzes and thus prove that he had a rival, who was most probably Vardanes.

There was a division of opinion as to who should succeed to the Parthian throne; many favored Gotarzes, while others preferred Meherdates, son of Vonones I and grandson of Phraatas IV, who had been sent to Rome. Because of the general dislike of Romanized Parthians and perhaps because of the proximity of Gotarzes, he was accepted as king again. But further reports of cruelties and excesses soon appeared,\(^9\) and in 47 an appeal was made to Rome for Meherdates.\(^9\) Claudius responded favorably and ordered C. Cassius Longinus, governor of Syria, to conduct the new pretender to the Euphrates.\(^9\) In 49 the expedition set out; at Zeugma a halt was made to await the Parthian supporters of Meherdates. Cassius urged an immediate advance before the ardor of the adherents of Meherdates could cool, and the head of the great house of Karen sent messengers with the same advice. Through the influence of Abgarus V of Edessa Meherdates was persuaded to make his advance through Armenia, where he was delayed for some time in the capital of this Arab ruler. After much hardship in the snow and mountains of Armenia, Meherdates reached the level ground, where

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\(^9\) Tac. Ann. xii. 10. Tacitus' information would of necessity be based largely on the reports brought to Rome by delegates of the dissatisfied parties.


\(^9\) Cf. the reference to some Parthian victory of Claudius, Seneca *Apocolocyntosis* 12.

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he was joined by forces under the command of the head of the Karen family. Crossing the Tigris they proceeded through Adiabene to Nineveh and Arbela. Faced with such an army, Izates of Adiabene could do nothing less than exhibit friendliness, however transitory. When they turned southward they found Gotarzes in a strong defensive position behind the river Corma ("Adhaim").\(^9\) Since, however, his troops were insufficient to force the issue, Gotarzes sought to delay a decisive battle while he attempted to win over the troops of his opponents. Izates and Abgarus were thus lost by Meherdates, who, fearing a general exodus, determined to strike before all his army melted away. The battle remained undecided until the Karen, who had defeated the forces opposed to him and carried his pursuit too far, was met on his return by the reserves of Gotarzes and was slain. His army defeated and its morale broken, Meherdates threw himself on the mercy of a certain Parraces, one of his father's vassals. This man betrayed him and gave him in chains to Gotarzes, who cropped his ears, that he might never again reign, but spared his life.\(^9\)

Probably in commemoration of this victory Gotarzes about A.D. 50 cut a great relief on the rock at

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\(^9\) Tac. Ann. xii. 13 f.; PW, art. "Corma." Sanbulus (see PW s.n.), the mountain where Gotarzes offered sacrifices to Hercules, is probably the Sunbula Kuh. Both the "Adhaim and the Diyala are so small in summer that the troops would scarcely notice them; hence their omission in Tacitus' account is understandable.

\(^9\) Tac. Ann. xii. 13 f.
Behistun. It shows him charging the foe with leveled spear, while overhead hovers a winged Victory crowning the king with a wreath. The accompanying inscription reads \( \Gamma \Delta \text{TPSEHC GEOTPOEPOC}, \) “Gotarzes, son of Gew.”

In 51, Gotarzes either died of some disease or fell the victim of a plot. He was succeeded by a certain Vonones (II), who was king of Media. Vonones must have reigned but a few months; the empire then passed to his son or brother Vologases I.

About A.D. 52, Pharasmanes of Iberia sent his

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The Contest for the Euphrates

son Rhadamistus to invade Armenia, which was at that time in the hands of the pro-Roman Mithradates, brother of the Iberian ruler. Mithradates was soon besieged in Gorneae (Garni), not far from Artaxata, the capital. The Roman garrison in the beleaguered town was under the command of the prefect Cælius Pollio and the centurion Casperius. Rhadamistus attempted to bribe Pollio to surrender Gorneae; the prefect was sorely tempted to accept, but Casperius refused to be a party to such an affair. He secured a temporary truce and set out to persuade Pharasmanes to abandon the war or, if he should be unsuccessful there, to carry the news to Ummidius Quadratus, legate of Syria. Casperius reached Pharasmanes, but his negotiations with him were unsuccessful, for the Iberian king wrote secretly urging Rhadamistus to press the siege in every possible manner. The bribe offered to Pollio was increased, and, with the restraining influence of the centurion absent, a deal was soon struck. The Roman soldiers forced Mithradates to surrender by threatening to

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refuse to fight. Mithradates, his wife, and all his children were murdered at the command of Rhadamistus, who thus came into possession of Armenia.\footnote{163} Quadratus heard of these events, perhaps through the centurion Casperius, and ordered a council of war. Pharasmanes was commanded to recall Rhadamistus and withdraw from Armenia, but no other action was taken. Julius Paellignus,\footnote{164} procurator of Cappadocia, gathered together some provincial auxiliaries, ostensibly to recover Armenia but actually to despoil his friends. Deserted by his troops, he was forced to flee to Rhadamistus, whom he urged to assume the crown and in whose coronation he participated. When Quadratus heard of these proceedings, he dispatched Helvidius Priscus with a legion to set matters right. Priscus had already crossed the Taurus and restored order in some measure when he was recalled. This sudden change on the part of the Romans was caused by the fact that the newly crowned Vologases I of Parthia was contemplating an advance into Armenia and the presence of Roman legions on soil which was considered Parthian was certain to cause trouble.

Vologases, who was the son of a Greek concubine, had two brothers, Pacorus and Tiridates.\footnote{165} Vologases was probably the eldest, since his brothers yielded to him their claims to the throne. To Pacorus, the elder of his two brothers, Vologases had given Media Atropatene;\footnote{166} it was now imperative that a suitable position be found for the younger, Tiridates. Since Armenia, which was felt to be properly Parthian territory, was unsettled, Vologases saw therein an opportunity to strengthen his own position and at the same time provide a satrapy for Tiridates.

Vologases about A.D. 52\footnote{167} began an advance into Armenia, where he encountered little resistance. In his rapid advance he took the important city of Tigranocerta and then the capital, Artaxata. Because of the severity of the winter, which had then closed in, and the attendant lack of provisions, Vologases was forced to abandon his conquest. Rhadamistus, who had fled on his approach, at once returned and began to rule with great cruelty, at least according to the reports which reached Rome.

In the meantime the nobles of Adiabene had become dissatisfied with the rule of Izates II and proposed Parthian intervention to Vologases. The Parthian ruler demanded that Izates give up the special privileges granted to him by Artabanus III and resume

\footnote{165} Josephus \textit{Ant.} xx. 74.

\footnote{166} If McDowell, \textit{Coins from Seleucia}, p. 191, is right in assigning to Gotarzes II a coin as late as December, 51, then Vologases’ invasion of Armenia is not likely to have taken place before 52. Cf. also \textit{CAH}, X, 757 and n. 2, following Henderson, “Chron. of the Wars in Armenia,” \textit{Class. Rev.}, XV (1901), 164 f.
This trip of Tirdates affords us glimpses of Zoroastrianism which unite with other scraps of evidence to show that in the second half of the first century after Christ a wave of oriental reaction was taking place. On the coins of the contemporary Parthian king Vologases I the altar appears for the first time in the history of Arsacid numismatics,37 and the figure of a man making an offering before a similar object is frequent.38 Under this same rule all of the scattered remains of the manuscript or oral traditions of the Avesta were ordered collected.39 For the first time Pahlavi appears on the coins in addition to the traditional Greek, which has by now become hopelessly corrupt.40

The period of peace which followed the temporary settlement of the Armenian question is responsible for a dearth of information on Parthia. There is even considerable doubt as to the length of the reign of Vologases I; it probably extended to 79/80.41 Military preparations on a large scale were made by Rome in the years 66 and 67: a new legion, the I Italica, was created;42 and one of the crack legions, the XIV Gemina (Martia Victrix), was started on the journey to the eastern front.43 At the time of his death in 68 Nero was engaged in plans for a great expedition which had as its objective the Iron Gates of the Caucasus.44 Possibly its ultimate aim was the Alani, as has been suggested,45 or it might have been a feint to keep the Parthians occupied and thus prevent their sending aid to the Jews; but in any case hostilities with the Parthians could hardly have been avoided. The troubous times which followed Nero’s death put a stop to all such preparations.

In 69 Vespasian declared himself emperor. Vologases, informed of the event, sent ambassadors to Alexandria the next year to offer him the use of forty thousand Parthian horse.46 The letter which they bore was addressed: “The King of Kings, Arsaces, to Flavius Vespasianus, greetings.”47 Possibly this salutation had something to do with the polite refusal which followed, but more likely Vespasian felt he had the situation in hand. Sohaemus of Emesa and Antiochus of Commagene joined forces with Vespasian, and embassies were sent to the Parthians and Armenians so that peaceful relations might be established with them.48 In 71 Vologases sent his congratulations to Titus at Zeugma on the Roman victories over the Jews and presented him with a gold crown.

40 Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. 182 f.
42 Suet. *Nero* 19; Dio Cass. iv, 24. 2.
The gift was accepted, and the messengers who brought it were feasted before their return.49

An incident occurred in 72 which threatened to break the established peace.50 L. Caesennius Paetus, formerly with Corbulo and now governor of Syria, informed Vespasian of a projected alliance of Antiochus of Commagene and his son Epiphanes with Vologases against Rome. The union would have been dangerous, for Samosata, the capital of Commagene, lay on the Euphrates at one of the best crossings. The Parthians would thus have an excellent base for operations in Syria and Cilicia. Paetus was given authority to proceed against Antiochus, which he did with all possible speed. Moving forward with the X Fretensis and some auxiliaries furnished by Aristobulus of Chalcis and Sohaemus of Emesa, Paetus took Antiochus of Commagene by surprise. That king gathered his wife and children and retired before the Roman advance, which swept into Samosata without a struggle. Though Antiochus himself was not disposed to contest the matter by force of arms, his two sons, Epiphanes and Callinicus, with such troops as they could muster, barred the passage. An all-day battle resulted in a draw at nightfall, when the king left and continued his flight. This so disheartened the troops that they deserted to the Romans and the princes fled for refuge to Vologases with a guard of only ten men.51 Among the Parthians they were well treated, but they were later surrendered to Velius Rufus, who had been sent by Vespasian to secure them. Antiochus was placed under arrest by the Romans, but was allowed to live in Sparta, where he was furnished with sufficient money to maintain an estate such as befitted a king.52 Lesser Armenia and Commagene were then made into provinces and garrisoned accordingly.53 The absorption of these frontier kingdoms was in accord with the policy begun under Tiberius and now continued under Vespasian, who had become thoroughly acquainted with the eastern situation during his campaign in Judea.

The number of standing legions in the Near East was raised, as well as the number of high commands. Syria and Commagene, which was added to it, had the III Gallica, the IV Scythica, and the VI Ferrata; Judea retained the X Fretensis; and the V Macedonica, which had been utilized in the Jewish War, was sent back to Moesia via Alexandria early in 71.

49 Josephus Bell. vii. 105 f.
51 *CIL*, III, No. 1438; i - DESSEAU 9198; also DESSEAU 9200.
52 Josephus Bell. vii. 219-43.
Cappadocia, Lesser Armenia, and Galatia were placed under one governor with military headquarters at Melitene. Apparently there were no legions in Cappadocia at the beginning of Vespasian's reign, and he was the first to station legions there.54 The legions for this district were the XII Fulminata and at least one other, probably the XVI Flavia.

The invasion of Parthian territory by the Alani, a nomadic tribe of the north, occurred about A.D. 72.55 They advanced from their territory near Lake Maeotis (the Sea of Azov),56 secured an alliance with the king of the now independent Hyrcania,57 and passed to the south through the Iron Gates of the Caucasus58 and thence into Media Atropatene. Pacorus, brother of Vologases I, installed in that country at the accession of Vologases to the Parthian throne, was driven into some remote spot. His harem fell into the hands of the Alani, but he succeeded in ransoming his wife and concubines. The hordes continued their march westward and defeated Tirdates, king of Armenia, within the confines of his own country, where they nearly captured him with a lasso. Satisfied with booty, they returned eastward.

In 75 Vologases appealed to Rome for aid against the Alani, but Vespasian did not send either Titus or Domitian as the Parthian monarch had requested.59 There was a Roman force in at least one of the passes of the Caucasus60 and Vespasian aided Mithradates of Iberia to fortify his capital, Metskheti. While these precautions were ostensibly for the purpose of curbing the Alani, they might also have been directed


56 There have been numerous attempts to emend the text of Josephus, especially on the basis of early translations of the Chinese sources; see Täubler, op. cit., pp. 18 ff. More recent work on these same sources makes it probable that Josephus was correct, as Gutsmiedt, Geschichte Trans., p. 133, recognized; see Hirth, "Story of Chang Ki'en," JASOS, XXXVII (1917), 96. J. Saint-Martin, "Discours sur l'origine et l'histoire des Arsacides," JA, I (1823), 65–77, believed the original Parthian invasion was similar in character to that of such peoples as the Alani.

57 Josephus Bell. vii. 245.
against the Parthians. In 76 M. Ulpius Trajan, father of the future emperor, received triumphal insignia for some diplomatic victory over the Parthians. The work of Valerius Flaccus, a part of which must have been composed about this time, clearly mirrors Roman interest in the Alani and in the Caucasus region.

62 W. H. Waddington, Fastes des provinces asiatiques (Paris, 1872), No. 100; Pliny Panegyricus 14. That no serious fighting took place is shown by Tac. Hist. i. 2; Victor Epist. 9. 12 and De Cæs. 9. 10.


CHAPTER IX

PARTHIA IN COMMERCE AND LITERATURE

IN THE period covered by the past four chapters important changes were taking place in the world of commerce, changes which were eventually to influence profoundly the course of Parthian history. With increasing wealth and luxury in Syria and Rome came a demand for the products of the Far East. One or more of the great silk routes from China passed through Parthia, and others crossed territory which Parthian arms controlled. The revenue from taxes swelled Parthian treasuries until Tacitus compared them with those of Rome. Incentive for the development of new routes to avoid Parthia probably arose not from a desire to avoid payment of these duties but from the breakdown of Parthian control along the route. Customs exacted by an organized government, though high, amount to less than the numerous tributes required by petty chieftains every

1 M. P. Charlesworth, Trade-Routes and Commerce of the Roman Empire (2d ed.; Cambridge, 1926), pp. 98 ff. There are several errors in that chapter; e.g., Selucia was directly opposite Ctesiphon, not "a few miles distant" (as stated on his p. 101). Again, Charlesworth, loc. cit., says: "Selucia on the Tigris . . . usually was able to hold itself independent (!) of Parthia."

2 Tac. Ann. ii. 60.5.
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2 Tac. Ann. ii. 60.5.

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few miles when strong centralized rule is gone. The water route to India with its harbor dues and pirates must have been the lesser of two evils.3

At a later date we have records of customhouses established on the Tigris-Euphrates frontier where taxes were collected by Roman publicans.4 Widespread occupation during the Parthian period, including extensive reoccupation of abandoned sites, proves that Parthian rule brought prosperity to Mesopotamia. The huge Nahrwan canal (east of the Tigris) with many of its branches may be of Parthian construction.

During the reign of Vologases I (A.D. 51/52-79/80) a new city, Vologasia or Vologesocerta, was founded in the vicinity of Babylon.5 The king’s intention may have been to establish a new commercial center to displace the older Seleucia, where party strife frequently disturbed the flow of trade and where opposition to the royal will often arose.6 Vologesocerta is frequent-

3 Cf. W. H. Schoff, *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (New York, 1912), p. 5; on the date of the Periplus, see p. 69, n. 41. J. W. Thompson, *An Economic and Social History of the Middle Ages* (New York, 1928), pp. 23 f., feels that the northern routes also were developed to circumvent Parthia.


5 The date of this foundation or refoundation was probably between 55 and 65, since it is mentioned in Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 122. The tenth book of Pliny’s work was published in 77. On the city see also Amm. Marcel. xxiii. 6. 23 and the Peutinger Table.

6 McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 229 and 236.

PARTHIA IN COMMERCE AND LITERATURE

ly mentioned in inscriptions from Palmyra as the destination of the Palmyrene caravans. With the diversion of trade to this new center, the increasing importance of the more purely Parthian Ctesiphon across the river, and the destruction wrought by successive Roman invasions, the decline of the old royal city of Seleucia grew progressively more rapid in the second century after Christ.

The most important of the early trade routes was the great road which led to the Land of the Two Rivers across the Iranian plateau from the borders of China. Chinese traders met the westerners7 at a place called the “Stone Tower,” tentatively identified as Tashkurgan on the upper Yarkand River.8 When the road reached Bactria, the presence of the Kushans forced a wide detour southward through Arachosia and Aria. From Rhages (Rayy) the road led westward to Ecbatana (Hamadan).9 From Ecbatana, however, goods continued to pass to Syria via the Fertile Crescent or across the desert via Dura-Europ-


pus or Palmyra. For Mesopotamian trade they might take a more southern route to the distributing center of Seleucia-Ctesiphon, where bales received overland from China and India mingled with those which came up the Persian Gulf and the Tigris River.

At the same time that shifts in the routes of commerce were taking place, interest at Rome in the Orient became both intense and widespread, an interest clearly reflected in the poets. Many historical references have already been pointed out, for some of these writers were in position to secure first-hand information, and most of them were contemporary with the events they mention. But more important than the actual information which they furnish is the fact that the poets mirror the passing thought and interests of contemporary Rome. In their writings, then, we should expect to find evidence of the rise of Roman interest in the East, and, since many of the poems are datable by internal evidence, we should be able to trace its development quite closely.

Sulla’s contact with Parthia was of an ephemeral character; he had no realization of the future of those “barbarians” or even of their strength in his own day.10 A most peaceful people, the “Persians” (Parthians), says Cicero before his governorship of Cilicia,11 Crassus had already begun to talk of Bactria, India, and the Outer Sea12 before he set out on his conquests in the East; but he had little information with regard to the enemy. Faith in the invincible Roman legion was unshaken; the effect of mounted archers and heavy-armed cavalry against foot troops remained to be demonstrated by the Parthians. Doubtless many excuses were found for the disaster at Carrhae, but in any case it did not suffice to awaken the public immediately to the presence of a new power on the eastern horizon. Few apparently realized the truth.

Cicero, governor of Cilicia, at the edge of the threatened territory, was aware to some extent of the danger from beyond the Euphrates. With Parthian cavalry at the very door of Syria, his frantic appeal for additional troops aroused no great concern at Rome. The raids passed, and no action was taken; but the seriousness with which Pompey, after Pharsalia, considered leading Parthia against the Roman world, proved that military men at least were somewhat cognizant of the situation. The elaborate preparations made by Caesar, including sixteen legions and six thousand cavalry, show clearly that he realized the magnitude of the task which lay before him. Still, it is very doubtful whether, to the man in the streets at Rome, Parthia was much more than a name. The awakening was sudden and rude.

10 This is clearly brought out by J. Dobiáš, “Les premiers rapports des Romains avec les Parthes et l’occupation de la Syrie,” Archiv or., III (1931), 215-56.
11 Cicero De domo sua 60.
12 Plut. Crassus 16. 2.
of the Parthian prince Pacorus and the Roman Labienus struck directly into the heart of the Roman East. The provinces of Asia, Pamphylia, Cilicia, and Syria were all taken by the Parthians; even as far south as Petra, Parthia's word was law. For two years this vast area, so vital to Roman commerce and pleasure, was under military occupation by the Parthians. Possession of the Cari and perhaps the Ionian coast by foreigners struck close to home, for in the coastal towns of those districts Roman officials were accustomed to land when they passed to their eastern commands. There were many in Rome itself who were native to that part of the world or who had been there on business. The victories of Ventidius had no sooner pushed the invaders beyond the Euphrates than another Roman army, under Antony, barely escaped annihilation at Parthian hands. The effect was electrical. Catchwords and phrases concerning the East became common property and were on every tongue. Occasional references are to be found as early as Lucretius and the first poems of Vergil. After the Parthian invasion of Syria a flood of such material begins. The Eclogues of Vergil and

\[13\] De rerum natura iii. 750. In the references which follow, mentions of specific historical events have generally been omitted; they will be found in their proper places in the narrative. The lists are not to be considered as complete.

\[14\] Calis 299, 308, 440, 512; Culex 62 and 67.

\[15\] Ecl. i. 62; iv. 25; x. 52.

PARTHIA IN COMMERCE AND LITERATURE 209 later his *Georgics* and his *Aeneid* abound in references to Parthia, Media, Bactria, and distant India. The Parthian bow, the feigned retreat, the parting shot from behind, the Armenian tiger, the Hyrcanian dog, Assyrian dye and spice, Indian or Assyrian ivory, the inhospitable Caucasus, the tepid Tigris, the broad Euphrates, the beautiful Ganges, the Indian Hydaspes, the wool of the Seres—all these and many more become stock phrases which persist in literature long after the events which caused them to spring into being have become ancient history. Epics and plays were written with Parthian settings.18 Horace was greatly interested in the East, especially in the proposed expedition of Tiberius and the recovery of the standards.19 Hints of an expedition to the East at the direction of Augustus are plentiful in Propertius.20


15 Aeneid iv. 367; vi. 794; viii. 685–88, 705 ff., 726, 728; ix. 31 ff.; xii. 57 and 87 ff.

16 Horace (Sat. ii. 1. 15) declares he cannot write an epic (as others were apparently doing) depicting the Parthians falling from their horses. Persius (Sat. v. 1–4), roughly a hundred years later, perhaps modeling his phrase on the passage in Horace, speaks of the poets' theme of a wounded Parthian.

17 Horace Ep. i. 12; vii. 9; xiii. 8; Od. i. 2. 21 ff. and 51; ii. 12; 13. 53 ff.; 19. 10–12; 21. 15; 22. 6–8; 26. 5; 29. 1–5; 31. 6; 35. 9 and 40; 38. 1; ii. 2. 17; 7. 8; 9. 17 ff.; 11. 16: 17. 17 f.; 16. 6; iii. 1. 44; 2. 31; 3. 44; 5. 41 f. 8. 19; 24. 1 ff.; 29. 27 ff.; iv. 5. 25; 14. 42; 15. 23; Carmen sac. 55 ff.; Epist. i. 45; 6. 6 and 39; 7. 36; ii. 1. 112 and 256.

18 See pp. 139 ff., nn. 50 and 55.

19 See p. 139, n. 50.
such Christian writers as Jerome still remember the Parthians.  

When Rome found herself confronted with new and more vigorous opponents, the Sasanidae, the Parthians were sometimes, though by no means always, confused with them. Examples of both confusion and correct identification may be found in Claudian, where again the Araxes, the Hycranian tiger, the Medes, the Indians, and other traditional terms appear. Even as late as Boethius and the Anthologia Latina the tradition was still alive; indeed, through the medium of classical literature it was carried over into English classics.

J. Jerome Epist. xiv. 3; Ixxvii. 10; cvii. 101; cxxv. 3; cxxvii. 3.
Claudian Paneg. dictus Probo et Olbicrio 78-81, 160-63, 173, 179 f.;  
In Rufinum i. 227, 292, 310-13, 374-76; ii. 242-44; De bello Gildonico 31-33; In Eutropium i. 321, 342-45, 354, 414-16; ii. 102, 475 f., 569-71;  
Pescennina de nuptiis Honorii Augusti i. i. f.; Epithalamium 168, 210-12,  
217, 222-25; In Paneg. terio cons. Hon. 4, 19 f., 27 f., 35 f., 70-72, 201-4, 210 f.;  
Paneg. quarto cons. Hon. 43 f., 145 f., 214-16, 257 f., 306-8, 387 f., 530 f., 543, 585 f., 601, 607-10, 653, 656; Paneg. dictus Manlio  
Theodoro 236; De consilatu Stilichonis i. 32 ff., 155-57, 266; iii. 62-64;  
Paneg. sexto cons. Hon. 18, 69 f., 85 f., 414-16, 502 f.; (IX) De hystere  
21 f.; (XXV) Epithalamium dictum Palladio et Celerinae 61, 74, 88 f.;  
(XXX) Laurus Serenae 52; (XXXI) Epist. ad Serenam 7, 14-16; De rapto  
Prosperinae i. 17 f.; ii. 82, 94, 200; iii. 105, 263-65, 320, 325. The tradition  
that the victories of Trajan made Mesopotamia a Roman province appears in Claudian Paneg. quarto cons. Hon. 315-17 and is frequently  
alluded to elsewhere.

Philosophiae consolatione i. 2. 34-38; iii. 5. 5 and 10. 9; iv. 3. 15;  
v. 1. 1-3.
Octavianus in Poetae Latini minores, IV, ed. A. Boeckhens (Lipsiae,  
Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra, Act III, Scene 1; Act IV,  
Scene 12, line 70; Cymbeline, Act I, Scene 6, line 20; Milton, Paradise  
Regained iii. 280 ff.

CHAPTER X
TRAJAN IN ARMENIA AND MESOPOTAMIA

The campaign of Corbulo had achieved a temporary though costly settlement of the Armenian succession which left that country well within the sphere of Roman influence. The inroads of the Alani broke upon Parthia about A.D. 72 and drew her attention again to her eastern frontier, where, from the middle of the first century, she had been gradually losing ground. At the time Josephus was writing, in the latter part of the first century, the Euphrates was still the western boundary. With Roman interests occupied elsewhere and Parthian arms engaged in the east, ancient historians of the western world found little of note to record.

In April, 78, a king by the name of Pacorus (II) began striking coins at the Seleucia-Ctesiphon mint; but Vologases I was able to continue his issues from the same place, and even during the same month. This evidence for the struggle between pretender and ruler continues until the end of the next year, when

1 Josephus Bell. iii. 107.
2 McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 192.
Vologases disappears from history. Pacorus II is seldom mentioned in our scanty literary sources, nor is there any hint as to what relation he bore to his predecessor, save that his succession was not a friendly one.

In 79 there appeared in the East a pseudo-Nero, in reality a Roman citizen from Asia Minor named Terentius Maximus. He progressed as far as the Euphrates, but was at last forced to take refuge with one of the pretenders to the Parthian throne, Artabanus (IV), who struck coins at the Seleucia mint in the years 80–81. The pseudo-Nero won a welcome from the Parthians on the ground that he had returned Armenia to Parthian control. Preparations were being made to restore him when his imposture was discovered and he died.

By 82/83 Pacorus II had apparently driven his rivals from the field; in any case they no longer had sufficient power to strike coins. The surrender of another pseudo-Nero was demanded by the emperor Domitian in 89, and Pacorus was at last constrained to give him up.

Toward the conclusion of his reign Domitian apparently planned to seek military honors in the East. Abascanitus, his secretary, was ordered to learn what news came from the wandering Euphrates. The Euphrates was to be crossed at Zeugma, whence the army would turn north, pass over the Araxes, and perhaps conquer regal Bactra or even India. Other forces would invade Mesopotamia; the wealth of Babylon would be theirs. M. Maecius Celer was sent in advance to take charge of the Syrian legions, and his earlier experience in fighting in the East was expected to be of great value.

Although Domitian did not live to carry out this plan, it was not long before Trajan was engaged in a campaign which followed closely along the same lines. Trajan came to the throne in 98. Perhaps it was early in his reign that certain difficulties arose between

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3 McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 119 f., rightly assigns to Vologases I the issues of 78-80 formerly given to Vologases II. This clears up the difficulty of a two-year reign of Vologases II in 78-80 and his reappearance thirty years later, in 111/112, when his real period of power commenced. Cf. Wroth, *Parthia*, p. lvi.

4 Not the ruler of Media (see p. 194), for his earliest coins (see Wroth, *Parthia*, p. lvi) show a youthful and beardless head.


6 Dio Cass. lxvi. 19, 36; Joan. Antioch. (FHG, IV, fr. 104); Zonaras xi. 18. C. Another pseudo-Nero appeared ten years later; to one of the two must refer the *Orac. Sibyl.* iv. 125: 138 f.

7 The early issues of Pacorus after his victory depict the king on horseback receiving a diadem from a Tyche and an untied diadem (?) from a male figure in the rear. This may well be the conquered Artabanus, as E. T. Newell suggests in the forthcoming *Survey of Persian Art*.


9 Statius *Silvae* v. 1: 89. Abascanitus was a friend of Statius, whose poems are filled with thoughts of the proposed expedition.

him and Pacorus over some frontier question, for the Parthian claimed that neither had executed a certain agreement within thirty days and that the Romans had fortified enemy territory contrary to the oracle.\(^{13}\)

The last years of Pacorus appear to have been troubled. His coinage at the Seleucia-Ctesiphon mint contains lengthy gaps, including one of five years (88–93) and one of eight years (97–105). As early as 105/6 a rival king, perhaps Vologases II, made his appearance; and in 109/10 Osroes, the brother or brother-in-law of Pacorus, began to coin money.\(^{14}\) The struggle soon became one between Osroes and Vologases II, for with one exception the dated coinage of Pacorus ceases in 96/97.\(^{15}\)

In 97, during the reign of the emperor Ho, the protector-general Pan Ch’ao sent Kan Ying on a mission to Ta Ch’in (Syria). He reached Mesene, where sailors discouraged his crossing by telling him that the round trip took three months. Here is another indication of the growing importance of this region and of the southern route to Syria. Four years later, in 101, a king of Parthia named Man-ch’iu

\(^{13}\) Arrian Parthica fr. 32. On the placing of this fragment cf. Longden, “Parthian Campaigns of Trajan,” JRS, XXI (1931), 12 f.

\(^{14}\) McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 193.

\(^{15}\) Wroth, Parthia, p. lvi. The issues of 107/8 usually assigned to Osroes are probably not his; possibly they belong to Vologases II, as McDowell, op. cit., p. 231, suggests.

TRAJAN IN ARMENIA AND MESOPOTAMIA 217

(identified as Pacorus) sent gifts of lions and ostriches from Mesene,\(^ {14}\) the latter perhaps brought there by traders from Arabia.

We have further evidence that Pacorus was not dead, however; for Decebalus, the famous Dacian opponent of Trajan, presented the Parthian with a slave named Callidromus, presumably a Greek, taken from the Romans by one of the Dacian leaders. The Greek remained for a number of years with Pacorus, and eventually came to possess a beautiful gem engraved with the figure of the Parthian ruler.\(^ {15}\) Possibly some of the heavy Parthian cavalry had aided the Dacians, for the armored warriors on Trajan’s column that are usually called Sarmatians might also be Parthians.\(^ {16}\) Perhaps it was to this Pacorus that Martial referred in one of his poems as deliberating in Arsacia (Rhages).\(^ {17}\) In 110 Pacorus sold the kingdom of Osroene to Abgarus VII, son of Izates, but the territory may have remained subject to Parthia in some manner. About the same time a ruler named Tiridates was deposed from the Armenian throne by Osroes, and Axidares, one of the two sons

\(^ {14}\) Édouard Chavannes, “Les pays d’Occident d’après le Hou Han chou,” Toung pao, 2. sér., VIII (1907), 178 and n.

\(^ {15}\) Pliny Epist. x. 74.


\(^ {17}\) Martial Epig. ix. 35.3. 

\(^ {18}\) Gutschmid, Geschichte Irans, p. 140.
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army received the act as one of surrender and raised the shout of "Imperator!". Trajan made no move to replace the diadem. When Parthamasiris saw that he was surrounded on all sides, he requested a private conversation, which was granted. This proved no more satisfactory, and the Armenian ruler eventually became angry and left camp, only to be brought back by the legionaries. Trajan then bade him speak out so that all might hear. Parthamasiris explained that he had not been defeated in battle but had come to be invested with the crown of Armenia, just as Tiridates had been. Trajan then declared that he would surrender Armenia to no one and that henceforth it was to be a Roman province.

For promised security Parthamasiris thanked the Emperor, but he complained of his suffering and reproached him for the treatment accorded him. Trajan permitted the Armenian ruler to leave camp, escorted by his Parthian companions and a detachment of Roman cavalry. The Armenians with him, now Roman subjects, were not allowed to depart. As the cavalcade left the encampment, the leader of the Roman cavalry swung his horse against that of Parthamasiris, ordered him to rein in his mount,

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46 Strack, loc. cit., 1, 220 f., believes that the coins inscribed IMPERATOR VII do not represent this acclamation, which he feels must have been unnumbered.


48 Arrian Parthica fr. 38.

49 Arrian Parthica fr. 39.
CHAPTER XI
THE DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE

At the accession of the new emperor, Hadrian, in 117, Roman foreign policy underwent a definite change. Claims to the new provinces which Trajan had attempted to add were dropped, and the frontier was once more to be limited to the old Euphrates boundary. Along with these changes went an increased respect for the ability of the provincial, who began to take more and more part in the government, not only in the provinces but also in Rome itself.

To honor the activities of Trajan in the Orient, Hadrian established the Parthian Games, which were celebrated for many years. Parthia herself was ap-

1 Eutrop. Brev. viii. 6. 2; Spart. Hadrian 5. 3 and 9. 1. These provinces were only partially held, and even so under military control, for from one to three years at the most. Thus they should not be included on maps illustrating the greatest extent of the Roman Empire. A comparable situation would be the inclusion of Asia Minor, Syria, and Palestine on a similar map of the Parthian empire.

2 Cf. the changed attitude in Juvenal Sat. viii. 47 ff. from the scorn of i. 103 ff. and iii. 60 ff. The last is the famous passage on the Syrian Oronites flowing into the Tiber. The accession of Hadrian had taken place about the time book vii was written.

3 Dio Cass. bxx. 3; CIL, i, pp. 377 f., and II, No. 4110 = Dessau 2931. Coins which might indicate military operations by Hadrian against the Parthians are now thought most doubtful. ADVENTIVI AUG. PARTHIÆ S.C. and EXERCITUS PARTIIOCUS legends have been reported, but are now either lost or considered possible forgeries. On the first legend see Mattingly and Sydenham, Rom. Imp. Coin., ii, 456, PARIATHE, note. On the second see ibid., p. 462, note, and Strack, Untersuch. zur röm. Reichsprägung, ii, 148, n. 328, and 233 f., n. 22. EXERCITUS SYRIACUS, Mattingly and Sydenham, op. cit., ii, 428, No. 690, does not relate to any Parthian war.


6 Spart. Hadrian 5. 4, erroneously Parthamasiris; Dio Cass. bxxviii. 33. 2; Julius Dür, Die Reisen des Kaisers Hadrian ("Abh. des archäolo-
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sonally to the eastern frontier, where he managed to settle difficulties which threatened to break out into actual hostilities. Perhaps these were connected with the struggle for power between Osroes and Vologases II, which was almost continuous from the time of the Roman withdrawal under Trajan. Vologases gradually was able to overcome his opponent, who struck no more coins after 128/29. During that year Hadrian returned to Osroes his daughter, who had been captured when Trajan took Ctesiphon, and in addition promised to restore the golden throne. In the years 131–32 another revolt of the Jews was simmering, and there is just a suggestion that the Parthians may have been expected to lend them assistance.

Vologases, who as we have seen had received a part of Armenia at the time of Trajan’s invasion and whose headquarters were probably in northwestern Iran, came into conflict with the Alani about 136.

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7 Spart. Hadrian 12. 5. 8 McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 195.
9 Spart. Hadrian 13. 5; Dür, Die Reisen des Kaisers Hadrian, pp. 61 f.; Gutschmid, Geschichte Iran, p. 146.
10 Dio Cass. lxix. 13. 1 ff.
11 Gutschmid, Geschichte Iran, p. 146. Note that there was no coinage struck in the Seleucia mint during 134–36; see McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 195.

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DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE

In that year, at the insistence of Pharasmanes of Iberia, this tribe from the northeast invaded Albania, Media Atropatene, and finally Armenia and Cappadocia. Probably it was this invasion which is mentioned by Mšíha Zkha. A hostile force, according to his account, was reported to have invaded Gorduene. Rakhbakhōt, governor of Adiabene, and the general “Arshak” (not the king) took command of the twenty thousand foot troops raised in Ctesiphon by Vologases and set out to the threatened area. There a chief named Kīzō managed to trap the Parthians in a valley; they were saved only by the heroic efforts of Rakhbakhōt, who lost his life in the fighting. The Parthians were forced to withdraw, and the way into Mesopotamia was open to the invaders. But fortune favored the Parthians, for at this critical juncture the homeland of the enemy was threatened by another people and they hastened eastward to repel the attack. Either the invaders of Gorduene or their own new foe or perhaps both of these groups must have been Alani. According to another account Vologases resorted to bribery in a vain attempt to stop their advance; but Flavius Arrianus, the historian, who

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was then governor of Cappadocia, finally forced them to halt. Vologases complained to Hadrian against Pharasmanes. But when Pharasmanes was “invited” to Rome, he refused, and insults were exchanged between him and Hadrian.

From the death of Osroes to the end of the reign of Vologases II, A.D. 128/29-147, to judge from comparative numismatic evidence, there was in Iran a king by the name of Mithradates (IV), as his Pahlavi coin legend informs us. His bronze issues display a number of animal types—eagle, reclining humped bull, sheep, heads of horses and bulls. Apparently, however, there are no literary references to his activities.

In 138 Hadrian died and was succeeded by Antoninus Pius, but there were no difficulties on the Parthian frontier which the western historians deemed worthy of mention. In May, 148, appear coins of Vologases III, who must have succeeded to the throne without a struggle and who ruled until about March, 192.

Vologases planned against the Armenians an expedition which some ancient writers claim was forestalled by correspondence from Antoninus. In any event Roman troops were sent to Syria for a Parthian war. Five years later the aged Abgarus VII of Osroene was returned to his kingdom from the east, possibly from independent Bactria or Hyrcania, wheither he may have fled at the time of the Parthian counterstroke against Trajan. At the same time the Hyrcanians and Bactrians sent an embassy to Antoninus, further evidence of internal weakness in Parthia and of the continued independence of these provinces (cf. pp. 240 f.). Parthian weakness is likewise indicated by the Emperor’s refusal to return the throne of Osroes, which had been captured by Trajan.

As to the Far East, Chinese records mention that a Parthian prince who came to China in 148 was among those responsible for the establishment of Buddhism there.

In 161 Antoninus Pius was succeeded by Marcus

\[\text{Capit. Antoninus Pius 9. 6;}\] cf. Aristides Or. sac. i (Dindorf, pp. 453 f.). Cf. also the reference to the preparations for the struggle, Capit. Marcus Antoninus 8. 6.

\[\text{CIL, IX, No. 2457 = Dessau 1076.}\]


\[\text{Victor Epit. 15. 4.}\]

\[\text{Capit. Antoninus Pius 9. 7.}\]

Aurelius, who joined with himself Lucius Verus, the adopted son of the late emperor. Soon after the accession of the new rulers, Vologases launched his long-threatened campaign. C. Sedatius Severianus, Gallic legate of Cappadocia, took the field against him. Severianus was probably following Trajan's route northward into Armenia when he was caught by the Parthian forces under a commander named Osroes and forced into Elegia. There Severianus was besieged, and he and his troops died almost to the last man. Edessa was taken by the Parthians, and a certain Waêl, son of Sahru, was placed on the throne. The Parthians then moved southward and crossed the Euphrates into Syria, where they spread terror everywhere. Since the days of Cicero the Syrians had been friendly with the Parthians, and danger of a general revolt became imminent. Attidius Cornelianus, governor of Syria, was driven back when he attempted to oppose the invaders, and thus the state of affairs became critical. It was decided to send Lucius Verus, the co-emperor, to take command of operations, and to supply him with the best generals Rome could produce: Avidius Cassius, Statius Priscus, and Martius Verus.

Accompanied by Marcus Aurelius as far as Capua, Verus set out for Syria, where he arrived in 162. Not only were troops gathered from the oriental provinces, but three legions were brought from the Rhine and the Danube. These were the I Minervia under M. Claudius Fronto, the II Adiutrix, later under Q. Antistius Adven tus, and the V Macedonica under P. Martius Verus. Parts or all of the following legions

22 PW, art. "Annus," No. 94.
25 Lucian Alex. 27. On the manner of his death cf. Lucian Quomodo hist. 21 and 25. See also Dio Cass. lxxi. 2. 1; Fronto Pris. hist. (Loeb, II, p. 214).
26 Hill, Cains of Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Persia, pp. xcvi f., and Gutschmid, Geschichte Iran., pp. 148 f.
27 Dio Cass. lxxi. 2. 1; Orosius vii. 15. 2.
31 CIL, VI, No. 1377 = Dessau 1098. Cf. also CIL, III, No. 1457 = Dessau 1097; CIL, XIII, No. 8213 (see Klio, XI [1911], 357 f.). Lucian Quomodo hist. 21 probably also refers to this Fronto.
32 CIL, VIII, No. 18893, and Dessau 8977 show the transfer of Adventus to the Adiutrix in A.D. 164. In 162 he was legate of the VI Ferrata.
33 CIL, III, No. 6180; CIL, III, No. 7505 = Dessau 2311. The legion served under M. Statius Priscus also. Of the oriental legions, the I Cyrenaica appears on an undated graffito from Dura-Europos which might belong to this time; see C. B. Welles in Bauer, Rostovtzeff, and Bellinga, The Excavations at Dura-Europos, Fourth Season, pp. 150 f., No. 294.
may have served: III Gallica,^{35} III Augusta,^{36} I Adiutrix,^{37} X Gemina,^{38} and possibly II Traiana.^{39}

The Syrian troops were in miserable shape, most of them ill equipped and some not even familiar with their weapons.^{40} Verus was greatly worried over the desperate situation in which he found affairs.^{41} He made an attempt to treat for terms, but the suggestion was refused by Vologases.\textsuperscript{42} Verus established his military headquarters in Antioch, where he could enjoy the cool shade and swift waters of near-by Daphne. His winters were spent in Laodicea.\textsuperscript{43} There is no record of his taking an active part in the campaign with the exception of a rapid trip to the

\textsuperscript{35} Amm. \textit{Epig.}, 191, No. 48 = Dessau 9492. Probably Lucian \textit{Qua-}

\textit{modo hist.} 21 refers to this legion. Possibly the imaginative account he cites uses the names of troops actually under Cassius in Mesopotamia. A Celtic and a small Moorish contingent are also mentioned by Lucian \textit{loc. cit.} See also Hopkins and Rowell in \textit{The Excavations at Dura-Europos, Fifth Season}, pp. 220 ff.

\textsuperscript{36} CIL, VIII, No. 2375 = Dessau 2306. This should perhaps be referred to the time of Severus.

\textsuperscript{37} CIL, III, No. 6755.

\textsuperscript{38} CIL, VIII, No. 7050.

\textsuperscript{39} On this and on all the other legions see PW, art. “Legio.”

\textsuperscript{40} Fronto \textit{Princ. hist.} (Loeb, II, pp. 206 ff.); Vul. Gall. \textit{Avidius Cassius}

5. 5-7.

\textsuperscript{41} Fronto \textit{Epist.} ii. 2 (Loeb, II, pp. 116-18).

\textsuperscript{42} Fronto \textit{Princ. hist.} 14 (Loeb, II, p. 212); Nazarius \textit{Paneg.} xxiv. 6.

The true estimate of the character of Verus must lie somewhere between the eulogy of Fronto and the vilification of Dio and the Scriptorum.

\textsuperscript{43} Dio Cass. lxxi. 1-2; Capit. \textit{Verus} 7. 3 and \textit{Marcus Antoninus} 8. 12.

Euphrates, said to have been made at the insistence of his staff.\textsuperscript{44}

That stern disciplinarian Avidius Cassius,\textsuperscript{45} a native Syrian, was given command of the army and the task of whipping the legions into fighting shape. Early in 163 Statius Priscus took the offensive and advanced into Armenia. He seized the capital, Artaxa-

\textsuperscript{45} As the evidence presented by F. Cumont, \textit{Fouilles de Doura-Europos} (Paris, 1926), p. 334 and notes, shows.

\textsuperscript{46} CIG, III, No. 6559; Asin. Quadr. fr. 9 (J, II A, p. 449); Fronto \textit{Epist.}

ii. 1 (Loeb, II, p. 144).

\textsuperscript{47} Some Roman candidate would certainly be placed upon the throne shortly after the capture of Artaxata, and the reference in Fronto \textit{Epist.}

ii. 1 (Loeb, II, p. 144), written at the end of the Armenian campaign, clearly belongs about this time. Cf. PW, art. “Sohaeus,” No. 5.

campaign in Mesopotamia. The latter fought an engagement at Sura (Sūriyyah) above Circesium and then threw a pontoon bridge across the Euphrates in much the same manner as would a modern military engineer. Pontoon bridges were collected back of the lines and brought forward above the point to be bridged. They were then floated downstream one by one and anchored at the desired point. The planks which the boats carried were used to join them to the bank or to similar pontoons farther out in the stream. Protection was given to the engineers by archers from a tower mounted on the pontoon nearest the opposite bank. Once across the river Cassius turned southward along the stream, took Dausara and Nicopolion (Kakka), and then won a bloody engagement near Dura-Europus, which thenceforward remained in Roman hands. The victory went to the Romans only after a hard struggle and a pursuit which forced the Parthians into an armistice. Thence the army moved southward to Seleucia, where it was received in a friendly fashion. Shortly afterward, however, upon the violation of some agreement, the metropolis was stormed by the legions, among them the III Gallica, and much of the city was destroyed by fire. Evidence from the excavations at Seleucia suggests that the assault on the city took place about December, 165, and that there was less damage than we have heretofore suspected. Some place the blame for this violation of faith on Cassius; but many others, including the later historian of the Parthian wars, Asinius Quadratus, say that the people of Seleucia were the first to break the agreement. Possibly the pro-Parthian party had gained the ascendancy over the pro-Roman one. Ctesiphon also was taken, and the palace of Vologases was destroyed.

52 Dio Cass. lxxxi. 3.
53 Fronto Epist. ii. 1 (Loeb, I, p. 132); PW, art. "Dausara." There is also a Dausara near Edessa; see Steph. Byz. (Dindorf, p. 148). Victories in "Arabia" are mentioned by Val. Gall. Asidius Cassius 6. 5.
54 Lucian Quomodo hist. 20 and 28. On the identification of this Europus with Dura see F. Cumont, Fossiles de Doura-Europos, p. lii and notes. A dedicatory inscription to Verus was found at Dura; see Cumont, op. cit., p. 173 and p. 410, No. 15.
56 Cf. p. 218.
57 McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 234. Coins were again struck about November, 165, and destruction in the main area excavated was relatively slight.
58 Capit. Verus 8, 4. On the capture of the city see Dio Cass. lxxxi. 2, 3; Eutrop. Brev. viii. 10, 2.
59 Dio Cass. lxxxi. 2, 3; Lucian Bist accusamus 2.
But the campaign was not fated to be a complete success, for while the troops were engaged in looting Seleucia one of the periodical epidemics, probably of smallpox,\(^{64}\) swept over the armies. The situation became so acute that the Romans were forced to retreat and leave behind large quantities of booty.\(^{62}\) Many soldiers died of disease and famine on the homeward road,\(^{63}\) and the remainder carried the scourge into the Roman world, whence it spread rapidly westward until it reached the Rhine and Gaul.\(^{64}\)

Our scanty sources on this campaign might be supplemented if we could place the numerous but scattered references in Lucian. We find, for example: “Arsaces was in the act of slaying his mistress, while the eunuch Arbaces drew his sword upon him; the guards were dragging Spathinus the Mede out from the banquet by the foot, with the lump on his brow from the golden cup.”\(^{65}\)

The Roman withdrawal must have been followed by a rapid Parthian advance over the invaded territory. Sohaemus was evidently driven from the Armenian throne and forced to flee to Syria. Such encroachment could scarcely be tolerated by the Romans, and about 166 another expedition began a march across Mesopotamia. Edessa was besieged, captured, and returned to its former ruler, Ma'nu VIII,\(^{66}\) and the Parthian appointee, Waël, disappears. Next Nisibis, which had refused to ally itself with the Romans, was beset both by them and by the plague.\(^{67}\) One of the Parthian commanders, Osroes, probably the same as the victor over Severianus, saved his life only by swimming the Tigris.\(^{68}\) Perhaps it was this same expedition which pushed on far enough to the east to enable Verus to strike coins with the legend L. VERUS AUG. ARM. PARTH. MAX. MEDIC.\(^{69}\)

In 168, or perhaps a few years later, when Martius Verus\(^{70}\) was governor of Cappadocia, he sent his gens...

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\(^{64}\) Heinrich Haesser, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Medizin und der epidemicen Krankheiten* (3d ed.; Jena, 1875–82), III, 24–33. This plague is mentioned in Chinese records; see Hirth, *China and the Roman Orient*, p. 175. See also Amm. Marcel. xxiii. 6. 24; Capit. Verus 8. 2.

\(^{65}\) Mśiha Zkha, p. 12 (tr. p. 88).

\(^{66}\) Dio Cass. lxxi. 2. 4.

\(^{67}\) Amm. Marcel. xxiii. 6. 23; Capit. Verus 8.


\(^{70}\) Lucian *Quomodot hist.* 15. The reference to the plague dates the siege to about 166; if we place the fall of Seleucia in December, 165. *Cf. CAH*, XI, 347 f.

\(^{71}\) Lucian *Quomodot hist.* 19.

\(^{72}\) Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, III, 328, No. 1455, struck between summer and December, 166; *CIL*, VIII, No. 665 = Dessau 365; Lucian *Quomodot hist.* 30; Capit. Verus 7. 2.

\(^{73}\) *CIL*, III, p. 1991; *CIL*, XI, No. 1024 = Dessau 5503; PW, art. “Martius,” No. 6; Lucius Verus to Fronto ii. 3 (Loeb, II, p. 194).
eral Thucydides\(^{27}\) to restore Sohaemus to the Armenian throne; but the exigencies of the situation evidently forced Verus himself to enter Armenia.\(^{22}\) The garrison which Priscus had left at Caecneopolis was found in a mutinous state, and the Parthian "satrap" Tiridates had stirred up trouble and slain the king of the Heniochi. Tiridates even dared to thrust his sword in Verus' face when the latter rebuked him for his action. Nevertheless Tiridates was not slain but was deported to far-off Britain.\(^{73}\)

The conclusion of this war marks a further step in the decline of Parthia. The territory west of the Khabur River remained permanently a portion of the Roman Empire; Carrhae and Edessa henceforth came more and more under the sway of Roman influence.\(^{74}\)

In 175 Avidius Cassius, the conqueror of Seleucia and Ctesiphon, declared himself emperor while Marcus Aurelius was far away on the Danube. In view of the prospect of civil war among the Romans, Vologases apparently threatened to resume the struggle.\(^{75}\) Doubtless he was dissuaded by the sudden collapse of the revolt and the appearance of the Emperor on the scene.

\(^{27}\) PW, art. "Thukydides," No. 5.


\(^{73}\) Dio Cass. lxxii (lxxii. 14. 2).

\(^{74}\) Hill, Coins of Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Persia, pp. xc and xcvi.

\(^{75}\) Capit. Marcus Antoninus 22. 1. This incident may have occurred earlier,\(^{22}\) about 173.

In September, 191, the aged Vologases was faced with a revolt, for another ruler of the same name, Vologases (IV), began to coin money in the Seleucia mint. Vologases III struck coins again in March, 192, but thereafter disappears.\(^{76}\) In 193, the year of the three emperors, conditions became very unsettled in the Near East. Among the claimants to the Roman throne was Pescennius Niger in Syria, to whom the eastern vassals of Rome and the western dependents of Parthia offered congratulations and troops. Perhaps even Vologases himself was among those who tendered support. At first, when the outlook was bright, these proposals were declined with thanks; later, especially after Septimius Severus, who had been acknowledged emperor at Rome, started eastward, Niger was constrained to seek aid. He sent legates to rulers east of the Euphrates, especially those of Hatra, Armenia, and Parthia. Many of the Roman vassals estimated the situation correctly and made no move. But Barsemius of Hatra, Abgarus of Edessa, and the ruler of Adiabene actually sent troops, and Vologases promised to order the satraps to collect forces.\(^{77}\) After being defeated by Severus,

\(^{76}\) McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 198; Mšiša Zkha, p. 22 (tr. p. 98). Mingana, editor of the latter, on pp. 97 f., n. 1, has attempted on somewhat uncertain grounds to calculate the year in which Vologases IV ascended the throne; he was correct at least in wishing to make it later than the then accepted date 191.

\(^{77}\) Herodian iii. 1. 2 f. and 9. 1 f. Moses Chor. ii. 75 states that Oroses of Armenia announced himself neutral.
Niger attempted to escape to the Parthians but failed. Some of his followers, more successful, gave military advice to Parthia.\(^7\)

While the attention of the Romans was occupied by the struggle between Severus and Niger, Vologases fomented a revolt in Osroene and Adiabene, and troops from these districts besieged Nisibis.\(^7\) After the death of Niger they sent ambassadors to Severus to lay claims before the Emperor by virtue of the aid which they had given him in attacking a city which had sheltered his opponent's sympathizers! They also promised to restore what spoils remained as well as the Roman prisoners. But they refused to surrender the cities which they had captured or to receive garrisons, and they demanded that the Romans completely evacuate that territory.\(^8\)

Late in the spring of 195 Severus crossed the Euphrates and advanced into enemy territory. At Edessa Abgarus IX, ruler of the surrounding area, joined Severus, gave his sons as hostages, and assumed the name Septimius.\(^9\) The next advance was to Nisibis, where Severus established his headquarters. The legionaries suffered greatly on this long march. Perhaps it was at Nisibis that the "Arabians" (of Hatra?) sent envoys with more reasonable offers than they had made before. The offers were refused, since the rulers had not come themselves. Severus remained at Nisibis, but divided his army into various commands under T. Sextius Lateranus,\(^8\) Tib. Claudius Candidus,\(^8\) P. Cornelius Anullinus,\(^8\) Probus,\(^8\) and Laetus,\(^8\) who proceeded to devastate the country round about. Three divisions, those under Anullinus, Probus, and Laetus, were sent to one of the districts of Mesopotamia, 'Arxi (unidentified).\(^8\) Severus received three imperial salutations and took the titles "Parthicus Arabicus" and "Parthicus Adiabenicus,"\(^8\) since he had conquered the middle Euphrates and Adiabene. "Parthicus (Maximus)," he declined,\(^8\) preferring no doubt to assume that honor after the

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\(^7\) Dio Cass. lxxv. 8, 3; Herodian iii. 4, 7 f.
\(^8\) Dio Cass. lxxv. 1, 1 f. (Loeb, IX, p. 194). For Vologases' part in the revolt see Mshia Zchea, p. 21 (tr. p. 98).
\(^9\) Dio Cass. lxxv. 1 f. (Loeb, IX, pp. 194-96).
\(^9\) Herodian iii. 9, 2. These events should probably be placed in the first campaign (contrary to Herodian). See also Spart. Severus 9, 9 and 18, 1; Victor De Caes. 20, 14-17.

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\(^8\) PW, art. "Sextius," No. 27.
\(^8\) PW, art. "Claudius," No. 96; CIL, II, No. 4114 = Dessau 1140.
\(^8\) PW, art. "Cornelius," No. 58.
\(^8\) Possibly the son-in-law of Severus; see Spart. Severus 8, 1.
\(^8\) PW, art. "Laetus," No. 1. He is not yet identified.
\(^8\) Dio Cass. lxxv. 3, 2 (Loeb, IX, p. 198). Hatra, Adiabene, Arbelitis, Asicha near Zaitha, and the Archene of Phrygia Hist. nat. vi. 128 have been suggested as emendations.


\(^8\) Spart. Severus 9, 10; cf. below, p. 260.
capture of the Parthian capital, in the manner of Trajan.

Early in 196, before a direct attack could be made on Parthia, Severus was forced to leave the eastern front by the revolt in Gaul of Clodius Albinus, who was eventually defeated and killed in 197. With the Emperor absent and the Roman power weakened by civil war, Vologases swept rapidly northward through Mesopotamia. Nisibis was saved only by the desperate defense of Laetus, who was besieged within the city, and even Armenia may have been retaken. 69

The Roman successes had apparently crystallized revolutionary sentiment in Iran, and definite action was probably begun by the Medes and the people of Persis 70 before the withdrawal of Severus. Vologases with a large army advanced against the enemy, whom he met in Khorasan. After crossing a small river his forces found themselves surrounded on all sides. Taken by surprise they were forced to abandon their horses and retreat, but the rebels cornered them in the mountains and killed a great number. At last the loyal Parthian troops managed to reorganize, fall upon their pursuers with great fury, and drive them as far as the sea (the Caspian?). Homeward bound after this victory, the army of Vologases met a rebel contingent which had become separated from the

69 Herodian iii. 9. 1 f.
68 The phrase "medes and Persians" used by Mšiḫa Zkha, pp. 21 f. (tr. pp. 98 f.), may mean merely "Iranians."

main body. After two days of hard fighting, the forces opposing the king melted away into darkness during the night, and his troops returned in triumph. 91

Nareses, king of Adiabene, had not only refused to join with Vologases in his eastern campaign but may have shown signs of becoming friendly to the Romans. For these reasons, after his successful conquest, the Parthian monarch invaded Adiabene, destroyed and pillaged several cities, and went home only after drowning Nareses in the Greater Zab. 92

In 197 Severus began preparations for an attack on Parthia itself. Three new legions—the I, II, and III Parthica 93—were created for the coming campaign, and at least a part of the III Augusta must have served. 94 His officers probably included Statilius Barbarus, 95 L. Fabius Cilo, 96 Q. Lollianus Gentianus, 97 and C. Fulvius Plautianus. 98 In the latter part of 197

91 Dio Cass. lv. 24. 4. On the numerous problems which surround these legions see PW, arts. "Legio (Severus)" and "Legio (I Parthica)."
92 Mattingly and Sydenham, Rom. Imp. Coin., IV, 102, No. 91, Prefectio Aug., may celebrate the Emperor's departure.
93 CIL VIII, No. 2975 = Dessau 2306.
94 PW, art. "Statilius (Barbarus)," No. 13.
97 PW, art. "Fulvius," No. 101. In the cases of some of these men there is uncertainty as to whether their service was in the first campaign instead.
Severus and his army left Brundisium and sailed directly to Syria. In the spring he advanced to relieve Nisibis; but the Parthians withdrew before him without a struggle, and Severus, accompanied by the brother of the Parthian king, returned to the Euphrates. There he prepared boats, and partly by this means and partly by marching along the banks the army descended the river. By the fall of 198 the capital city was reached, and both Seleucia and Babylon were occupied after they had been abandoned by the Parthians. Ctesiphon, which apparently put up considerable resistance, was captured and sacked. The Emperor then assumed the title "Parthicus Maximus" after the example of his predecessor Trajan.

Food for man and beast soon became scarce, and no extensive stay was made in the vicinity of Ctesiphon. Again partly by boat and partly by land the army moved up the Tigris. Like Trajan, Severus made an

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88a CIL, VIII, No. 4583, dated in the spring of 198, celebrates a victory over the Parthians.

99 A hoard of coins dated 198/99, probably buried upon the approach of the Romans, strongly confirms this dating; see McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 91, No. 122, and p. 235.

100 Dio Cass. Ixvi (lixv. 9); Spart. Severus 16. On date see Maurice Platnauer, The Life and Reign of the Emperor Lucius Septimius Severus (Oxford, 1918), p. 117, n. 1; cf. also Johannes Hasebroek, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Septimius Severus (Heidelberg, 1921), pp. 113 f.


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attempts to capture Hatra and, like him, was unsuccessful. This first attack in 199 accomplished nothing; not only were many soldiers lost, but the siege engines also were destroyed. Severus therefore retired, perhaps to Nisibis, only to renew the attack again the next year with better food stores and additional engines. The second expedition was scarcely more successful than the first. Foraging parties were cut off; all the new engines, except those designed by a fellow countryman of Dio Cassius the historian, were destroyed; and even the Emperor himself on his lofty tribunal was endangered. The defenders' machines for shooting two arrows at once were so effective and had such range that some of the imperial guards were shot down. Burning naphtha and jars of insects were thrown upon the heads of the attackers. At last a breach in the outer circuit was made. The final rush was checked by Severus, who felt that the legionaries had not shared in the sack of Ctesiphon and wished to retain the rich spoil from the temple of the Sun-god and the numerous slaves for himself. But instead of surrendering, as he expected, the people of Hatra rebuilt the wall in the night. The European soldiers, angered by the events of the day before, refused to advance; and the Syrian troops, when driven to the attack, were slaughtered miserably. At the end of twenty fruitless days Severus

102 Numbers of heavy arrows which must have been shot from engines have been found at Dura-Europos.
left for Syria. During this siege Laetus, who had so successfully defended Nisibis, was killed by the soldiers, perhaps at the Emperor's command. Laetus was extremely popular with the men and was suspected of too high political aspirations.

The Parthian campaign of Severus can scarcely have given satisfaction from either the political or the personal point of view. No territory beyond that already within the Roman sphere of influence was added, the loss of men was heavy, and the expedition closed with the failure at Hatra. On the other hand Parthia suffered greatly. Her western capitals and territory had once more been raided by Roman arms, and the destruction caused must have furthered the rapid decay which was already under way.

Between the departure of Severus from Hatra and the death of Vologases in 207/8 our sources for Parthia fail us. At any rate Vologases IV was followed by his son, the fifth of the same name. In 211 Caracalla became head of the Roman state. Not long after this Abgarus IX of Osroene began to expand the limits of his control over neighboring groups. Caracalla induced the king to pay him a friendly visit and

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193 Dio Cass. lxxvi (lxxv. 11–13). The campaign was commemorated in 197–98 by issues bearing the legend VICT. PARTHICA东亚 (see Mathinglay and Sydenham, op. cit., IV, 105, No. 131, and 108, No. 142(a)) and then and later by numerous other coins celebrating the return of peace.

194 Dio Cass. lxxvi (lxxv. 10); Spart. Severus 15. 6.

195 McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 199.

196 Dio Cass. lxxvii (lxxvii. 12. 2a).
Adiutrix, the II Parthica under Aelius Decius Tricianus, the III Augusta, the III Italica, the III Cyrenaica, the IV Scythica, and some German troops. Caracalla found a pretext for war in the fact that the Parthians had not surrendered to him a certain Cilician cynic named Antiochus and a Tiridates, perhaps an Armenian prince. The cynic Antiochus had found favor with Severus and Caracalla by rolling in the snow to encourage the troops when they were suffering from the cold. Later he became a friend of Tiridates, and together they deserted to the Parthians. When the latter felt it advisable to surrender Antiochus and Tiridates, the Emperor gave up the idea of an immediate advance against the Parthians. Instead he sent Theocritus with an army against the Armenians, while he himself proceeded to Antioch, where he spent the winter of 215/16. Theocritus was severely defeated.

1. JGR, III, No. 1412 = Dessau 8879. On the question of whether or not the legions of this inscription are the I and II Parthica see PW, art. "Legio (Caracalla)" and the articles on those legions.
3. CIL, VIII, No. 2564.
4. CIL, III, No. 14327a.

By 216 Artabanus V had apparently extended his sway over Mesopotamia, but Vologases continued to strike coins at the Seleucia mint for some years to come. While Caracalla was resident in Antioch he sent a request to Artabanus for the hand of his daughter. Perhaps this was an attempt to unite the two great powers of the world, but more probably it was simply an attempt to secure a casus belli. If we follow the contemporary but most untrustworthy Herodian, Artabanus at last consented to the marriage. The Emperor proceeded to the Parthian court in great state and amid much festivity. During the celebration the Romans fell upon the unsuspecting Parthians and slaughtered great numbers of them, though Artabanus managed to escape. Whether or not this somewhat improbable tale is true, Caracalla ravaged a large part of Media, sacked many of the fortresses, took the city of Arbela, and dug open the Parthian royal tombs, scattering the bones.

Artabanus retired into the mountains to gather additional forces, and Caracalla announced his victory to the Senate. Coins with the legend VICTORIA

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120 See McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 200.
121 Dio Cass. lxxix (lxxviii. 1).
122 A hoard of coins found at Ashur suggests that the Romans occupied the city in 216; see MDOG, No. 28 (1905), pp. 34 f., and E. Herzfeld, "Untersuchungen über die historische Topographie der Landschaft am Tigris, kleinen Zab und Gebel Hamrin," Memnon, I (1907), 115 f.
123 Dio Cass. lxxix (lxxviii. 1 f.); Spart. Caracalla 6. 4 f.
PART(HICA) were issued to commemorate the victory. In the spring of 217 Artabanus invaded Roman territory and burned several cities of Beth Aramaya (Mesopotamia). About this time, early in April, Caracalla was assassinated while en route from Edessa to Carrhae, and Macrinus succeeded to the throne.

Since the new emperor felt that the time was not auspicious to continue the war, he returned the captives (of the previous struggle?), laid the blame on Caracalla, and requested peace. Artabanus at once rejected this offer and demanded that the towns and fortresses which had been destroyed be restored, that Mesopotamia once more be returned to Parthia, and that reparation be made for the injury to the royal tombs. Artabanus advanced toward Nisibis, near which city Macrinus met him. The battle was precipitated by a skirmish over a water hole. The cavalry and camel corps of the Parthians were particularly effective, but the Romans had the advantage in close fighting. Caltrops, scattered by the Romans, hindered the movements of the Parthian mounted forces. The struggle lasted for three days, at the end of which the Parthians held the advantage. Perhaps this was because the numerical superiority of the Parthians enabled them to extend their line in a flanking movement until the inferior Roman forces were greatly weakened. Macrinus after the defeat was able to purchase peace at the cost of two hundred million sesterces expended in gifts to Artabanus and influential Parthians. To the Senate the whole affair was represented as a Roman victory, and Macrinus was offered the title of "Parthicus," a title which he felt constrained to refuse. Coins were struck in 218 with the legend VICTORIA PART(HICA).

In June, 218, Macrinus was defeated near Antioch. He sent his son Diadumenianus to seek refuge with Artabanus; but the young man was captured at Zeugma and killed, and the father suffered a like fate near Antioch.

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129 Mšša Zkha, p. 28 (tr. p. 104), clearly means by this name northern Mesopotamia, not the area about Seleucia-Ctesiphon as is usually the case. For the common interpretation see Eduard Sachau, Zur Ausbreitung des Christentums in Asien (APAW, 1919, No. 1), p. 26.

130 Dio Cass. lxix (lxviii. 5. 4 f.); Herodian iv. 13. 3 ff.
The final downfall of the Parthian empire and the rise of the Sasanian power are alike shrouded in that uncertainty which prevails when events in the East do not directly concern the Roman world. The Arabic sources are much better informed on the Sasanian period than on the Arsacid, and unfortunately few Sasanian sources have survived. Archaeological evidence is as yet scanty. About A.D. 212 the revolt which was to end the empire began as a series of petty wars among the kings and princes of the districts about Persis, which was then doubtless independent. Ardashir, son of Papak, son of Sasan, having expanded his territory at the expense of neighboring kinglets, persuaded his father to revolt against his immediate overlord. Papak then assumed the titles “god” and “king” and requested permission of the Parthian “great king” Artabanus to place his son Shapur on the throne of the slain overlord. The demand was refused. Papak soon died, and his place was taken by Shapur, who not long thereafter was killed by a falling wall. Ardashir hastened to Istakhri and was recognized as king.\(^{132}\)

About 220 began a revolt against the authority of Parthia which soon spread both widely and rapidly. Allied to Ardashir were certain of the Medes together with Shahrat of Adiabene and King Domitian of Kerkh Slukh (Kirkuk). The final struggle began in the springtime. In a single year the allies invaded Mesopotamia (Seleucia-Ctesiphon district) and Beth Aramaya (to the north), made an unsuccessful attack on Hatra, then overran Beth Zabdai (Zabdicene), and finally invaded Arzun (Arzanene).\(^{133}\) Vologases V was evidently killed in the fighting, for his last coins are dated 222/23.\(^{134}\) Artabanus V was defeated and killed about 227, and all his territory, including Media, fell into the hands of Ardashir. The remaining Parthian forces fled to the mountains, where Artabanus’ son Artavasdes continued the struggle for some years. Eventually captured, he was executed in Ctesiphon.\(^{135}\)

Thus ended the Parthian empire, which in truth at this late date was no longer a living organism but was a senile wreck whose ruler had no more power than tradition or his individual prowess could command. The arrival of the Sasanidae brought fresh blood and new inspiration to a world which was sorely in need of such stimulants.

\(^{132}\) Mīḥa Ṣkha, pp. 28 f. (tr. p. 105); Dio Cass. lxxx. 3 f. (Loeb, IX, p. 482) agrees very closely with this Syriac source.


\(^{134}\) See his coinage, Wroth, Parthia, p. 251, and the statement by Mīḥa Ṣkha, p. 29 (tr. p. 104), that the young son of Artabanus was killed by the Persians in Ctesiphon. McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 200, assigns tentatively to Artavasdes a coin bearing the late date of 228/29 which he believes was struck at Seleucia.

\(^{135}\) It is planned to treat the rise of the Sasanidae more fully in a future work on their empire.
# Lists of Rulers

## Parthian Kings

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1 Adapted from *CAH, IX*, 1023.